Globalization has increased communication and decreased transportation costs throughout the past decade, enabling countries to prosper and thrive. Why, then has African been left behind? This answer, multifaceted and complex, is crucial to understanding how Africa can develop further and catch up with the rest of the world. It has been proposed that regionalization, economic and political, is the solution for Africa. However, it is impetuous to prescribe a solely regional solution that depends on the security and stability on a domestic level. In the past, regional integration in Africa has been repeatedly met unsuccessfully due to domestic failures. Insecurities on the domestic level must be faced before regional integration can occur. In the past, different regions have pursued different goals of integration based on its own economic interests, rather than as a single vision intended for development of the continent as a whole. There are two possible solutions for Africa to begin the path towards development that is inclusive of quelling the domestic insecurities and also uniting the goals of the continent. First is creating an outwardly oriented economic model that promotes global integration, and second, a more open, democratic polity. Both factors are necessary as political security is a precursor for economic stability and both factors are manifested in the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).

Economic stability is defined as a lack of drastic fluctuations in the macroeconomy and can be characterized by relatively constant output growth and low and steady inflation. In Africa, the policies adopted after colonialism did not allow Africa room for growth or development. Economic policy mainly relied on import-substitution industrialization, focused on the reduction of foreign dependence of goods through local production of industrialized products. This growth strategy dwarfed Africa’s full development by creating inefficient and uncompetitive economies, with stunted private sectors. Currently, the continent is export-dependent on oil and non-oil commodities and is import dependent on manufactured goods, exposing it to adverse terms of trade. Africa’s position in the international market has been to export raw commodities in an unfavorable external trade environment, such as barriers to access in key markets (Qobo, 2007).

In the 1980s and 1990s, with the shift towards neo-classical policies, several African countries had structural reforms, but were not vigorously implemented as they were in other parts of the developing world. These exogenous stabilization programs were not as effective as those that were endogenously driven. Even still, the institutions for the reforms were too weak to sustain them into real developmental factors for the future. The international financial institutions did not foresee the decreased impact of the reforms in countries with weak institutional mechanisms. The lack of strong institutions along with weak political leaders and poor design of the structural adjustment programs are possible explanations as to why there have not been positive results. Similarly, in Europe, regional convergence occurred after difficulty and after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s. It was only implemented when pivotal states such as France and Germany were in favor of the integration (Qobo, 2007).

Another reform agenda is unilateral trade liberalization. It has been argued that opening up a country’s economy too early or too much can be damaging. “The most adverse effects have arisen from the liberalization of financial and capital markets – which has posed risks to developing countries without commensurate rewards” (Stiglitz 210). However, with proper administrative policy measures aimed at strengthening social institutions and infrastructure such as health, education, and social welfare, trade liberalization will have a better chance of resulting in economic gains than a closed economy. A vibrant, growing and thriving economy will increase investor confidence in the short-run and allow for the regional integration to sustain and further development agendas. There should be a sharp distinction between “developmental regionalism as opposed to integration-focused regionalism.” Instead of placing emphasis on trade creation and trade liberalization, developmental regionalism stresses, “removal of supply-side constraints and infrastructure development and views trade in a more integrated manner, linked to domestic developmental challenges” (Qobo, 2007).

A generalized model to integration in Africa does not consider the unique circumstances and completely heterogeneity of each different regional group (Qobo, 2007). For example, regional economic blocks are remnants of the Lagos Plan of Action, which blamed Africa’s economic crisis on the structural adjustment programs of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. It suggested that Africa needed to decrease reliance on raw material extraction, industrialization, global equality in trade relations and an increase in development aid from the international community, but it failed to assume accountability and responsibility to the domestic governments of Africa. Following again, the European model towards regional integration, “African countries should spend less effort and resources on the creation of an unworkable model of regional integration and more on undertaking far-reaching economic reforms and building the competitiveness of their own economies” (Qobo, 2007).

A successful economic model would then require strong governance and financial institutions that includes viable public service infrastructure. It’s this step that will act as a stepping-stone for capacity building in Africa. However, it is futile to attempt regional economic integration, as so many have argued, on the basis of weak domestic foundations. A marker of a successful and thriving state is an active, participative civil society, which can be defined as the total voluntary civic and social organizations and institutions that form the basis of a functioning society, independent of the systemic structure of a state or institutions of the market. Civil society can be understood as non-state actors that are able to voice a divergent political voice. Successful integration and therefore development will require political and macroeconomic reform, underlined by “infrastructure development, attracting and nurturing private economic activities, supporting socially and economically viable indigenous practices, and creating the right climate for the expression of a plural and divergent voice in civil society” (Qobo, 2007).

Sub-Saharan Africa currently lacks the minimal capacities to sustain complex economic policies. A lesson from East Asian countries is that capacity is built through trial and error, essentially a learning process. There must be constant reforms to create competency in a state bureaucracy and its parallel business sector (Akyus and Gore, 2001). A successful example is Botswana and its rare growth rate (7.7% annually between 1965 and 1998) due to good policy and good institution. Quick market liberalization and immediate global integration was not emphasized, but rather, the quality of economic policies and institutions were held more important. Botswana success was tied to its policy of managed openness and of effective use of imported resources. Integration and development stemmed from rational and sensible policy, not one that was quick to fix the problem in the present. This example illustrates the necessity of refocusing the argument, therefore, from one of which policy to how to effectively enact these policies given the quality of economic policies and institutions, which can be defined as governance (Hansohm, 2002). Poor governance within countries is usually characterized by: unaccountable governments, weak civil societies, low levels of freedom and civil liberties, weak enforcement of property rights, and limited role for the rule of law, low levels of cooperation between the public and private sectors, and sets of economic policies not based on systematic application of economic analysis (Hansohm, 2002).

Without capacity to sustain development projects, any initiative would fail. Good governance plays a critical role in the creation of capable states with the capacity to lead development efforts. “It entails the existence of efficient and accountable institutions – political, judicial, administrative, economic, corporate – and entrenched rules that promote development, protect human rights, respect the rule of law, demand a professional and ethical bureaucracy, and ensure that people are free to participate in, and be heard on, decisions that effect their lives” (Hope, 2008).

Governance, in terms of the policies and institutions cannot be functional if they are insecure and lack capacity. The states that are trying to integrate into the global economy suffer for their own internal insecurities. In particular, there are three areas of non-traditional or “human” securities that Africa currently faces: health, political and economic. The three areas of human insecurities that Africa is experiencing are detrimental to its development, politically and economically. The first one, health, is often viewed separate of traditional definitions of security, which included only military power, competence, and deterrence (Burgos 4/13/09). It is this trifecta of insecurities that needs to be addressed simultaneously in order for Africa to further develop.

Currently, the African Union is working on several initiatives from within the active member states that will address the development concerns. In contrast to the failures of the Lagos Plan, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) provides an overarching, unified vision and policy framework for accelerating economic cooperation and integration among African countries. In addition, one of the main aspects that separates it from Africa-wide initiatives for African development such as the Lagos Plan is that it emphasizes and recognizes the necessity of democracy and governance. The three insecurities listed earlier are clearly stated in NEPAD’s overarching goals:
- Promoting and protecting democracy and human rights in their respective countries
and regions, and by developing clear standards of accountability, transparency and
participatory governance at the national and sub-national levels;
- Restoring and maintaining macroeconomic stability, especially by developing
appropriate standards and targets for fiscal and monetary policies, and introducing appropriate institutional framework to achieve these standards;
- Revitalizing and extend the provision of educational, technical training and health
services, with high priority given to tackling HIV/AIDS, malaria and other communicable diseases;
- Building the capacity of states in Africa to set and enforce the legal framework, as
well as maintaining law and order.

The immediate advantage of NEPAD is that it is rooted directly in African democracies as a regional institution and will take existing institutions and better them. NEPAD’s framework recognizes the salient importance of good governance for achieving sustainable development. This framework of developing from within the continent, endogenously, has shown to be much more effective than having an external actor come in with his own interests trying to promote development. This specific plan lends itself to accountability and responsibility on the part of the countries themselves. “For the first time in post-independence Africa, the African leaders themselves are pointing to the shortcomings of the institutional structure over which they preside directly or have much say” (Hope, 2008). Because of its organic roots, NEPAD has been endorsed and supported by the international community, including the G8 countries and multilateral and bilateral organizations such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

This new partnership will require countries to yield sovereignty to a supranational regional body, the AU. More specifically, African leaders have agreed to subject their countries to peer review through the use of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). This is one of the first objective measures in something unique as this peer review. The APRM will cover issues, codes, and standards pertaining to governance and sustainable development (Hope, 2008). Together, APRM and NEPAD have the potential to provide numerous benefits for African development by providing a framework and mechanism for measuring, monitoring and facilitating progress toward good governance and sustainable development.

In conclusion, while regional integration may be an obvious solution to Africa’s deficits, it is only feasible through good domestic governance. And, good governance is predicated on stable and effective institutions and policy. The NEPAD initiative is Africa’s best option because it is the most comprehensive regional proposal grown from the member states that integrates all factors of security, macroeconomic stability and civil society.

Works Cited

Akyus, Yilmaz, and Charles Gore. 2001. “African Economic Development in a Comparative
Prespective.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 25:265-88.

Hansohm, Dirk. “Economic Policy Research, Governance, and Economic Development: The
Case of Namibia.” Better Governance and Public Policy. Ed. Dele Olowu and Soumana
Sako. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2002. 195-213.

Hope, Kempe Ronald, Sr. “Poverty, Livelihoods, and Governance in Africa: Fulfilling the
Development Promise.” New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Kanbur, Ravi. “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD): An Initial
Commentary.” Cornell University, 2001.

Qobo, Mzukisi. “The challenges of regional integration in Africa in the context of globalisation
and the prospects for a United States of Africa.” Institute of Security Studies, 2007.

Stiglitz, Joseph E. “Globalism’s Disconents.” The Globalization Reader. Ed. Frank J Lechner
and John Boli. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008. 208-215.

Heinze, From Scarcity to Abundance, 1990
Heinze’s topic focused on immigrants as consumers, but emphasized Jewish immigrants in particular. Heinze set out to explore why there was such a disparity between the consumption patterns of Jewish people who have immigrated to the United States versus those who have not. His hypothesis involves how Jewish immigrants interpret the values of the United States, link that to their religious past to view “America as a haven” (196) and assimilate accordingly. Thus, as Heinze concludes, Jewish immigrants are more absorbed in wanting to adopt US values, particularly consumerism, to more quickly adopt to their new home. Heinze mainly uses statistics and observations, whether his own or those noted in cultural histories.

I think Heinze’s point is very valid when he states that “this unique attitude of Jews toward America motivated them to view items of consumption as foundation stones of American identity” (197). In this essay, the idea of consumption is exclusive to material accumulation as a wealth marker so much as it is an identity marker. The identity of the Jewish immigrants were set in an unstable foundation as they were forced to flee to the US, which in turn, forced them to rely on America as their new foundation, thus adopting new values.
While most social studies are based on generalization and always leave room for outliers, I think one of the finer points of Heinze’s is the mention of language. Language is clearly one of most distinctive markers of a culture and identity, and one of the hardest. In illustrating the hesitation to invest a lot of work into learning a language, the next option would be to adopt American values of excessive consumerism because goods were more accessible and more easily acquired than a language was.

Gladwell, The Coolhunt, 1997
In The Coolhunt, Gladwell investigates what is “cool”, how it’s determined and by whom it is determined. Gladwell follows two coolhunters, Baysie Wightman and DeeDee Gordon, who are trying to revive Reebok’s cool factor. The bulk of this essay is Gladwell’s observations of Baysie and DeeDee’s work with Reebok, with a few examples of the spread of hybrid seed corn and the Hush Puppies revival sprinkled in between to illustrate diffusion research. He categorizes his findings with three rules of cool. Gladwell’s first rule highlights the ephemeral nature of cool—as soon as something is cool, it is no longer cool. But, the rule in itself poses a problem: it is impossible to observe what is cool. The second rule is that “[you] can’t just manufacture cool out of thin air” (7) —the company cannot manufacture something cool. Finally, the third rule of cool is that “[cool] can only be observed by those who are themselves cool” (11). Similar to the second rule, this one marks the exclusive cycle of those who are cool determining what is cool.

I enjoyed this article because it is a very accurate conjecture of how the fashion industry works today, nearly twelve years after this original article was written. While I do agree with a majority of Gladwell’s points, namely the fleeting nature of cool and the diffusion research studies, I have to disagree with his overly exclusive conclusion of what is cool, particularly rule three. With the influx of technology and shared information via the Internet, sites such as TheSartorialist.com features “average” people dictating what is cool. However, it can be argued that the person/people behind the website are actually very influential fashion insiders and that with that comes the ability to dictate what is cool. I believe that because of how the Internet has evolved, there is no general idea of cool—there are too many niche markets and too many diverging interests that I don’t think any person would confine herself/himself to just one.

Abramowitz, The X/Y Factor, 2007
This is the most recent article of this week’s readings. In this article, Abramowitz does a very similar exploration to Gladwell’s in The Coolhunt; however, Abramowitz is set in the 21st century era of the Internet. Much like the data determining what was cool to who Baysie and DeeDee collected and categorized then sold, the woman Abramowitz follows, Jane Buckingham, produces a manual that is sold to companies about what kids in this era considered cool. While Gladwell’s article focused on “cool” as a commodity, Abramowitz’s article focuses on the generational differences that reinforces who thinks what is cool and how that is determined.

Abramowitz notes the underlying force that separates Generation X and Generation Y—what she called “wages of technology” (1). With recent technological innovations, our lives have become so integrated and we have been so connected that oftentimes the line separating reality and virtual reality are blurred. This causes a problem to marketers, as they do not know how to advertise in such a way to captivate those Generation Y kids.

I think this article was well written and reported, but I do not think Abramowitz posed anything new or thought provoking. To me, the marketers who attend her conference should take note from Heinze’s article and instead of trying to market to a general audience, to target specific populations. Also, I believe that similar to how the Jewish immigrants adopted American consumerism because they were trying to adopt an identity, businesses should market an identity, a lifestyle instead of a pure commodity. The best example of this selling of an “identity” instead of a simple commodity would be Apple Computers. They have branded their computers with a very “cool”, for lack of better word, identity; it is the preferential computer of the artsy folks. Their marker of success is being competitive despite significantly higher costs.

Hayles, An Excerpt from: How We Became Posthuman Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics
In this excerpt, Hayles uses several people and experiments to delineate the idea of intelligence in post-humanism. She begins by introducing a famous game proposed by Alan Turning, in which the subject is given contact to two entities through a computer and he is supposed to distinguish which is the man and which is the woman through posing questions. Failure to correctly identity the two means that machines can think, Turing contended. Hayles uses this example to illustrate disembodied intelligence, that is, intelligence is separate from the embodied reality. In this case, verbal performance is used to guise the intelligence of the machine and the human. Therefore, intelligence is a discrete variable.

This example segues into Hayles mention of Hans Moravec who proposed, “ that human identity is essentially an informational pattern rather than an embodied enaction” (Hayles). Moravec composed his own test as well; one that Hayles appropriately calls the Moravec test. This test, while similar to the Turning test in that it also used the idea of disembodied intelligence, Moravec’s test extended this idea, claiming that a human being’s brain can be uploaded into a machine as information therefore becoming human.

In Hayles final example, she introduces Andrew Hodges, who believes that “verbal performance cannot be equated with embodied reality” and questions Turning’s implications of including gender. The inclusion of gender does nothing, Hodges argues, and that it [gender was merely a red herring. Through these examples, Hayles concludes that in that initial acceptance of participating in Turing’s test, the participant subjects himself to become a part of the machine itself. Using the pre-established tests and their results supported her argument well and makes her points distinct and easy to follow.

Hayles, Liberal Subjectivity Imperiled: Norbert Wiener and Cybernetic Anxiety
In this chapter, Hayles continues to explore cybernetics. She uses a wealth of data: direct quotes from notable people though mainly from Weiner, theories of nature such as thermodynamics, analogies, mathematics and science. This wide array of data types makes her argument more wholesome and provides many lenses through which to view her argument.

She begins with the burgeoning idea that the boundaries of what it means to be human is not given, but rather constructed by humans; therefore, it is not something that naturally exists. This is particularly alarming because it implies that these certain boundaries can be applied to other things, namely the machine. If the tool is a part of the man who uses it, then can an information system become part of man? Hayles mentions Weiner’s idea of liberal humanism, which included “a coherent, rational self, the right of that self to autonomy and freedom” as one of the foundations. However, in this light, can a machine own itself it can think?

Hayles transitions, rather slowly, as she sets up the analogy framework that she will use to illustrate the relationship between entropy and information. If close systems tend to move from order to randomness, more randomness equals more information. However, “if entropy and information are inversely related, the more information, the less entropy” and vice versa. The implications of this are still a bit ambiguous. If an observable pattern of information is required to successfully store onto a machine, then is randomness is not desirable?

The most notable and lucid example Hayles provides is her mention of Weiner’s distinction between Augustinian and Manichean opponents. If the Augustinian opponent plays honorably and that opponent is nature, the scientist observing nature will ultimately hold an advantage. This chapter was not an enjoyable read because not only were the ideas dense, the ideas posed were very esoteric and required a considerable amount of background reading.

Rorty, A Literary Postscript: Characters, Persons, Selves, Individuals
In this essay, Rorty examines the subtle differences between a character, figure, person, self, individual and presence. Given the essay’s title, Rorty’s main source of data is from literature, though she also uses examples from religion and philosophy. She hypothesizes that it is through these differences that we can discern the changes in conception of ourselves based on political and social constructs at the given time. This adaptive nature that we have constructed has, in some way, affected our biological base as well.

To understand Rorty’s argument, however, the reader must simplify the intricate details that distinguish character from figure from person and so on. A character is static in that its traits are defined and any response thereafter given a circumstance is because of its innate nature; therefore, choice is irrelevant. Characters’ physical and psychological traits have the closest relation. Figures, however, are characters serving the purpose of discovery and idealization. It is with the figure that inner and outer person is presented. It is when we include choice that a person is defined. After choice is attributed and other external factors, such as property, “define the right and power of agency of choice” persons become selves. The transformation between self and individual is similar in that it reiterates the notion of rational choice. Arriving at the final phase, an individual represents the fusion between nature and culture.

Rorty’s argument is laid out well in that it traces the history of the conception of character and brings back this notion of character to explain how it has been socially constructed. In her final example, Rorty uses Venusians and robots as concrete entities to be analyzed. If Venusians and robots exhibited the same functions as “we” (humans) do, are they persons? Also, if we do treat them similarly, are we Venusians and robots? I disagree that the traits specific to an individual are not so mutally transferable.

Rosecrance, The Rise of the Virtual State (Chpt. 1 A New Kind of Nation)
In this chapter, Rosecrance focuses on the process of the “shrinking nation—in function, if not in geographic size” (3). To do this, he emphasizes the increasing importance of financial markets and the mobility of capital over solely acquiring territory. Rosecrance asserts that when the acquisition of territory becomes too costly for an individual country, the country then reverts to trade-oriented strategies. Therefore, the idea of power has evolved from military might to economic might. Technology has enabled the trading state to become the “virtual state,” which encompasses increasing overseas production and global commodity chains. Though Rosecrance emphasizes the declining power of the nation-state and decreasing importance of territory, he stresses, “states require a certain minimum of territory to conduct political business” (4). His primary question is how this process is in effect and how politics and economics can reconcile and balance each other within the framework of the nation-state in a globalizing world.

In analyzing the political effects, Rosecrance mainly relies on historical facts, citing events such as the multiple genocides in Sudan, Bosnia, and Rwanda to highlight the nation-state’s reluctance and even inability to act. He also uses events such as the Industrial Revolution to highlight Fordism to transition into a more fragmented commodity chain. Rosecrance also makes use of the Gross Domestic Product indexes of particular countries to support his idea of increasing international trade over purely domestic production. He also uses ideas from notable economists such as Paul Krugman to illustrate “The New Trade” theory, which focuses on path dependence.

Rosecrance presents his ideas and lays out his data to support his hypothesis very well. He presented opposing points, such as the one from Paul Ehrlich and refuted it while supporting his hypothesis. His inclusion of further emphasis on education to cultivate our human capital was insightful and accurate. Rosecrance’s final point about the nation-state being similar to a broker state, negotiating “directly with international factors of production to solve domestic economic problems” clarified his claim that the nation was not in decline, but rather, its role in the international sphere and in a time of globalization is being further redefined (19).

Sassen, Global Networks: Linked Cities (Chpt. 12 Digital Amsterdam by Patrice Riemens and Geert Lovink)
This chapter focuses on the Digital City or DDS De Digital Stad, “an Amsterdam-based free community network” and its effect on the Amsterdam Public Digital Culture at the DDS’s onset in the “broader new media culture” in the 1990s up to the current developments and its recent privatization (327). Riemens and Lovink explore how the DDS, which started as an open social movement, enabling communication within a large audience, to become a “private enterprise as a result of management buyout” (340).

The DDS was originally created as a proxy for government officials to communicate with its citizens but has since been restructured, in part by independent hacker groups. The issue with the DDS, as Riemans and Lovink contend, is its large scope and the inability for anyone to have a complete overview of the system itself. Also, the rapid exchange and lack of permanence led to “people express[ing] opinions, then disappear[ing] without trace” (333). Adaptation to this virtual community was slow and ineffective; therefore, it lacked further necessary funding.

The authors mainly use user data from the system itself along with statistics about technology usage at the time and various accounts from publications on the subject. The interviews from the individuals involved in the private sector helped elucidate the imperative behind the self-governed system to “an executive model of governance” (339). The very last paragraphs were very effective in outlining the constant struggle between culture and markets.

Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo
This particular excerpt was uncommon in that it was more based on theory and was not as factual because it was an epilogue and epilogues usually serve to clarify and assess the author’s argument. Sassen reflects on the idea of global cities, namely New York, London, and Tokyo and how this idea has been influenced and affected by globalization.

Her hypothesis is global cities have become and important unit in the dynamic of territorialization (345). She separates her argument into six concerns regarding global cities: the construct and model, financial industries’ weight, producer services as an indicator of global city status, relations among cities, question of inequality, and whether it is in global cities that there will be the emergence of a new spatial order. Sassen mainly relies on previous scholarly journals and theory to conceive her idea of global cities. In addition to the epilogue, she has attached an appendix with further data on the specific countries, which was useful to reference when her points are vague and difficult to understand. However, while the additional data was useful, Sassen herself did not point to the information there directly in her analysis.
However, the bulk of this epilogue is Sassen defending her points against counter-arguments, such as the one proposed by Castell (349) and Scott et al. (352). The problem with these explanations is that she references other chapters without disclosing enough information for a clear understanding of her argument and the counter-argument. Because of this, a lot of her conclusions are inconclusive. Sassen realizes this, stating, “We need more studies to specify this” and “It is very difficult to establish for how much it accounts” (355, 362). Her final statement on contributing to the scholarship in the global cities study by “go[ing] out on a theoretical limb” is truthful and accurate of her efforts.

Ito, Introduction: Personal, Portable, Pedestrian, 2005
In this brief introduction, Ito primary topic is cellular technologies, specifically the “keitai” or cellular phone in the context of Japan. He examines the impacts of the keitai versus other technological systems, such as the Internet, on the social history of communication through cultural studies, sociological surveys and ethnography. Ito argues that the shift towards mobile technologies such as the keitai is in fact exogenous and not the product of a “‘universal’ technology (the mobile phone) encountering a ‘particular’ national culture (Japan)” (Ito 12).
He does this by illustrating the different ways that keitai has been incorporated and domesticated into a wide range of spheres and paradigms. The movement from a business tool model to a tool for personal communication is paramount to this understanding. Ito compares keitai usage to usage of the Internet and concludes that cellular communications bridged the offline life with the online life, creating “intimate spheres [that] are even more pervasively present” (Ito 11). This shift in the framework relied more on interaction, rather than interface, highlighting the experience provided by technologies, not just the service itself.

Ito’s argument is fluid because he provides quantitative and qualitative data. Specifically, he uses comparisons between the US and Japan in adopting new cellular technologies and the usage of said technology from different demographics in Japan. In addition to the quantities data, Ito provides “a range of approaches including diary-based study, … visits and interviews in domestic space and observations in public places” further elucidating on the shift from the intended business model to the personalized domestic model. Overall, his attempt to define Japanese keitai usage in different historical, social and cultural contexts is effective because he recognizes the mutual exchange and influence from within and outside of Japanese society.

Lipsitz, World Cities and World Beat: Low-wage Labor and Transnational Culture, 1999
Lipsitz topic is the exchange between world cities and music, specifically focusing on Miami and Los Angeles (Lipsitz 213). He examines the impact of immigrant capital and labor in “transforming Miami and Los Angeles into global cities” (Lipsitz 213).

Lipsitz primarily relies on statistic heavy data to illustrate how the geographical locations of Miami and Los Angeles helped construct their identity as attractive to immigrants, due to the heavy manufacturing based economies (Lipsitz 214, 226). Because of this heavy influx of immigrant capital and labor, the culture of both cities began to change “the meaning of all racial identities, … [and] cultural networks” (Lipsitz 216). One of these changes was music, the most easily exchanged cultural artifact. He argues that hip-hop in these communities were used as an economic tool. Lipsitz claims that the usually obscene language used in 2 Live Crew’s songs empowered women is highly questionable. However, his realization that hip-hop created another genre, not just an “immigrant subculture” is on point. Especially now, due to globalization, there have been many cultural imports that are not exclusive to their native country, but instead, have become a hybrid of both cultures—similar to the dancehall in Miami and the banda craze as “a fusion that leaves both musical styles transformed” (Lipsitz 224).

Lipsitz’s argument is structured and logically follows; therefore, it is effective. A large part of this is due to this centralization of two areas and specific trends that immigrants have brought with them to Miami and Los Angeles. He is right in that globalization is indeed a catalyst to changing racial and national identities and one of the most global things is music.

Thompson, Machines, Music, and the Quest for Fidelity: Marketing the Edison Phonograph in America, 1877-1925, 1995
Thompson’s article focuses the historical process in which the Edison phonograph became popular. His concentration on the marketing of the phonograph is on tone-tests as a way to illustrate “the real thing” and “reality itself. When the phonograph was introduced, it was regarded as a machine that could replicate live musical sessions through recordings. However, “modern artists strove not for realism but for ‘reality itself,’ and consumers of modern art sought not realistic reproductions but ‘the real thing’” (Thompson 133). The initial aim was fidelity—a way to reproduce the sounds that was faithful to the original composition.

The phonograph also failed when there was no standard to evaluate its performance, causing it to fail and reframed with a “business model” (Thompson 137). As its purpose changed, the phonograph was more accessible in private homes. Thompson illustrates the transition through data from the Tone Test campaigns, which was a demonstration to advertise for the Edison phonograph. If the audience, who was presumably aficionados of music, found the sounds to be realistic—the phonograph passed the test of replicating “the real thing.”

Thompson’s analysis in the marketing strategies was exhausted and detailed. His conclusion that “ by effacing the mechanism of the machine, by blurring the distinctions between public and domestic music, by personalizing the musical reproductions, and by cloaking them in all the traditional trappings of an elite musical culture, the tone test campaign enabled people to equate listening to records with listening to live music and thus to turn phonograph reproductions into ‘real music’” encapsulates his argument effectively and succinctly. The same way that the consumers personalized the music was the same way that the immigrants in Miami and Los Angeles personalized theirs and created an identity around it.

Endelman, “Just a Car”
In this essay, Endelman explicates the importance of the study of material culture. She contends that the information and history that can be found through objects of the past serve to complement and supplement the written history. Museums were the first institution to give purpose and significance to objects, albeit at the time, it was more to display anomalies than history itself. Now, the museum and the study of material culture have evolved to become a fundamental pillar of historical narrative. “Objects don’t lie and artifacts in museums could be approached on their own terms, unmediated, and without interpretation” (251).

She uses various types of data to support her argument, fittingly, two objects: the chair President Lincoln was sitting on when he was assassinated and the car that President Kennedy was riding in when he was assassinated. Both objects existed in the collective memory of the public and “acquired value, meaning, and an association with a historic event that was not recognized at the time” (248). However, because these two objects evoked dark and uncomfortable memories, they were hidden. These two uses of data were paramount to making her argument about objects – because she used two objects and embedded meaning to them in the context of history.

Endelman not only argued for the study of material culture as one mean, but as a study to enrich the current historical texts. Oftentimes, when paired with past accounts, an object can expand on, in the case of the Kennedy car, “conclusions about American society and its relationship with its presidency—from the open accessibility of a convertible to the armored fortress of a tank” (250). Due to Endelman’s framing the study of material objects as a supplement, rather than the only lens to view history, she is more persuasive. While written texts are compiled by an inescapably biased human being, “objects can tell the truth” (251).

Cooper, Memories of Colonization
Cooper’s primary topic is his reflections and analysis of a conference the National Archives of Senegal organized, the “Colloquium Commemorating the Centenary of French West Africa” in Dakar. He hypothesizes that the “categories and units of analysis that shape the colonial archives also shape other forms of historical preservation and memory” (257). In other words, the attempt to differentiate the colonial history of both France and Africa was futile because both of their histories are inextricably linked and are continually being affected by one another.

The data Cooper gathers is mostly from scholarly writers and historians at the event with him at the time. This gathering was supposed to be a “once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to showcase the international importance of National Archives” (260). However, this is where he has his contentions. Through various presentations, the overall tone of the conference was not one of recognizing the importance of both narratives, separately and as a whole, but rather, dissolution and “assimilation into ‘relationships’ with their inevitable ‘difficulties’” between the French colonialists and colonized Africa and ultimately rejecting the archival work (260).

Cooper believes, justifiably, that this idea of a “common” history disrespects the work of historians and sociologists. It was a paradoxical act of the colonizer redefining history to justify its “mission civiliastrice”, which was accepted by the colonized in order for the Senegalese to have their “independent struggle” (262). This tandem relationship between the two countries is baffling because it fails to challenge the “master narrative of state building, whether the centrality of the state was a consequence of colonial tutelage or nationalistic mobilization” (263).

The analysis that Cooper provides alongside transcripts of the presentation work nicely together in illustrating his discontents about the conference.

Burds, Ethnicity, Memory, and Violence
Burds main topic in this essay is the problem with “double memory,” a term used to describe the collective memory of an ethnic group and “identify the phenomenon of distinct and often contradictory accounts of divergent ethnic groups who share the same history” (466). The task of reconciling these two accounts, especially in extremely violent times, is Burds’ question.

He collects a lot of data from writers, physicians, governmental workers and soldiers. While these accounts are viable, Burds recognizes the shortfall of historian’s motives – “[they will be] impugned no matter how diligent the research, or how conscientious his or her efforts to be fair” (466). Ironically, this concession strengthens his argument.

One of the paramount concerns that Burds mentions in regards to double memory is the dynamic nature of ethnicity itself. “[They] adapt to changing circumstances” therefore, double memory is even more complex. “Just as memories are reshaped by ethnicity, and by intervening contexts, their correction or reinterpretation is profoundly inhibited and controlled by the selective construction, destruction, and reconstruction of archives” (469). If archives are ultimately shaped by the person writing it, then this fact compounded with the fact that ethnic collective memories are constantly shifting and adapting, makes the collection of those memories twice as difficult.

The data Burds uses is oftentimes unnecessary, especially the vivid accounts of the tortures. He could have made his point about the transition from tainted accounts of Soviet police abuse into “institutional memories of alleged documented evidence of rebel terror” without the uncomfortable first-hand accounts. However, again recognizing his shortcomings as an archivist being a “‘the person who knows how to destroy’,” Burds inclusion of the horrific scenes is understandable and can be accepted as an attempt to further illustrate his argument.