Globalization has increased communication and decreased transportation costs throughout the past decade, enabling countries to prosper and thrive. Why, then has African been left behind? This answer, multifaceted and complex, is crucial to understanding how Africa can develop further and catch up with the rest of the world. It has been proposed that regionalization, economic and political, is the solution for Africa. However, it is impetuous to prescribe a solely regional solution that depends on the security and stability on a domestic level. In the past, regional integration in Africa has been repeatedly met unsuccessfully due to domestic failures. Insecurities on the domestic level must be faced before regional integration can occur. In the past, different regions have pursued different goals of integration based on its own economic interests, rather than as a single vision intended for development of the continent as a whole. There are two possible solutions for Africa to begin the path towards development that is inclusive of quelling the domestic insecurities and also uniting the goals of the continent. First is creating an outwardly oriented economic model that promotes global integration, and second, a more open, democratic polity. Both factors are necessary as political security is a precursor for economic stability and both factors are manifested in the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).

Economic stability is defined as a lack of drastic fluctuations in the macroeconomy and can be characterized by relatively constant output growth and low and steady inflation. In Africa, the policies adopted after colonialism did not allow Africa room for growth or development. Economic policy mainly relied on import-substitution industrialization, focused on the reduction of foreign dependence of goods through local production of industrialized products. This growth strategy dwarfed Africa’s full development by creating inefficient and uncompetitive economies, with stunted private sectors. Currently, the continent is export-dependent on oil and non-oil commodities and is import dependent on manufactured goods, exposing it to adverse terms of trade. Africa’s position in the international market has been to export raw commodities in an unfavorable external trade environment, such as barriers to access in key markets (Qobo, 2007).

In the 1980s and 1990s, with the shift towards neo-classical policies, several African countries had structural reforms, but were not vigorously implemented as they were in other parts of the developing world. These exogenous stabilization programs were not as effective as those that were endogenously driven. Even still, the institutions for the reforms were too weak to sustain them into real developmental factors for the future. The international financial institutions did not foresee the decreased impact of the reforms in countries with weak institutional mechanisms. The lack of strong institutions along with weak political leaders and poor design of the structural adjustment programs are possible explanations as to why there have not been positive results. Similarly, in Europe, regional convergence occurred after difficulty and after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s. It was only implemented when pivotal states such as France and Germany were in favor of the integration (Qobo, 2007).

Another reform agenda is unilateral trade liberalization. It has been argued that opening up a country’s economy too early or too much can be damaging. “The most adverse effects have arisen from the liberalization of financial and capital markets – which has posed risks to developing countries without commensurate rewards” (Stiglitz 210). However, with proper administrative policy measures aimed at strengthening social institutions and infrastructure such as health, education, and social welfare, trade liberalization will have a better chance of resulting in economic gains than a closed economy. A vibrant, growing and thriving economy will increase investor confidence in the short-run and allow for the regional integration to sustain and further development agendas. There should be a sharp distinction between “developmental regionalism as opposed to integration-focused regionalism.” Instead of placing emphasis on trade creation and trade liberalization, developmental regionalism stresses, “removal of supply-side constraints and infrastructure development and views trade in a more integrated manner, linked to domestic developmental challenges” (Qobo, 2007).

A generalized model to integration in Africa does not consider the unique circumstances and completely heterogeneity of each different regional group (Qobo, 2007). For example, regional economic blocks are remnants of the Lagos Plan of Action, which blamed Africa’s economic crisis on the structural adjustment programs of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. It suggested that Africa needed to decrease reliance on raw material extraction, industrialization, global equality in trade relations and an increase in development aid from the international community, but it failed to assume accountability and responsibility to the domestic governments of Africa. Following again, the European model towards regional integration, “African countries should spend less effort and resources on the creation of an unworkable model of regional integration and more on undertaking far-reaching economic reforms and building the competitiveness of their own economies” (Qobo, 2007).

A successful economic model would then require strong governance and financial institutions that includes viable public service infrastructure. It’s this step that will act as a stepping-stone for capacity building in Africa. However, it is futile to attempt regional economic integration, as so many have argued, on the basis of weak domestic foundations. A marker of a successful and thriving state is an active, participative civil society, which can be defined as the total voluntary civic and social organizations and institutions that form the basis of a functioning society, independent of the systemic structure of a state or institutions of the market. Civil society can be understood as non-state actors that are able to voice a divergent political voice. Successful integration and therefore development will require political and macroeconomic reform, underlined by “infrastructure development, attracting and nurturing private economic activities, supporting socially and economically viable indigenous practices, and creating the right climate for the expression of a plural and divergent voice in civil society” (Qobo, 2007).

Sub-Saharan Africa currently lacks the minimal capacities to sustain complex economic policies. A lesson from East Asian countries is that capacity is built through trial and error, essentially a learning process. There must be constant reforms to create competency in a state bureaucracy and its parallel business sector (Akyus and Gore, 2001). A successful example is Botswana and its rare growth rate (7.7% annually between 1965 and 1998) due to good policy and good institution. Quick market liberalization and immediate global integration was not emphasized, but rather, the quality of economic policies and institutions were held more important. Botswana success was tied to its policy of managed openness and of effective use of imported resources. Integration and development stemmed from rational and sensible policy, not one that was quick to fix the problem in the present. This example illustrates the necessity of refocusing the argument, therefore, from one of which policy to how to effectively enact these policies given the quality of economic policies and institutions, which can be defined as governance (Hansohm, 2002). Poor governance within countries is usually characterized by: unaccountable governments, weak civil societies, low levels of freedom and civil liberties, weak enforcement of property rights, and limited role for the rule of law, low levels of cooperation between the public and private sectors, and sets of economic policies not based on systematic application of economic analysis (Hansohm, 2002).

Without capacity to sustain development projects, any initiative would fail. Good governance plays a critical role in the creation of capable states with the capacity to lead development efforts. “It entails the existence of efficient and accountable institutions – political, judicial, administrative, economic, corporate – and entrenched rules that promote development, protect human rights, respect the rule of law, demand a professional and ethical bureaucracy, and ensure that people are free to participate in, and be heard on, decisions that effect their lives” (Hope, 2008).

Governance, in terms of the policies and institutions cannot be functional if they are insecure and lack capacity. The states that are trying to integrate into the global economy suffer for their own internal insecurities. In particular, there are three areas of non-traditional or “human” securities that Africa currently faces: health, political and economic. The three areas of human insecurities that Africa is experiencing are detrimental to its development, politically and economically. The first one, health, is often viewed separate of traditional definitions of security, which included only military power, competence, and deterrence (Burgos 4/13/09). It is this trifecta of insecurities that needs to be addressed simultaneously in order for Africa to further develop.

Currently, the African Union is working on several initiatives from within the active member states that will address the development concerns. In contrast to the failures of the Lagos Plan, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) provides an overarching, unified vision and policy framework for accelerating economic cooperation and integration among African countries. In addition, one of the main aspects that separates it from Africa-wide initiatives for African development such as the Lagos Plan is that it emphasizes and recognizes the necessity of democracy and governance. The three insecurities listed earlier are clearly stated in NEPAD’s overarching goals:
- Promoting and protecting democracy and human rights in their respective countries
and regions, and by developing clear standards of accountability, transparency and
participatory governance at the national and sub-national levels;
- Restoring and maintaining macroeconomic stability, especially by developing
appropriate standards and targets for fiscal and monetary policies, and introducing appropriate institutional framework to achieve these standards;
- Revitalizing and extend the provision of educational, technical training and health
services, with high priority given to tackling HIV/AIDS, malaria and other communicable diseases;
- Building the capacity of states in Africa to set and enforce the legal framework, as
well as maintaining law and order.

The immediate advantage of NEPAD is that it is rooted directly in African democracies as a regional institution and will take existing institutions and better them. NEPAD’s framework recognizes the salient importance of good governance for achieving sustainable development. This framework of developing from within the continent, endogenously, has shown to be much more effective than having an external actor come in with his own interests trying to promote development. This specific plan lends itself to accountability and responsibility on the part of the countries themselves. “For the first time in post-independence Africa, the African leaders themselves are pointing to the shortcomings of the institutional structure over which they preside directly or have much say” (Hope, 2008). Because of its organic roots, NEPAD has been endorsed and supported by the international community, including the G8 countries and multilateral and bilateral organizations such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

This new partnership will require countries to yield sovereignty to a supranational regional body, the AU. More specifically, African leaders have agreed to subject their countries to peer review through the use of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). This is one of the first objective measures in something unique as this peer review. The APRM will cover issues, codes, and standards pertaining to governance and sustainable development (Hope, 2008). Together, APRM and NEPAD have the potential to provide numerous benefits for African development by providing a framework and mechanism for measuring, monitoring and facilitating progress toward good governance and sustainable development.

In conclusion, while regional integration may be an obvious solution to Africa’s deficits, it is only feasible through good domestic governance. And, good governance is predicated on stable and effective institutions and policy. The NEPAD initiative is Africa’s best option because it is the most comprehensive regional proposal grown from the member states that integrates all factors of security, macroeconomic stability and civil society.

Works Cited

Akyus, Yilmaz, and Charles Gore. 2001. “African Economic Development in a Comparative
Prespective.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 25:265-88.

Hansohm, Dirk. “Economic Policy Research, Governance, and Economic Development: The
Case of Namibia.” Better Governance and Public Policy. Ed. Dele Olowu and Soumana
Sako. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2002. 195-213.

Hope, Kempe Ronald, Sr. “Poverty, Livelihoods, and Governance in Africa: Fulfilling the
Development Promise.” New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Kanbur, Ravi. “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD): An Initial
Commentary.” Cornell University, 2001.

Qobo, Mzukisi. “The challenges of regional integration in Africa in the context of globalisation
and the prospects for a United States of Africa.” Institute of Security Studies, 2007.

Stiglitz, Joseph E. “Globalism’s Disconents.” The Globalization Reader. Ed. Frank J Lechner
and John Boli. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008. 208-215.

When the United Nations was created, it was seen as a forum for international relations—a place for nations to come together and strive towards a common goal, a “potential nucleus of a world state” . This aim, however, comes at the price of each nation forfeiting some of its sovereignty. But, by no means does this make the nation-state irrelevant in our globalizing world, as Kenichi Ohmae and Susan Strange have argued, albeit for different reasons. The United Nations, as an international organization and as a society of nation-states, pronounces the relevant, but changing role of the nation-state in a globalizing world.

In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia brought an end to the Thirty Years War. These collections of treaties defined the concept of a nation-state’s sovereignty based on the principles of territoriality and a strictly domestic authority. Following the Peace of Westphalia, individual states were given complete sovereign right to their land and people. It was this Westphalian system that has influenced many polities, such as Europe. However, after 1945, following World War II and signaling the creation of the UN, this idea of sovereignty began to shift as nation-states were willing to transfer some of their sovereign rights to a supranational institution. It is this erosion of interdependence and Westphalian sovereignty that began to overturn the realist models of international relations. However, the institutional form of the UN, built around the concept of a post WWII and bipolar world may be obsolete now that each day looks less like 1945. When political domain supersedes the nation-state, through the rapid use of technology and markets, there is a space created for International Organizations—such as the UN.

The UN may be the closest existing form of a truly international society. It aims at creating a more horizontal organization—the General Assembly being an example of this. In the GA, where all 192 countries are represented, each state is granted one vote, “favor[ing] coalitions of the small and powerless” . A simple majority is required of all member states in order for resolutions to pass. Using this organ of the UN as an example, the GA seeks to redefine the power of the state by allowing every state one vote, independent of GDP, internal politics, or etc. Ideally, this would allow a more wholesome agenda, with nations such as Vanuatu and Tuvalu able to impact the topics at hand. This is misleading, however, because GA resolutions are generally “recommendations” to member governments and the Security Council. Said resolutions are non-binding, “but up to a point the norms of the institution make opposition look more harshly self-interested and less defensible” . Even in the GA, where the playing field is most even amongst the member states, participation is still entirely dependent on the action of its member states “to enforce compliance with its resolutions and sanctions against misbehaving states” , only countered by the general stigma of a nation-state seeming self-absorbed.

It is only the SC that has the power to make binding decisions, given that the member states have agreed. The SC is comprised of 15 members, five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and 10 non-permanent rotating members (Currently this includes: Belgium, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Croatia, Indonesia, Italy, Libya, Panama, South Africa and Vietnam). The five permanent members hold veto on all substantive matters. This means that China, France, Russia, the UK and the US must agree upon all resolutions or statements issued by the SC. This can result in a lot of stalemates, further reinforcing the power of each of the five nation-states.

In refining their identity, the UN is sometimes misrepresented as simply a group of 192 member states, as opposed to a cohesive organization with similar goals. “… All sorts of collectives have learned to organize their claims around a nation-state identity, and the consolidation of the UN system has provided a central form for identity recognition” thus further allowing for the UN as an IO to gradually take on an identity of their own as a whole . An IO, the UN, is simply a venue within which nation-states interact. Once an IO is introduced and credited this power, there is a possibility that the centrality of the norm of sovereignty and the nation-state could be weakened. If an IO successfully develops an identity, it is predicated on the fact that it has developed specific interests and incentives—layers of authority, new venues for cooperation and conflict and new channels of influence. Each IO sets up its own rules, norms and procedures. However, this power to potentially weaken the norm of sovereignty, as illustrated with the example of the SC, the hard power, as defined by the power to demand and/or take action to regulate resolutions passed, rests in the votes of the Big Five or the five permanent members—the nation-states that have endlessly reasserted their own sovereignty.

The effectiveness of the UN has been questioned for this very reason. Aside from the concentration of the power in the Big Five, the UN is financed through voluntary contributions from its member states, with the US contributing 22.00% of the UN budget, Japan at 16.624%, Germany at 8.66%, the UK at 6.13% and France at 6.03% in 2006 . Through this voluntary donation system, the UN puts itself at risk to be highly influenced by these states, further reinforcing the still evident power of the nation-state. However, it must be noted that the exclusion of Russia and China from the top donors list (they do not even make the top 10) shows that the dynamics of the nation-state are changing. These Big Five countries were chosen at a volatile time in our world, following the war, when military power was the dominant power. Now, it is evident that the role of the nation-state is shifting relative to this 1945 timeframe and that economic might may take the reins.

This does not dismiss the clout of a powerful military though. The UN does not maintain its own military, instead forces are voluntarily provided by member states. While realism is becoming less relevant now, we cannot deny the fact that the nation-state is still the only power that can make war and tax, thus retaining some power as a sovereign nation. This begs the question—“is the UN paralyzed by its own diplomatic culture?” Diplomacy is the currency of the UN, but not of the world and of nation-states. When this gap is rectified, the UN will be infinitely more effective. The power of the nation-state is still the driving force at the helms of international relations. The UN and other IOs are not a substitute for the nation-state; IOs are not autonomous and therefore, there is a finite domain of authority that must be wrestled with. However, the nation-state is in good company, as more and more actors are becoming prominent players in the field, namely Non-Governmental Organizations. IOs and NGOs seek to redefine norms that have been set dating back to the Westphalian system.

While nation-states have not lost their significance despite these new players, that does not necessarily equate to a deadlock in progress. International organizations such as the UN are trying to alter the course of international relations and politics by providing a global forum for issues to be discussed. “The UN mandate from the beginning was much broader than the issues of security and peace … [becoming] the focal point for global governance in many domains” . After all, it was after gaining legitimacy on a global arena through the World Health Organization, a sub-committee of the UN, that female genital cutting was recast as a human rights issue, not exclusively a feminist issue.
When we weaken the analytical importance of borders, how does this affect our traditional way of understanding world politics? The conundrum lies in the role of the nation-state and the emerging IOs and NGOs. If IOs and NGOs perform the functions of the nation-state, does that mean one is replacing the other? If a large part of the success that IOs and NGOs have accrued is due to advances in the market allowing access to information technology, does that threaten the nation-state? If trade allows culture to be transmitted and translated throughout the world, does this threaten the nation-state? Does globalization undermine the nation-state? No, not necessarily. The idea of a nation-state still persists and is still desirable, e.g., Palestine. The United Nations is an essential facet to understanding globalization because it highlights the shifting power of the nation-state and allows for these dynamic interactions between the three pillars.