What’s the home page of your browser? Whatever it is, that window is a subtle window to your accumulated interests or your way to get the news and, by a long shot, maybe even your appreciation for a faster load time.

Those interests we’ve amassed, the collective memory and general knowledge bank, have been developed and delivered from the top down. Facts used to be taught in school by rote. If someone deemed something important, it was important.

Now, the Internet is killing general knowledge. Why memorize state capitals and stanzas when you can look them up?

OK, I lie. I don’t think the Internet is killing general knowledge. I do think that there is a balance between the skills to look up a fact and knowing the fact itself.

Strive for that balance because general knowledge and the collective memory constantly change. Once cultural references are relegated to cultural relics.

Take, for example, Minerva – no, not Professor Minerva McGonagall or the Half-Life 2 mod – Minerva, the Roman goddess of wisdom who is, coincidentally, on our state’s seal. Minerva was born fully grown from the brain of Jupiter, similar to how California moved quickly from independence to annexation by the United States.

In contrast, we all have a long history, including Minerva and California, which we have to objectively view in its entirety to determine and develop our own beliefs.

I was listening to “This I Believe,” a broadcast on National Public Radio based on Edward R. Murrow’s radio show by the same name in the 1950s. Naturally, I wondered what it was that I believed.

When we were young, it was easy to have convictions. The sky was blue. Rocks were hard. In contrast to the absolute way we thought about people, events and ideas when we were younger, everything is more nuanced now – nuanced by our different backgrounds, interests and circumstances.

I believe in change – not of the Barack Obama variety, just change.

We are perpetually depositing a coin in our knowledge bank every day. Learning facts is not a means to an end; it’s a continuous cycle. It’s a lifelong accumulation of experiences, the people you’ve met and, of course, things you were taught.

The inclination to scapegoat the Internet for the dumbing down of society is easy. When the Egyptian god Thoth invented writing and offered it as a gift to the king of Egypt, the king said the “invention will produce forgetfulness” and “(equip) your pupils with only a semblance of (wisdom), not with truth.” When Johannes Gutenberg invented the printing press, the same cries were heard.

Now, just as Thoth and Gutenberg had before, the Internet has dissolved and democratized the whole structure of knowledge.
The fountain of information has exploded – take advantage of it. We have the power to change how we digest knowledge, how we get the news and what news we get. We are no longer vassals ingesting information fed to us.

I had a humbling conversation with a columnist the other day. While deliberating on a column idea, I hastily suggested he write about the search for knowledge in the study of philosophy, to which he retorted, “OK, that’s weaksauce. The search for knowledge is an imperative of every major.”

So, my modest advice to you:

• Read a newspaper everyday, preferably this one because it’s free and it’s about you.
• Question everything and think critically. Don’t just passively absorb everything you’re taught – not because what you’re reading or hearing is wrong, but because you will stand to gain more by knowing why or why not.
• Talk to everyone, but listen more.
• Be curious. Always.

Knowledge is important because you cannot think critically and creatively without knowing a wide range of basic facts. How we connect and manipulate those facts are the foundations of thinking – and that’s what we’re here to learn.

You have the power to achieve that balance between knowledge and skill. You can change the home page of your browser.

And if you must know, my home page is blank – I appreciate the faster load time.

The CSS file is available here and the live Burkle Center website can be found at http://international.ucla.edu/burkle.

Before 1648 and the Peace of Westphalia, states were grouped in geographical blocks, with a focal point usually being the capital of the empire. However, following the treaty, which recognized the territory and sovereignty of each state, the conception of the state shifted to bounded states. At the time, this conception of territory and state sovereignty encouraged individual states’ development over exploitation of larger areas, or colonialism . Now, the implications of that treaty are still very relevant. It suggests that each state is responsible for its own actions, not to other states, successfully paving the way for the breakdown of collective action. This is a problem when states are confronted with global problems such as global warming. This issue in particular is extremely important given the consequences and costs of inaction – high human costs and essentially an unlivable Earth. A graphic by the CNA Corporation, a think tank funded by the Pentagon , illustrates the impact and probability of impact of the Cold War compared to climate change. For the Cold War, there is on “X” in the quadrant, indicating that while the impact was high (nuclear war), the probability was low. However, in the quadrant for climate change, there are two “X’s” showing that both the probability and impact are high . Regardless of states’ decisions to act politically, everyone will ultimately pay a cost that is greater than any short-term economic gain. In all three perspectives, states’ decisions are constrained by a variety of factors, including economic cost, competing interests and simply, the difficulty of collective action – as evidenced by the tragedy of the commons game. If national interest continues to drive states’ actions under realist theory, then the collective action necessary to combat climate change will not be achieved. However, if there is a readjustment of national interest to include climate change, states’ interest will be redefined to include the common interest, as identity theory suggests, and finding a solution to global warming will ultimately become a rational choice for the state, solving the tragedy of the commons.

Global warming has been researched and analyzed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a group of 2,000 climate change experts. Since the late 1990s, the IPCC has reported about the causal relationship between human activity, or the increase in greenhouse gases, and global warming, with 90 percent confidence . The effects found are disastrous: ocean levels will rise and entire towns will sink, crops and wildlife will not survive, and weather patterns will cause unnatural and frequent disasters . However, the costs are not limited to the environment. If the arctic ice continues to melt, there could be a resource scramble for its methane-rich polar caps, and the possibility of war to gain access to the drastically shorter trade routes . In addition, global warming could threaten already unstable regions, such as Afghanistan and many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, and further exacerbate the crises already in place. Clearly, these consequences will dramatically affect, and possibly threaten, the national security of many countries, including that of the United States.

All of the aforementioned effects will also prompt mass migration of populations due to unlivable environments. Not only will wage and economic prosperity be pull factors for these immigrants, but also quality of life and habitat. However, realists tend to object liberalization of immigrant flows unless it offers a national advantage. In this circumstance though, forced immigration will not contribute to any gain in relative national power and may even be a burden. Even the liberal perspective does not favor immigration unless there is a specific opportunity to match labor skill and economic need . Also, the common rules and standards that liberals desire to govern immigrant flows will be eroded as the cost of protecting borders comes at the expense of human life.

In the same way that states’ actions are constrained by the global economy in that it needs to accepts the costs of integration or be left behind, states’ action in regards to global warming is also constrained by the immediate economic opportunity costs of addressing an abstract and distant problem. This directly conflicts realist theory stating that the states’ primary interest is to advance their own power, economically and politically. If the start of the Industrial Revolution marked the exponential increases in greenhouse gases, then globalization and the increased transport and trade of goods have continued to contribute to that increase. However, if the increase of greenhouse gases is proportional to increased trade and thereby, economic growth, then each state will, rationally, oppose to sacrifice its own growth. The states’ decision remain a compromise between the international community’s desires and its own. The result, therefore, will always be a decision between what is necessary to combat global warming, which is the global interest, and what is less than necessary, or the desire of the state to fulfill its own interests – or simply, the result will always be less than what is necessary . Therefore, it is in the interest of each state, especially the developed countries, to redefine how global warming will affect their political and economic interests.

Since climate change is a global problem, it is a problem of the commons, which can be demonstrated through the tragedy of the commons game, similar to the prisoner’s dilemma quadrants. What is specific to the commons in regards to global warming is the effect of time and enough iterations. There will ultimately be a tipping point, where the commons reverts to tragedy and the consequences listed previously, such as mass forced immigration and environmental disasters, will be irreversible. In essence, the goal is to play the game – before it is too late. The commons, viewed through the realist perspective, will focus on the states’ desire to increase their own power, at the expense of combating climate change – thereby, states eliminate themselves in the game by trying to survive. The quest for power will prevail according to the realist perspective. Through the liberal perspective, similar to the process in the prisoner’s dilemma, negotiations can be made through incremental changes in reducing emissions by each state signaling to the other states that they are collaborating or until both actors recognize the common goal and continue until they’ve both lowered emissions to the necessary levels. Finally, the commons in regards to the identity perspective proposes simply analyzing the intentions of other states and whether their decisions will benefit itself or the good of the collective.

The problem of the commons directly applied to addressing and combating global warming is more complex and shows the obvious disagreements between perspectives. As Nau suggests, realists emphasize the scarcity of resources and competition, and individualized solutions, not blanket proposals . A single set of rules will not suffice because it implies a single hegemon will govern. This will fail in the realist perspective due to the states’ unwillingness to give up their own sovereignty and the clear imbalance of power. The realist perspective warrants two options: to consume as much fuel to further economic growth, or if technology to reduce emissions is in demand, to produce more technology to lower emissions and gain economic power that way. In both situations, the main goal is to seek more power. However, if the latter option is emphasized, power can be reconceptualized to include combating global warming. Therefore, lowering emissions and greenhouse gases will be included in the states’ national interest, and will be a rational choice.

The liberal perspective again proposes the use of international institutions to seek broader solutions by emphasizing absolute gains. However, the problem lies in the two groups that gain and lose through cooperation and each group will advocate the use and disregard of said international institutions. The biggest struggle for liberals in proposing international institutions to overcome the collective action problem is to bypass each state’s individual interests for the common goal – this is where the liberal perspective and realist perspective come at direct odds with one another. Identity theorists propose ideas that transcend borders, specifically the idea of sustainable development.
The identity perspective complements both the liberal and realist perspective separately in combating global warming. First, through the realist perspective: changing the idea of national interest and power to conform to the desire to reduce emissions and greenhouse gases by including it into national security policy makes it a possible policy solution. By emphasizing the economic benefits of technological innovation to lower emissions, the state may pursue it as part of its national interest to gain power. Second, through the liberal perspective: ideas are built upon language and language is one of the easiest signals to send in the international arena. To successfully complete or avoid the commons tragedy, each state needs to signal to one another that it is willing to compromise and collaborate. By changing the language and redefining the identity of each states’ goals in regards to global warming, the incremental changes can continue until the goal is reached. Overall, the necessary force to escape the tragedy of the commons is collective action, which is not probable in the near future. Instead, a very plausible alternative is a redefinition of the goal to include national interest and the pursuit of power, incorporating both realist and identity perspectives.

The problem with proposed solutions is the concentration on the liberal perspective and organizing successful international institution and consensus to address the problem. Take, for example, the problem with nuclear disarmament. It has been discussed for years on end and there is still no solution or drastic progress on the proposal. This is because realism prevails over liberal desires to institute global and blanket policies that threaten the balance of power. The liberal perspective in both the commons and the prisoner’s dilemma requires successful signals to continue the incremental changes, but changes in the international arena are clouded and often difficult to interpret. Therefore, global warming, like nuclear disarmament, will not be solved through liberal proposals, or at least, not in the near future. The liberal process is a very long process of action and legitimizing. Unlike nuclear disarmament, global warming is time-sensitive. This is why the Kyoto Protocol, which groups developing countries, or Non-Annex I countries, such as Burkina Faso and China, which have very different emission outputs, together will not succeed. However, the cap and trade proposals already enacted by several cities and countries, which emphasize market incentives and economic benefits, have been relatively more successful. It, again, embeds incentives for power within the national interests, but in an effort to combat a global problem.

The solution must be a fusion of both realist and identity perspectives. The liberal approach to prescribe a blanket solution to all has failed or made minimal progress in the past, as evidenced by the Kyoto Protocol. Waiting for an international institution to find consensus among all states is not a practical solution to a problem that is time sensitive. Similar to the lofty goal of complete disarmament, universal agreement to cut carbon emissions will not come into fruition unless there is an international body that is willing and able to regulate and penalize those who defy the rules. Instead, by reimagining global warming as a security threat to everyone, we change the definition and consequently the identity of the problem to each state. By taking preventative measures now, despite short-term costs, the state will still be acting within its self-interest and continue seeking power, congruous to the realist perspective. It is through these two strategies that states will have a chance against global warming. In a globalizing world, global problems require transnational state cooperation, but this will only be achieved if it is in each states’ national interest.

Globalization, as suggested by Nau, is the process of consolidating into a single global economy (273). Nau uses Thomas Friedman’s The Earth is Flat as the framework for the history of globalization and the shift from absolute power to institutions to individuals (277). However, the working definition of globalization I will be using is a bit different. I will focus on the effects of transport costs under globalization. Reduced transport costs allow cheaper goods to be bought from foreign countries, increasing overall absolute global trade. There are seven distinct areas of policies that a government can enact that directly affect its relationship to the globalized world economy (328), but I will focus exclusively on trade policy and how a state can manipulate trade policy in response to globalization. The decisions on a systemic level result from compromises and resolutions on the domestic level. While globalization has allowed for increased specialization and the division of labor, states still have the ability to control domestic policy in its interest. However, the extent to which a state can respond to international economic pressures is dependent on its capacity and willingness to compromise or be left behind in a globalizing world. The actions of both developed and developing states are ultimately enhanced and constrained, respectively, in a globalized economy.

Since globalization has dramatically decreased transport costs, which has induced high levels of trade, countries are forced to make decisions regarding trade policy often. Trade policy affects the prices of goods and services through taxes, subsidizations or quality restrictions, which can be broken down into two categories: tariffs and non-tariff barriers (332). It is also a border policy, that is, it is a foreign economic policy that only affects goods, services, capital and people as they cross national boundaries (328). This is particularly important because it recognizes the sovereignty of each state and its power to make decisions within its borders and its own country. Tariffs are taxes on goods and services crossing borders such as customs fees and duties, export taxes or subsidies while non-tariff barriers are policies that do not concern price, such as quotas, embargoes or qualitative restrictions (333).

Despite these policy abilities, not all countries have the capacity to enact all of these regulations. The difference in the capacity to implement trade policies is most evident between developed and developing countries. From a realist perspective, which emphasizes relative distribution of power and favorable security conditions, a country may enact a unilateral tariff to secure its alliances or its own hegemony, or use economic sanction such as an embargo to punish adversaries. While a developed country such as the United States has the ability to place an embargo, a trade policy that effectively reduces imports or exports to zero (333), on another country either as a political or economic tool, a developing country such as India may not have the same luxury because the relative cost will be greater. It may risk disengaging from the global economy. The non-tariff barriers, such as quality restrictions, are also constrained by different states’ capacity. Qualitative regulations include restrictions based on the safety, health, labor standards, and environmental concern of traded products (333). Similar to developing countries’ high costs of enacting tariff trade policies, refusing a multinational corporation for low labor standards, for instance, comes at a high cost – possible investment into the country. From a liberal perspective, countries would depend on the strengthening of global rules and institutions that regulate trade policy, such as the World Trade Organization, where security and economic policies are separate and sanctions are not instruments of security policy. Developing countries particularly depend on the function of institutions such as the WTO to limit international payment balances. For example, countries are currently in the ninth round of trade talks, the Doha Round (362). This round of trade talk will eventually influence domestic policy based on agreements during the talk. Countries’ national policies will be coordinated through negotiations during the Doha Round, as they were during the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round (361-362). Therefore, all decisions on a domestic level are a compromise between the country’s citizens and the state’s interest in the globalized economy.

Globalization, with its low transport costs, has allowed for increased specialization and the division of labor between many countries. Specialization enables individuals or countries to gain proficiency and be the most effective at their individual task – which paves the way for comparative advantage. This process of specialization and division forms what are called Global Commodity Chains. An example of a well-known GCC is Nike, which distributes its production, marketing and other functions across several countries. Comparative advantage, which is based on relative advantage within a country, is only effective between two countries if they are able to freely specialize then trade their products. Again, domestic governments still have the option to control these trade policies through the mechanisms mentioned above because specialization is predicated on a free market. With the onset of increased market liberalization in the past few decades, there was an increase in specialization and trade based on comparative advantage. From a realist perspective, specialization within a regional bloc, also called geoeconomics, increase its relative power and economic competition. However, from a liberal perspective, free-trade policies and stronger enforcement of trade agreements through international institutions are favored over unilateral decisions such as sanctions. Liberals saw this time of liberalization as an opportunity for non-zero sum gains, or absolute gains, and the strengthening and development of global institutions. Again, there is a wide discrepancy in the ability of developed versus developing countries to react to market liberalization. The cost of a country liberalizing could come at the high cost of not protecting its infant industries, or developing industries that require protection to get started, as several Latin American countries did (351). Realists would support these protectionist policies because they are indifferent to how individuals manage their domestic economic policy and favor the inward-first approach; while, liberals would favor market integration and an outward-first approach. The decision of countries to respond to globalization’s increased specialization is largely dependent on the country’s capacity and relative cost of the decision.

Works Cited

Nau, Henry R. (2009) Perspectives on International Relations, 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press Inc.

Globalization has increased communication and decreased transportation costs throughout the past decade, enabling countries to prosper and thrive. Why, then has African been left behind? This answer, multifaceted and complex, is crucial to understanding how Africa can develop further and catch up with the rest of the world. It has been proposed that regionalization, economic and political, is the solution for Africa. However, it is impetuous to prescribe a solely regional solution that depends on the security and stability on a domestic level. In the past, regional integration in Africa has been repeatedly met unsuccessfully due to domestic failures. Insecurities on the domestic level must be faced before regional integration can occur. In the past, different regions have pursued different goals of integration based on its own economic interests, rather than as a single vision intended for development of the continent as a whole. There are two possible solutions for Africa to begin the path towards development that is inclusive of quelling the domestic insecurities and also uniting the goals of the continent. First is creating an outwardly oriented economic model that promotes global integration, and second, a more open, democratic polity. Both factors are necessary as political security is a precursor for economic stability and both factors are manifested in the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).

Economic stability is defined as a lack of drastic fluctuations in the macroeconomy and can be characterized by relatively constant output growth and low and steady inflation. In Africa, the policies adopted after colonialism did not allow Africa room for growth or development. Economic policy mainly relied on import-substitution industrialization, focused on the reduction of foreign dependence of goods through local production of industrialized products. This growth strategy dwarfed Africa’s full development by creating inefficient and uncompetitive economies, with stunted private sectors. Currently, the continent is export-dependent on oil and non-oil commodities and is import dependent on manufactured goods, exposing it to adverse terms of trade. Africa’s position in the international market has been to export raw commodities in an unfavorable external trade environment, such as barriers to access in key markets (Qobo, 2007).

In the 1980s and 1990s, with the shift towards neo-classical policies, several African countries had structural reforms, but were not vigorously implemented as they were in other parts of the developing world. These exogenous stabilization programs were not as effective as those that were endogenously driven. Even still, the institutions for the reforms were too weak to sustain them into real developmental factors for the future. The international financial institutions did not foresee the decreased impact of the reforms in countries with weak institutional mechanisms. The lack of strong institutions along with weak political leaders and poor design of the structural adjustment programs are possible explanations as to why there have not been positive results. Similarly, in Europe, regional convergence occurred after difficulty and after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s. It was only implemented when pivotal states such as France and Germany were in favor of the integration (Qobo, 2007).

Another reform agenda is unilateral trade liberalization. It has been argued that opening up a country’s economy too early or too much can be damaging. “The most adverse effects have arisen from the liberalization of financial and capital markets – which has posed risks to developing countries without commensurate rewards” (Stiglitz 210). However, with proper administrative policy measures aimed at strengthening social institutions and infrastructure such as health, education, and social welfare, trade liberalization will have a better chance of resulting in economic gains than a closed economy. A vibrant, growing and thriving economy will increase investor confidence in the short-run and allow for the regional integration to sustain and further development agendas. There should be a sharp distinction between “developmental regionalism as opposed to integration-focused regionalism.” Instead of placing emphasis on trade creation and trade liberalization, developmental regionalism stresses, “removal of supply-side constraints and infrastructure development and views trade in a more integrated manner, linked to domestic developmental challenges” (Qobo, 2007).

A generalized model to integration in Africa does not consider the unique circumstances and completely heterogeneity of each different regional group (Qobo, 2007). For example, regional economic blocks are remnants of the Lagos Plan of Action, which blamed Africa’s economic crisis on the structural adjustment programs of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. It suggested that Africa needed to decrease reliance on raw material extraction, industrialization, global equality in trade relations and an increase in development aid from the international community, but it failed to assume accountability and responsibility to the domestic governments of Africa. Following again, the European model towards regional integration, “African countries should spend less effort and resources on the creation of an unworkable model of regional integration and more on undertaking far-reaching economic reforms and building the competitiveness of their own economies” (Qobo, 2007).

A successful economic model would then require strong governance and financial institutions that includes viable public service infrastructure. It’s this step that will act as a stepping-stone for capacity building in Africa. However, it is futile to attempt regional economic integration, as so many have argued, on the basis of weak domestic foundations. A marker of a successful and thriving state is an active, participative civil society, which can be defined as the total voluntary civic and social organizations and institutions that form the basis of a functioning society, independent of the systemic structure of a state or institutions of the market. Civil society can be understood as non-state actors that are able to voice a divergent political voice. Successful integration and therefore development will require political and macroeconomic reform, underlined by “infrastructure development, attracting and nurturing private economic activities, supporting socially and economically viable indigenous practices, and creating the right climate for the expression of a plural and divergent voice in civil society” (Qobo, 2007).

Sub-Saharan Africa currently lacks the minimal capacities to sustain complex economic policies. A lesson from East Asian countries is that capacity is built through trial and error, essentially a learning process. There must be constant reforms to create competency in a state bureaucracy and its parallel business sector (Akyus and Gore, 2001). A successful example is Botswana and its rare growth rate (7.7% annually between 1965 and 1998) due to good policy and good institution. Quick market liberalization and immediate global integration was not emphasized, but rather, the quality of economic policies and institutions were held more important. Botswana success was tied to its policy of managed openness and of effective use of imported resources. Integration and development stemmed from rational and sensible policy, not one that was quick to fix the problem in the present. This example illustrates the necessity of refocusing the argument, therefore, from one of which policy to how to effectively enact these policies given the quality of economic policies and institutions, which can be defined as governance (Hansohm, 2002). Poor governance within countries is usually characterized by: unaccountable governments, weak civil societies, low levels of freedom and civil liberties, weak enforcement of property rights, and limited role for the rule of law, low levels of cooperation between the public and private sectors, and sets of economic policies not based on systematic application of economic analysis (Hansohm, 2002).

Without capacity to sustain development projects, any initiative would fail. Good governance plays a critical role in the creation of capable states with the capacity to lead development efforts. “It entails the existence of efficient and accountable institutions – political, judicial, administrative, economic, corporate – and entrenched rules that promote development, protect human rights, respect the rule of law, demand a professional and ethical bureaucracy, and ensure that people are free to participate in, and be heard on, decisions that effect their lives” (Hope, 2008).

Governance, in terms of the policies and institutions cannot be functional if they are insecure and lack capacity. The states that are trying to integrate into the global economy suffer for their own internal insecurities. In particular, there are three areas of non-traditional or “human” securities that Africa currently faces: health, political and economic. The three areas of human insecurities that Africa is experiencing are detrimental to its development, politically and economically. The first one, health, is often viewed separate of traditional definitions of security, which included only military power, competence, and deterrence (Burgos 4/13/09). It is this trifecta of insecurities that needs to be addressed simultaneously in order for Africa to further develop.

Currently, the African Union is working on several initiatives from within the active member states that will address the development concerns. In contrast to the failures of the Lagos Plan, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) provides an overarching, unified vision and policy framework for accelerating economic cooperation and integration among African countries. In addition, one of the main aspects that separates it from Africa-wide initiatives for African development such as the Lagos Plan is that it emphasizes and recognizes the necessity of democracy and governance. The three insecurities listed earlier are clearly stated in NEPAD’s overarching goals:
- Promoting and protecting democracy and human rights in their respective countries
and regions, and by developing clear standards of accountability, transparency and
participatory governance at the national and sub-national levels;
- Restoring and maintaining macroeconomic stability, especially by developing
appropriate standards and targets for fiscal and monetary policies, and introducing appropriate institutional framework to achieve these standards;
- Revitalizing and extend the provision of educational, technical training and health
services, with high priority given to tackling HIV/AIDS, malaria and other communicable diseases;
- Building the capacity of states in Africa to set and enforce the legal framework, as
well as maintaining law and order.

The immediate advantage of NEPAD is that it is rooted directly in African democracies as a regional institution and will take existing institutions and better them. NEPAD’s framework recognizes the salient importance of good governance for achieving sustainable development. This framework of developing from within the continent, endogenously, has shown to be much more effective than having an external actor come in with his own interests trying to promote development. This specific plan lends itself to accountability and responsibility on the part of the countries themselves. “For the first time in post-independence Africa, the African leaders themselves are pointing to the shortcomings of the institutional structure over which they preside directly or have much say” (Hope, 2008). Because of its organic roots, NEPAD has been endorsed and supported by the international community, including the G8 countries and multilateral and bilateral organizations such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

This new partnership will require countries to yield sovereignty to a supranational regional body, the AU. More specifically, African leaders have agreed to subject their countries to peer review through the use of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). This is one of the first objective measures in something unique as this peer review. The APRM will cover issues, codes, and standards pertaining to governance and sustainable development (Hope, 2008). Together, APRM and NEPAD have the potential to provide numerous benefits for African development by providing a framework and mechanism for measuring, monitoring and facilitating progress toward good governance and sustainable development.

In conclusion, while regional integration may be an obvious solution to Africa’s deficits, it is only feasible through good domestic governance. And, good governance is predicated on stable and effective institutions and policy. The NEPAD initiative is Africa’s best option because it is the most comprehensive regional proposal grown from the member states that integrates all factors of security, macroeconomic stability and civil society.

Works Cited

Akyus, Yilmaz, and Charles Gore. 2001. “African Economic Development in a Comparative
Prespective.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 25:265-88.

Hansohm, Dirk. “Economic Policy Research, Governance, and Economic Development: The
Case of Namibia.” Better Governance and Public Policy. Ed. Dele Olowu and Soumana
Sako. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2002. 195-213.

Hope, Kempe Ronald, Sr. “Poverty, Livelihoods, and Governance in Africa: Fulfilling the
Development Promise.” New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Kanbur, Ravi. “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD): An Initial
Commentary.” Cornell University, 2001.

Qobo, Mzukisi. “The challenges of regional integration in Africa in the context of globalisation
and the prospects for a United States of Africa.” Institute of Security Studies, 2007.

Stiglitz, Joseph E. “Globalism’s Disconents.” The Globalization Reader. Ed. Frank J Lechner
and John Boli. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008. 208-215.

Realism rests on the assumption that the international system is anarchic, where the key actors are sovereign nation-states who must guarantee their own security in a constant struggle for power. Given that there is no legitimate and universal international system that can guarantee the safety of any one nation, states, as rational actors, must do what they can to ensure their survival in this security dilemma. (Nau, 2009, pg. 30-31) While there are many causes of war, the most dominant is the conscious, rational choice by these insecure states in attempting to attain security and power. This is, by no means, a universal barometer for the cause of war. As I delve deeper into each level, each action becomes more nuanced and other causes also affect the decisions. However, within different levels of analysis, the quest for power is still the dominant and overarching goal of the state and state actors leading up to World War I, World War II and the Cold War.

The anarchic international system ensures that any state’s action will be within the norms of the system itself. The system is anarchic because there is no supra-international institution that governs or can effectively and legitimately retaliate or punish a state for wrong-doing. In the case of World War I, the liberal process failed because there was no body to punish states that do not disarm, namely Germany. Such is the case of the attempted liberal appeasement of Germany through the “Versailles Complex.” The Versailles Complex aggravated the already sensitive relations between the nations by decreasing Germany’s geopolitical leverage and its military power. Realists would cite this as a turning point, among others, for the war. If resources equal power, then a drastic cut of Germany’s resources in the form of land made it increasingly insecure. (Anderson, 2009, Lecture 5) This would prove to be problematic within the power vacuum that was caused by many new, weaker colonies in eastern Europe and a weak China. (Nau, 2009, pg. 156) In this particular case, it was necessary that a major power, specifically the United States or the Soviet Union would get involve to maintain balance. The lack of a legitimate international institutional contributed to the failure to restrain and monitor Germany – and again, leaving states vulnerable and insecure.

Another institution, the League of Nations was also problematic for a variety of reasons, namely its lack of pervasiveness in the international community. (Anderson, 2009, Lecture 5) Even within the League of Nations, if it were successful, each state was still primarily concerned with its own self-interest, seeking power and security for itself, perpetuated through the requirement for unanimity. Liberal institutions that rely on diplomacy are merely an afterthought and not the main variable in explaining structural power shifts. Instead, the anarchic systemic structure of international politics dictates the need for diplomacy. (Nau, 200, pg. 120) Because of its lack of universality, the League eventually became irrelevant and the states were again left in an anarchic international system.

Likewise, in current times, the United Nations suffers from a lack of military power to assert its legitimacy and is therefore, a defunct international institute. A committee to note in particular is the Security Council. The Security Council, under Article 27 of the United Nations Charter, grants each of the five permanent members (China, France, UK, US, Russia) veto-power. This is another avenue in which the top powers can invalidate the votes of the General Assembly to further their own interest. In this way, the United Nations fails to act as a separate, legitimate institution. Instead, it is still driven by the self-motivation of its five permanent Security Council members. This underlines two assumptions of the realist perspective: the international system is anarchic and that states are rational actors motivated by their own self-interest.

Polarity and the balance of power are also essential because war typically occurs during the process of shifting hegemons and the imbalance of power. (Anderson, 2009, Lecture 4) In a bipolar world, such as the period of the Cold War, the two hegemons are able to keep each other in check and ensure quasi-stability. However, when the balance of power is in a tripolar world, the distribution of power is comparatively more unstable. In the case of the period that preceded WWII, there was a tripolar distribution of power. This prompted the US, Germany and the Soviet Union to constantly engage each other to prevent a possible alliance between the other two states. (Nau, 2009, pg. 154) The balance of power is not the process, however, it is the end result. If a state challenges a declining power, the result will either be a balance of power or war, which may eventually result in a balance of power. Most times, this balance of power suffices to stabilize the international system. (Nau, 2009, pg. 152-153) Despite these continual balance of powers, the states are still left in an anarchic world system.

States are also constrained to make decisions with inaccurate perceptions and the security dilemma. During times of imperfect information, the rational actor state will choose the best decision that is in its self-interest to survive or gain power. If the security dilemma explains how wars are possible and why states must exist in either armed standoff or war, then imperfect information and signaling explains why armed standoff fails and peace is unattainable. (Anderson, 2009, Lecture 2 and 4) Again, in the security dilemma, the risk of being disarmed and attacked is far more risky than having limited information. Ultimately, the combination of these factors in the systemic level will only intensify any existing conflicts and may create more conflict and insecurity.

In the domestic arena, competing interests within the state make the state unstable, thereby overextending itself on the international stage, increasing insecurities as well. Changes in domestic policy and within individual states cause shifts in power that exacerbate these insecurities. For example, realist explanations of WWI attribute German aggression to its cartelized domestic politics. At the time, there were three different factions forming within Germany: the agricultural landowners, the military elites, and the industrial leaders. Each group was interested in various expansionist policies that would embroil Germany with all of Europe’s major powers, and ultimately provoke the other powers. Grain tariffs agitated Russia, increased industry and naval plans antagonized Great Britain and their military plans drove a wedge between relations relations with France and Russia. (Nau, 2009, 120-121)

It is this combination of the international circumstances at the time and the rivaling interest groups in Germany seeking more power that can be marked as a pivotal point during the early stages of the war. As the levels of analyses continue to get more narrow, I cannot solely use the realist perspective. These insufficiencies in the domestic level of analysis cannot be only focused on realist expansionist policy and zest for power. It must also include the liberal perspective in other words, the weak domestic institutions. (Nau, 2009, pg. 126-127) The domestic politics of Germany demonstrate a way in which the domestic level can influence the systemic level in provoking war, whether intentionally or not.

Also, the process of power conversion solidifies the states’ desire for power. If resources translates to power, then any pursuit of geographic or economic gain can be assumed as a quest for power. For example, Hitler’s decision to eventually cut consumption to finance the war efforts illustrates that economic policies also feed into the struggle for power. (Nau, 2009, pg. 154) In addition to “hard power” or military power that is visible, power in terms of political competence and stability play a role in balance of power politics. For example, while Russia had significant natural resources, it also had an inefficient bureaucracy. Meanwhile, Germany was more efficient than Russia in producing military equipment. The ability to effectively translate wealth and resources into military power played a role in situating each state the systemic structural balance of power. (Nau, 2009, pg. 115) The importance placed on military power demonstrates that even domestic policy is made within the framework of the anarchic world order. The interest that dictates domestic policy is still power.

In analyzing the individual level of analysis, the highly variable actors and their nuanced decisions make it difficult to generalize. The vendetta of an individual in power whose seeking more power, such as Hitler, is enough to divert the course of the entire country’s history. The personality of the leader during pivotal times of crisis can largely affect the outcome, resulting in war. In all three cases of WWI, WWII and the Cold War, an individual can be attributed to mistakes leading up to the respective wars. WWI saw weak leaders (Such as: Emperor Franz Joseph, Tar Nicholas II, and Kaiser Wilhelm II) who were unable to make rational decisions while considering all options. (Nau, 2009, pg. 121) As one of the leading voices directing the domestic politics, as I mentioned earlier, leaders hold a great responsibility to act, quick and rationally, to crises.

Wars are reactions to events; WWI being the leading example. Leading up to WWII, the actions of leaders also decidedly altered the course of the war. Referencing back to the lack of accurate information, Stalin overestimated French and British power in 1939 and thereby not challenging them. Meanwhile, Hitler, in the interest of gaining power, exploited foreign policy mistakes of others, especially that of Britain’s to align with Stalin. (Nau, 2009, pg. 155). In the US, President Franklin Roosevelt amended the Neutrality Acts, a series of laws passed earlier in the decade, to be amended to lift an embargo against sending aid to European countries that face Nazi aggression. It was a decision that essentially took the US out of the neutral category and was the first step towards the US alliance with Britain and France. (Nau, 2009, pg. 156) Moreover, in the context of the Cold War, Nikita Khrushchev’s, the Soviet premier, decision to place missiles in Cuba prompted then President John F. Kennedy to order a naval quarantine. In the end, the Soviet Union, under Khrushchev, backed down. This harkens back to the idea of incomplete information, or in this case, credible signals. Khrushchev withdrew the missiles because the threat of escalation was credible. (Nau, 2009, pg. 178-180) While the Cuban Missile Crisis did not escalate to nuclear warfare, it is evident that sending signals such as deploying missiles to a significant area like Cuba, can be a cause for war. Leaders will interpret signals as they will, based on history and their own personality. In this case, President Kennedy handled the crisis in such a way by waiting for credible information and as a rational actor to deter nuclear war. His personality also allowed for extensive dialogue within his cabinet for further action. That said, individuals in position of power can drastically affect the path towards or away from war.

In conclusion, the realist perspective is most evident in the systemic level in illustrating the cause for war. The anarchic international system leaves states constantly vulnerable and threatened. One of the main reasons why the realist perspective is more salient in explaining why wars happen is demonstrated with the failed international institution of the League of Nations coupled with the existing, but defunct, international institution of the United Nations. In both instances, war has resulted, which has led me to believe that diplomacy is indeed a factor in prevention, but it comes secondary to the state’s desire for power or its fear and vulnerability. Diplomacy does not change the structure; instead, the structure dictates whether diplomacy will be necessary. In a realist perspective, war is not a last resort, but rather, it is the default in which countries avoid by creating stable balances of power within the international system.

Works Cited

Nau, Henry R. (2009) Perspectives on International Relations, 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press Inc.

Imagine: It’s 2059. You’re in the Guiyu of Guangdong Province, China, strolling the streets. The air is crisp and the grass green. The cafe-lined streets are littered with people chatting and typing away on their laptops.

Actually, at this rate, the only thing Guiyu will be littered with is electronic waste, or e-waste, an umbrella term for discarded electronic devices.

Instead of the idyllic image of Guiyu above, the town is the main center of exported e-waste, in China.

The benefits of computers are obvious, but we often overlook the environmental costs and increased e-waste. For instance, it was Earth Day on Wednesday, and I’ll bet that we all used our computers without a thought of where they’d eventually end up.

As Jim Puckett, founder of the Basel Action Network, a recycling watchdog group, said in a statement, “It just so happens that the most benign part of a product’s life cycle is when it’s sitting on your desk. That happens in rich countries. The ugly parts of the life cycle, the dirtier parts, the production and the waste, happen in developing countries.”

An alarming 50 to 80 percent of American e-waste is exported to developing countries, driven by economic benefits and often in violation of international law.

It is counterintuitive to send emerging countries a defunct bundle of lead, mercury and cadmium wrapped in wires coated with highly toxic plastic and expect them to prosper. Nascent countries should not serve as virulent dumping grounds for our trash.

The emergence of netbooks – which are cheaper, smaller laptop computers – will dwarf efforts at regulating e-waste. The proliferation of netbooks means more people will be able to afford them. Efforts to bring computing technologies to developing countries calls upon these pillars of affordability to increase accessibility.

However, netbook consumers aren’t made up of the growing middle class or those who are buying a computer for the first time.

As of November 2008, 70 percent of netbook sales occurred in Europe – presumably to those who wanted an additional, more portable computer.

Netbooks range from about $200 to $400; that’s nearly a third of the price of a regular laptop computer, which ranges from about $600 to $1200.

Last month, AT&T offered customers in Atlanta and Philadelphia a netbook for only $50 if they signed up for an Internet service plan.

These low-priced computers will increase competition and drive prices down, but they will also drive up production and – in the long run – create more e-waste. Netbooks will stimulate a culture of disposable electronics.

This notion of planned obsolescence has already been cultivated with the rapid consumption of iPods, which are updated every year or two. It seems illogical to fix your iPod if it’s cheaper to buy a new one.

Hopefully, you won’t have to make a decision about recycling your computer anytime soon, but when you do, there are options. The Goodwill branch in Southern California offers a free computer recycling and donation program.

If you are considering purchasing a computer, check whether the company has a “take-back” program and, if so, where they will take back your computer to recycle. Dell, Lenovo and Toshiba all offer completely free take-back programs for computers. Hewlett-Packard, Apple, and Asus (laptops only) will take back some products for free. The quest for computing accessibility and affordability does not have to be synonymous with increased production and e-waste.

In the international system, there are various lenses or perspectives to view war and conflict and the intentions or rationale behind it. There are three dominant perspectives that exist: the realist, liberal and identity perspectives. I will focus on the realist and liberal perspectives only. In War and Peace in Zaire/Congo: Analyzing and Evaluating Intervention 1996-1997 , the analysis of United States and French intervention or lack thereof is explained through a mix of the realist and liberal perspectives, noting both the power struggle in Central Africa and the economic interests and failed negotiations.

The core of the realist perspective rests upon the continuous struggle between strong actors and weak actors and the balance of power. This behavior is characterized by the lack of an overarching, authoritative power in the world – this ideally would be the United Nations, but the UN is constrained by its charter and is not recognized by all actors as legitimate. Because there is no leader or center of authority that monopolizes power, this decentralization distribution of power leaves the international system in a state of anarchy, where all states are vulnerable and are required to self-help and defend themselves through the acquisition of military arms, a visible attempt at the balance of power. However, in the pursuit of self-defense, states face the possibility of threatening other states because its intentions are either unknown or untrustworthy, causing other states to arm as well – resulting in a security dilemma. Arms may be amassed to protect the state itself or to use that power to protect its territory. Power does not only exist in military capacity but also material capabilities such as “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, and [also] military strength” (Nau 30). Resource endowments and geography, or geopolitics, are of particular importance when examining an area such as Africa that is so rich in resources (Nau 5-6, 28-31).
On the other hand, the liberal perspective, on the other hand, does not place central significance on power, but rather relationships, economic and political, and negotiations among actors. It emphasizes the role of institutions in solving international conflicts. Given these perspectives, I will analyze the conflict in Zaire through a default realist perspective and interject liberal perspectives on all levels of analysis, systemic, domestic and individual. These different levels of analysis focus on the nature of the interaction between states or the international system, the “nature of the state” and the “nature of man,” respectively (Lecture 2).

On a systemic level, there was already an imbalance of power dating back to colonial rule and indigenous divisions, as well as a volatile power transition. One of the main tenets of the realism is that war is caused by instability. This instability is rooted in the arbitrary boundaries created by European states with “little regard for ethnic of cultural homogeneity” (Nau 417). Those from the same group may find themselves in the same territorial zone, while conflicting groups may find themselves forced to exist in the same colony (Lecture 3). In Zaire alone, there exist 75 distinct languages (Nau 417). These borders are colonial remnants that have left the small countries landlocked and incapable of developing independently.

Despite the increasing tensions, through a realist perspective, after the collapse of the biopolar world, the US did not have good reason to intervene, and when it did in the later stages of the AFDL campaign, it was reactionary and served its own self-interest in promoting anti-Sudanese sentiments throughout the region (Huliaras 285). A 1995 document from the Department of Defense noted that there was “very little traditional strategic interest in Africa” (Huliaras 299). This non-intervention can be presumably attributed to the cost of involvement in African conflicts was increasingly outweighing the benefits, harkening back to failed efforts in Somalia. Non-intervention and Rwanda’s invasion by Kabila’s rebellion were considered as serving important US interests. On the international level, Washington considered intervention futile when the UN in 14 December 1996 suspended the plan to deploy force in the area (Huliaras 289). France, however, saw the US’s faint interest in Zaire as a threat to its arc of influence from Ethiopia and Eritrea via Uganda, Rwanda and Zaire to Congo and Cameroon, and termed it the “Anglo-Saxon Conspiracy”; Francophone was not to be defeated by the Anglo-Saxons (Huliaras 293). Following the Cold War, France foreign policy was insecure as Germany was reunifying and becoming a more economically powerful neighbor. Post Cold War, France was no longer an important neutral regional ally against communism, thus upgrading economics over the balance of power and security in the US foreign policy agenda. The crisis in Zaire, therefore, threatened France’s position in the world, causing it to overreact to the developments (Huliaras 294).

On a domestic level, ethnic divisions exacerbated the actor states and civil wars broke out, which meant unpredictable power transitions. Tutsi militias and the Congolese aligned with the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL) led by Laurent-Desire Kabila against President Mobutu Sese Seko and the Hutus, allied with Zairian armed forces (FAZ). The US wanted a smooth transition because a smooth transition was particularly important for the stability of the region (Nau 286). However, stability in the region meant non-intervention for the US because Rwanda’s invasion of Zaire strengthened the anti-Sudanese alliance; the US, understandably via a liberal perspective, employed unilateral economic sanctions in Sudan. Furthermore, its non-involvement in Zaire was critical in preventing the civil war from spreading north to Uganda, given the survival of Kagame’s regime of Rwanda (Huliaras 290-291).

It is clear then, that on the individual level, Kabila and Mobutu were the integral driving forces between in the conflict. After independence in the 1950s and 1960s, the norm in these African states was not democracy, but one-party rule under strong leaders who manipulated ethnic loyalties, similar to how the colonial powers had and maintained stability through brute force (Nau 420). Through a liberal perspective, the failed negotiations on March 21, 1996 with Mobutu and Kabila only aggravated the war. Mobutu said he would only relinquish power to a transitional body that would hold national elections, and presumably vote for him again, and Kabila insisted that Mobutu cede power directly to him and vowed to keep fighting with the AFDL. In regards to the liberal perspective, the intervention in Zaire by the US under the Clinton administration had less to do with eliminating the Mobutu regime than it had to do with economic interests. In particular, control of Congo was especially attractive because of its vast mineral riches profiting North-American-based and influential companies such as America Mineral Fields Inc. or AMF, based in Clinton’s hometown of Hope, Arkansas (Huliaras 288).

In conclusion, the actions of the US and France via the realist and liberal perspective on all levels of analysis display their reasons for both non-intervention and the development of insecurities within the world system.

I’ve always wanted to be a meteorologist.

The forecast? Cloudy. Well, the technological forecast, anyway. The next big Internet innovation is cloud computing.

In this case, the “cloud” represents the intricacies of all of the interconnected computers on the Internet. Cloud computing is a way to store your data on the Internet and make it accessible anywhere, through any computer.

The simplest example of cloud computing is e-mail, which I believe I can safely assume we’re all familiar with. All of your data is stored online on servers, or the “cloud,” rather than your hard drive. Other Web-based services such as YouTube and Flickr use cloud computing.

There are numerous benefits to cloud computing. Due to the increasing bandwidth available online, cloud computing allows more complex programs and software to be accessed online, similar to how Google Docs operates. Also, because all data is stored in the “cloud,” you can not only use software, but also access your documents and photos that were on your desktop online. This higher degree of availability of software allows cross-platform use across Macs, Windows and Linux. It also increases the mobility of information, since you can access your software and data through any Web browser, essentially eliminating the need for ownership of multiple programs or a personal computer.

Cloud computing is important on a large scale because the Internet has created a global platform. However, only 16.5 percent of the global population has a computer, and just 23.8 percent have Internet access. Developing countries can take advantage of this technology because it removes the reliance on owning a personal computer. The process of renting applications with borrowed or cheaper computers makes computing easy and affordable. Similar to the cost benefits of renting a car, cloud computing makes computing power a pay-as-you-go enterprise and makes it available to the masses.

One particular application that stands out is Nivio, a company based in Geneva that was founded by 25-year-old Sachin Duggal. It is an online desktop program that uses cloud computing technology, allowing access to the Windows XP interface and all of your data through any computer connected to the Internet.

I believe in cloud computing and Nivio because the target audience is not people living in developed nations, but rather the developing nations. This will make computing more affordable in the future.

On a continent such as Africa, which only accounts for 3.4 percent of the online global population, a technology like Nivio could be a step toward increasing education levels and infrastructure by connecting it to the rest of the world – something that is desperately needed.

The World Economic Forum has recently awarded Nivio and Duggal the Technology Pioneer Award for 2009, an honor given to visionary companies that will have a world-changing impact on society and businesses. Nivio is in good company with past recipients of the prize: Google in 2002 and the Mozilla Corporation in 2007.

Benefits aside, there are obvious risks and stigmas involved with storing sensitive data through a third party. Especially in America, where there is a strong emphasis on privacy, ownership and personalization, cloud computing services will have to emphasize the benefits to overcome initial reluctance.

In the long run – when we trust the cloud – the personal computer will become less relevant and cheaper, which is beneficial to everyone.

On its Web site, Nivio states, “It is only a matter of time before the PC is just a browser (as) browsers are … incorporated into more consumer devices every day from TVs to game consoles.”

However, cloud computing is still in its early stages. For now, it seems that a mix of cloud and non-cloud or hard-drive computing will be the best route. We’ll see how my weather report fares.