What started as a worry about artists and collectors fleeing to New York transformed the contemporary art scene in Los Angeles and set the city on the path to become a global city. I use global city as opposed to world city, for its subtle nuances as Saskia Sassen has noted. Global cities incorporate more of a networked hub of activity than just an insular hub of activity, as a world city is understood to be.

The concept of a global city “brings a strong emphasis on the networked economy” and “where a multiplicity of globalization processes assume concrete, localized forms.” These processes include a range of operations: political, economic, and cultural. Global cities can be world cities, but don’t have to be—Miami has developed as a global city, one that assumes those globalization processes, but it is not a world city in the old sense of the term (e.g. New York, London). For the purpose of this paper, I will use the term global cities and will focus primarily on the cultural processes.

The idea of a museum dedicated to contemporary art came about in 1979 from efforts by artists, collectors, museum directors and curators who recognized the need for a world-class museum for contemporary art and an especial need for it in the West Coast. The fanfare was well recognized and reverberated across the country back to New York. Shortly after its plans were finalized 1983, art magazines were already dubbing it “the country’s best known unbuilt art museum,” “pinned on it the artistic/aesthetic hopes of so many people.” New York Times Art Critic John Russell wrote in 1984 that the greater Los Angeles area could become a new place for high art to be studied, similarly to New York or Washington, if all goes well.

Only a little over 30 years old, MOCA now has three different buildings throughout the city of Los Angeles devoted to contemporary art: MOCA on Grand Avenue, which is the main site, the Geffen Contemporary in Little Tokyo, which hosts new artists and large-scale work, and MOCA at the Pacific Design Center in West Hollywood. However, in the same 30 years, what was written in 1986, “the concept that Los Angeles has become a cultural mecca remains in question,” is still being debated, by some (New Yorkers mostly) more than others. MOCA was instituted because it addressed a need for contemporary art in the West Coast, but it also crafted a new cultural identity for Los Angeles as a global city.

Surreptitiously, while there was this need for a home for contemporary art, not just in Los Angeles, but the world, the Bunker Hill area in downtown Los Angeles was undergoing a multi-million dollar redevelopment project called California Plaza. With the support of then mayor of Los Angeles, Tom Bradley, the project was integrated as part of a city-brokered deal into the initial phase of the California Plaza project. The museum was part of an 11.2 acres, $1.2 billion development plan in Bunker Hill downtown, with the $23 million cost of the Grand Avenue building paid by the Californa Plaza Partnership, the developer of the California Plaza Bunker Hill project. Now, MOCA is leasing the facility from the City of Los Angeles for 50 years, until the year 2038.

With MOCA’s groundbreaking on Grand Avenue scheduled for mid-1983 with a projected completion date of late 1986, it was clear that excitement and interest around the museum would fade quickly. The solution was to create a temporary space to act as a “transitional home” — so became the Temporary Contemporary, which opened in November 1983. Frank Gehry was the architect chosen to renovate the original Albert Martin-designed 1947 Union Hardware industrial warehouses, which was an apt decision given his own industrial style. Gehry capitalized on the original warehouse’s resemblance to many artists’ studios and left most of the exterior and interior space intact, even leaving a steel crane rail to nod to the building’s original purpose as a warehouse. The gallery, totaling 55,000 square feet , is lit by wire-glass skylights, has south-facing clerestory windows. Exposed steel beams support the space’s many movable walls. A canopy of chain-link fencing spanning Central Avenue extending to the length of the building rests above the access point while simultaneously forms a plaza space. Overall, the existing structure had minimal intervention of fireproofing, exhibition walls, and access points. As the largest of the three buildings, this gallery is used to showcase larger works or works by new artists. It 1996, following a $5 million gift from The David Geffen Foundation, the Temporary Contemporary was renamed MOCA at The Geffen Contemporary.

As scheduled, in December 1986 MOCA on Grand Avenue was completed by Japanese architect Arata Isozaki with MOCA being his first piece in the United States. The museum was built by the California Plaza Partnership and funding for the building, which cost $23 million, was provided by an initiative of the Community Redevelopment Agency, which stipulated that 1.5% of the total budget of any development within CRA be set aside for public art. The site area is 40,000 square feet but the building itself is only 28,500 square feet. It is unique in that the gallery is not created on the upper ground level but underground. The upper ground displays geometric pyramids, cubes and cylinders that contrast with the mix of Indian red sandstone and red granite. Inside, the pyramids work as skylights to naturally fill the room with natural night. The galleries are quiet and spacious, which allow the viewer to deeply engage with the pieces.

The last building, a 4,000 square foot free standing gallery at the Pacific Design Center in West Hollywood, was completed in December 2000 by Cesar Pelli. This two-story structure was established for international architecture, design, and art exhibitions. The building itself is located in the two-acre outdoor plaza of the Pacific Design Center and it is a 12-inch thick architectural concrete structure with gypsum board interior surfaces. There is exposed concrete floors on the first level, and wooden floors on the second.

Sharon Zukin, a sociologist at the City University of New York, has done research on the impact of culture on cities. Throughout her work, I found three themes that she argues that could be applied to MOCA’s implementation in downtown Los Angeles. The first is that (1) culture and cultural capital is the new economic driver behind cities and urban culture, sometimes intersecting both artistic and business interests. Secondly, (2) there is an increasingly privatization of public spaces which may be reactionary to the first point in that it is an accommodation for the new urban dwellers. Finally and most importantly, Zukin notes that (3) the soul of a city is its people and its roots, and that cities will survive because of the diversity of its people, not in spite of it. These three arguments can be applied to not just to the California Plaza project as a whole, but also to the influx of new cultural and commercial development projects in city centers. Zukin mostly refers to New York and London as global and world cities, but using this framework, we can analyze the makings of Los Angeles as a global city through its cultural and art emphasis in development projects.

Gentrification began in 1950s and early 1960s in cities like New York and London and slowly attracted people, but really gained momentum in the 1980s. By then, it was being marketed to middle-class families as a safe place. The height of gentrification represented cities as a period of decline as people and business fled to the suburbs. Eventually, the new consumer’s taste displaced a lot of the original tenants. That said, it’s important to recognize the social and cultural capital of people.

When the California Plaza project was first introduced, it was called “the most ambitious mixed-used urban development in the West” and with reason. It attempted to fuse urban spaces with people’s needs, but let the goal of evening the playing field fall by the way side. The soul of the city, Zukin says, is not in its buildings, but in its people and their roots. However, when financial elites (say those in charge of the California Plaza project) and elected officials change the rules to favor deregulation and create more facilities for cultural consumption (MOCA), the physical landscape of global cities did not separate creativity from consumption, which ultimately leads to more homogenization and standardization as more cities compete with one another to provide the same cultural services. In The Los Angeles Plaza, David William Estrada stressed the importance of public spaces as a way to understand cultural and political meaning in contemporary Los Angeles. The new business district, which the California Plaza project continued, was “designed to ensure a seamless continuum of middle-class work, consumption, and recreation that was insulated from the city’s immigrant poor. ” The creation of this “quasi-public” space (renovated Pershing Square, LA Live, etc.) “reflects a national movement toward defensible urban centers and the corresponding loss of public space.”

Cities will survive because of the diversity of its people, but there is no diversity when everyone is a college-educated gentrified, or the “creative class,” a term that has been coined by Richard Florida. There is a tremendous cultural value in diversity, and if a contemporary art museum is able to bring that diversity together in a common place, then I believe Los Angeles has succeeded. Otherwise, Zukin may be correct in that cultural gentrification’s dark side of aggressive private-sector bidding for control of public spaces, as well as an increasing redesign of the built environment for the purpose of social control.

Before 1648 and the Peace of Westphalia, states were grouped in geographical blocks, with a focal point usually being the capital of the empire. However, following the treaty, which recognized the territory and sovereignty of each state, the conception of the state shifted to bounded states. At the time, this conception of territory and state sovereignty encouraged individual states’ development over exploitation of larger areas, or colonialism . Now, the implications of that treaty are still very relevant. It suggests that each state is responsible for its own actions, not to other states, successfully paving the way for the breakdown of collective action.

This is a problem when states are confronted with global problems such as global warming. This issue in particular is extremely important given the consequences and costs of inaction – high human costs and essentially an unlivable Earth. A graphic by the CNA Corporation, a think tank funded by the Pentagon , illustrates the impact and probability of impact of the Cold War compared to climate change. For the Cold War, there is on “X” in the quadrant, indicating that while the impact was high (nuclear war), the probability was low. However, in the quadrant for climate change, there are two “X’s” showing that both the probability and impact are high . Regardless of states’ decisions to act politically, everyone will ultimately pay a cost that is greater than any short-term economic gain. In all three perspectives, states’ decisions are constrained by a variety of factors, including economic cost, competing interests and simply, the difficulty of collective action – as evidenced by the tragedy of the commons game. If national interest continues to drive states’ actions under realist theory, then the collective action necessary to combat climate change will not be achieved. However, if there is a readjustment of national interest to include climate change, states’ interest will be redefined to include the common interest, as identity theory suggests, and finding a solution to global warming will ultimately become a rational choice for the state, solving the tragedy of the commons.

Global warming has been researched and analyzed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a group of 2,000 climate change experts. Since the late 1990s, the IPCC has reported about the causal relationship between human activity, or the increase in greenhouse gases, and global warming, with 90 percent confidence . The effects found are disastrous: ocean levels will rise and entire towns will sink, crops and wildlife will not survive, and weather patterns will cause unnatural and frequent disasters . However, the costs are not limited to the environment. If the arctic ice continues to melt, there could be a resource scramble for its methane-rich polar caps, and the possibility of war to gain access to the drastically shorter trade routes . In addition, global warming could threaten already unstable regions, such as Afghanistan and many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, and further exacerbate the crises already in place. Clearly, these consequences will dramatically affect, and possibly threaten, the national security of many countries, including that of the United States.

All of the aforementioned effects will also prompt mass migration of populations due to unlivable environments. Not only will wage and economic prosperity be pull factors for these immigrants, but also quality of life and habitat. However, realists tend to object liberalization of immigrant flows unless it offers a national advantage. In this circumstance though, forced immigration will not contribute to any gain in relative national power and may even be a burden. Even the liberal perspective does not favor immigration unless there is a specific opportunity to match labor skill and economic need . Also, the common rules and standards that liberals desire to govern immigrant flows will be eroded as the cost of protecting borders comes at the expense of human life.

In the same way that states’ actions are constrained by the global economy in that it needs to accepts the costs of integration or be left behind, states’ action in regards to global warming is also constrained by the immediate economic opportunity costs of addressing an abstract and distant problem. This directly conflicts realist theory stating that the states’ primary interest is to advance their own power, economically and politically. If the start of the Industrial Revolution marked the exponential increases in greenhouse gases, then globalization and the increased transport and trade of goods have continued to contribute to that increase. However, if the increase of greenhouse gases is proportional to increased trade and thereby, economic growth, then each state will, rationally, oppose to sacrifice its own growth. The states’ decision remain a compromise between the international community’s desires and its own. The result, therefore, will always be a decision between what is necessary to combat global warming, which is the global interest, and what is less than necessary, or the desire of the state to fulfill its own interests – or simply, the result will always be less than what is necessary . Therefore, it is in the interest of each state, especially the developed countries, to redefine how global warming will affect their political and economic interests.

Since climate change is a global problem, it is a problem of the commons, which can be demonstrated through the tragedy of the commons game, similar to the prisoner’s dilemma quadrants. What is specific to the commons in regards to global warming is the effect of time and enough iterations. There will ultimately be a tipping point, where the commons reverts to tragedy and the consequences listed previously, such as mass forced immigration and environmental disasters, will be irreversible. In essence, the goal is to play the game – before it is too late. The commons, viewed through the realist perspective, will focus on the states’ desire to increase their own power, at the expense of combating climate change – thereby, states eliminate themselves in the game by trying to survive. The quest for power will prevail according to the realist perspective. Through the liberal perspective, similar to the process in the prisoner’s dilemma, negotiations can be made through incremental changes in reducing emissions by each state signaling to the other states that they are collaborating or until both actors recognize the common goal and continue until they’ve both lowered emissions to the necessary levels. Finally, the commons in regards to the identity perspective proposes simply analyzing the intentions of other states and whether their decisions will benefit itself or the good of the collective.

The problem of the commons directly applied to addressing and combating global warming is more complex and shows the obvious disagreements between perspectives. As Nau suggests, realists emphasize the scarcity of resources and competition, and individualized solutions, not blanket proposals . A single set of rules will not suffice because it implies a single hegemon will govern. This will fail in the realist perspective due to the states’ unwillingness to give up their own sovereignty and the clear imbalance of power. The realist perspective warrants two options: to consume as much fuel to further economic growth, or if technology to reduce emissions is in demand, to produce more technology to lower emissions and gain economic power that way. In both situations, the main goal is to seek more power. However, if the latter option is emphasized, power can be reconceptualized to include combating global warming. Therefore, lowering emissions and greenhouse gases will be included in the states’ national interest, and will be a rational choice.

The liberal perspective again proposes the use of international institutions to seek broader solutions by emphasizing absolute gains. However, the problem lies in the two groups that gain and lose through cooperation and each group will advocate the use and disregard of said international institutions. The biggest struggle for liberals in proposing international institutions to overcome the collective action problem is to bypass each state’s individual interests for the common goal – this is where the liberal perspective and realist perspective come at direct odds with one another. Identity theorists propose ideas that transcend borders, specifically the idea of sustainable development.
The identity perspective complements both the liberal and realist perspective separately in combating global warming. First, through the realist perspective: changing the idea of national interest and power to conform to the desire to reduce emissions and greenhouse gases by including it into national security policy makes it a possible policy solution. By emphasizing the economic benefits of technological innovation to lower emissions, the state may pursue it as part of its national interest to gain power. Second, through the liberal perspective: ideas are built upon language and language is one of the easiest signals to send in the international arena. To successfully complete or avoid the commons tragedy, each state needs to signal to one another that it is willing to compromise and collaborate. By changing the language and redefining the identity of each states’ goals in regards to global warming, the incremental changes can continue until the goal is reached. Overall, the necessary force to escape the tragedy of the commons is collective action, which is not probable in the near future. Instead, a very plausible alternative is a redefinition of the goal to include national interest and the pursuit of power, incorporating both realist and identity perspectives.

The problem with proposed solutions is the concentration on the liberal perspective and organizing successful international institution and consensus to address the problem. Take, for example, the problem with nuclear disarmament. It has been discussed for years on end and there is still no solution or drastic progress on the proposal. This is because realism prevails over liberal desires to institute global and blanket policies that threaten the balance of power. The liberal perspective in both the commons and the prisoner’s dilemma requires successful signals to continue the incremental changes, but changes in the international arena are clouded and often difficult to interpret. Therefore, global warming, like nuclear disarmament, will not be solved through liberal proposals, or at least, not in the near future. The liberal process is a very long process of action and legitimizing. Unlike nuclear disarmament, global warming is time-sensitive. This is why the Kyoto Protocol, which groups developing countries, or Non-Annex I countries, such as Burkina Faso and China, which have very different emission outputs, together will not succeed. However, the cap and trade proposals already enacted by several cities and countries, which emphasize market incentives and economic benefits, have been relatively more successful. It, again, embeds incentives for power within the national interests, but in an effort to combat a global problem.

The solution must be a fusion of both realist and identity perspectives. The liberal approach to prescribe a blanket solution to all has failed or made minimal progress in the past, as evidenced by the Kyoto Protocol. Waiting for an international institution to find consensus among all states is not a practical solution to a problem that is time sensitive. Similar to the lofty goal of complete disarmament, universal agreement to cut carbon emissions will not come into fruition unless there is an international body that is willing and able to regulate and penalize those who defy the rules. Instead, by reimagining global warming as a security threat to everyone, we change the definition and consequently the identity of the problem to each state. By taking preventative measures now, despite short-term costs, the state will still be acting within its self-interest and continue seeking power, congruous to the realist perspective. It is through these two strategies that states will have a chance against global warming. In a globalizing world, global problems require transnational state cooperation, but this will only be achieved if it is in each states’ national interest.

Globalization, as suggested by Nau, is the process of consolidating into a single global economy (273). Nau uses Thomas Friedman’s The Earth is Flat as the framework for the history of globalization and the shift from absolute power to institutions to individuals (277). However, the working definition of globalization I will be using is a bit different. I will focus on the effects of transport costs under globalization. Reduced transport costs allow cheaper goods to be bought from foreign countries, increasing overall absolute global trade. There are seven distinct areas of policies that a government can enact that directly affect its relationship to the globalized world economy (328), but I will focus exclusively on trade policy and how a state can manipulate trade policy in response to globalization. The decisions on a systemic level result from compromises and resolutions on the domestic level. While globalization has allowed for increased specialization and the division of labor, states still have the ability to control domestic policy in its interest. However, the extent to which a state can respond to international economic pressures is dependent on its capacity and willingness to compromise or be left behind in a globalizing world. The actions of both developed and developing states are ultimately enhanced and constrained, respectively, in a globalized economy.

Since globalization has dramatically decreased transport costs, which has induced high levels of trade, countries are forced to make decisions regarding trade policy often. Trade policy affects the prices of goods and services through taxes, subsidizations or quality restrictions, which can be broken down into two categories: tariffs and non-tariff barriers (332). It is also a border policy, that is, it is a foreign economic policy that only affects goods, services, capital and people as they cross national boundaries (328). This is particularly important because it recognizes the sovereignty of each state and its power to make decisions within its borders and its own country. Tariffs are taxes on goods and services crossing borders such as customs fees and duties, export taxes or subsidies while non-tariff barriers are policies that do not concern price, such as quotas, embargoes or qualitative restrictions (333).

Despite these policy abilities, not all countries have the capacity to enact all of these regulations. The difference in the capacity to implement trade policies is most evident between developed and developing countries. From a realist perspective, which emphasizes relative distribution of power and favorable security conditions, a country may enact a unilateral tariff to secure its alliances or its own hegemony, or use economic sanction such as an embargo to punish adversaries. While a developed country such as the United States has the ability to place an embargo, a trade policy that effectively reduces imports or exports to zero (333), on another country either as a political or economic tool, a developing country such as India may not have the same luxury because the relative cost will be greater. It may risk disengaging from the global economy. The non-tariff barriers, such as quality restrictions, are also constrained by different states’ capacity. Qualitative regulations include restrictions based on the safety, health, labor standards, and environmental concern of traded products (333). Similar to developing countries’ high costs of enacting tariff trade policies, refusing a multinational corporation for low labor standards, for instance, comes at a high cost – possible investment into the country. From a liberal perspective, countries would depend on the strengthening of global rules and institutions that regulate trade policy, such as the World Trade Organization, where security and economic policies are separate and sanctions are not instruments of security policy. Developing countries particularly depend on the function of institutions such as the WTO to limit international payment balances. For example, countries are currently in the ninth round of trade talks, the Doha Round (362). This round of trade talk will eventually influence domestic policy based on agreements during the talk. Countries’ national policies will be coordinated through negotiations during the Doha Round, as they were during the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round (361-362). Therefore, all decisions on a domestic level are a compromise between the country’s citizens and the state’s interest in the globalized economy.

Globalization, with its low transport costs, has allowed for increased specialization and the division of labor between many countries. Specialization enables individuals or countries to gain proficiency and be the most effective at their individual task – which paves the way for comparative advantage. This process of specialization and division forms what are called Global Commodity Chains. An example of a well-known GCC is Nike, which distributes its production, marketing and other functions across several countries. Comparative advantage, which is based on relative advantage within a country, is only effective between two countries if they are able to freely specialize then trade their products. Again, domestic governments still have the option to control these trade policies through the mechanisms mentioned above because specialization is predicated on a free market. With the onset of increased market liberalization in the past few decades, there was an increase in specialization and trade based on comparative advantage. From a realist perspective, specialization within a regional bloc, also called geoeconomics, increase its relative power and economic competition. However, from a liberal perspective, free-trade policies and stronger enforcement of trade agreements through international institutions are favored over unilateral decisions such as sanctions. Liberals saw this time of liberalization as an opportunity for non-zero sum gains, or absolute gains, and the strengthening and development of global institutions. Again, there is a wide discrepancy in the ability of developed versus developing countries to react to market liberalization. The cost of a country liberalizing could come at the high cost of not protecting its infant industries, or developing industries that require protection to get started, as several Latin American countries did (351). Realists would support these protectionist policies because they are indifferent to how individuals manage their domestic economic policy and favor the inward-first approach; while, liberals would favor market integration and an outward-first approach. The decision of countries to respond to globalization’s increased specialization is largely dependent on the country’s capacity and relative cost of the decision.

Works Cited

Nau, Henry R. (2009) Perspectives on International Relations, 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press Inc.

Globalization has increased communication and decreased transportation costs throughout the past decade, enabling countries to prosper and thrive. Why, then has African been left behind? This answer, multifaceted and complex, is crucial to understanding how Africa can develop further and catch up with the rest of the world. It has been proposed that regionalization, economic and political, is the solution for Africa. However, it is impetuous to prescribe a solely regional solution that depends on the security and stability on a domestic level. In the past, regional integration in Africa has been repeatedly met unsuccessfully due to domestic failures. Insecurities on the domestic level must be faced before regional integration can occur. In the past, different regions have pursued different goals of integration based on its own economic interests, rather than as a single vision intended for development of the continent as a whole. There are two possible solutions for Africa to begin the path towards development that is inclusive of quelling the domestic insecurities and also uniting the goals of the continent. First is creating an outwardly oriented economic model that promotes global integration, and second, a more open, democratic polity. Both factors are necessary as political security is a precursor for economic stability and both factors are manifested in the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).

Economic stability is defined as a lack of drastic fluctuations in the macroeconomy and can be characterized by relatively constant output growth and low and steady inflation. In Africa, the policies adopted after colonialism did not allow Africa room for growth or development. Economic policy mainly relied on import-substitution industrialization, focused on the reduction of foreign dependence of goods through local production of industrialized products. This growth strategy dwarfed Africa’s full development by creating inefficient and uncompetitive economies, with stunted private sectors. Currently, the continent is export-dependent on oil and non-oil commodities and is import dependent on manufactured goods, exposing it to adverse terms of trade. Africa’s position in the international market has been to export raw commodities in an unfavorable external trade environment, such as barriers to access in key markets (Qobo, 2007).

In the 1980s and 1990s, with the shift towards neo-classical policies, several African countries had structural reforms, but were not vigorously implemented as they were in other parts of the developing world. These exogenous stabilization programs were not as effective as those that were endogenously driven. Even still, the institutions for the reforms were too weak to sustain them into real developmental factors for the future. The international financial institutions did not foresee the decreased impact of the reforms in countries with weak institutional mechanisms. The lack of strong institutions along with weak political leaders and poor design of the structural adjustment programs are possible explanations as to why there have not been positive results. Similarly, in Europe, regional convergence occurred after difficulty and after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s. It was only implemented when pivotal states such as France and Germany were in favor of the integration (Qobo, 2007).

Another reform agenda is unilateral trade liberalization. It has been argued that opening up a country’s economy too early or too much can be damaging. “The most adverse effects have arisen from the liberalization of financial and capital markets – which has posed risks to developing countries without commensurate rewards” (Stiglitz 210). However, with proper administrative policy measures aimed at strengthening social institutions and infrastructure such as health, education, and social welfare, trade liberalization will have a better chance of resulting in economic gains than a closed economy. A vibrant, growing and thriving economy will increase investor confidence in the short-run and allow for the regional integration to sustain and further development agendas. There should be a sharp distinction between “developmental regionalism as opposed to integration-focused regionalism.” Instead of placing emphasis on trade creation and trade liberalization, developmental regionalism stresses, “removal of supply-side constraints and infrastructure development and views trade in a more integrated manner, linked to domestic developmental challenges” (Qobo, 2007).

A generalized model to integration in Africa does not consider the unique circumstances and completely heterogeneity of each different regional group (Qobo, 2007). For example, regional economic blocks are remnants of the Lagos Plan of Action, which blamed Africa’s economic crisis on the structural adjustment programs of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. It suggested that Africa needed to decrease reliance on raw material extraction, industrialization, global equality in trade relations and an increase in development aid from the international community, but it failed to assume accountability and responsibility to the domestic governments of Africa. Following again, the European model towards regional integration, “African countries should spend less effort and resources on the creation of an unworkable model of regional integration and more on undertaking far-reaching economic reforms and building the competitiveness of their own economies” (Qobo, 2007).

A successful economic model would then require strong governance and financial institutions that includes viable public service infrastructure. It’s this step that will act as a stepping-stone for capacity building in Africa. However, it is futile to attempt regional economic integration, as so many have argued, on the basis of weak domestic foundations. A marker of a successful and thriving state is an active, participative civil society, which can be defined as the total voluntary civic and social organizations and institutions that form the basis of a functioning society, independent of the systemic structure of a state or institutions of the market. Civil society can be understood as non-state actors that are able to voice a divergent political voice. Successful integration and therefore development will require political and macroeconomic reform, underlined by “infrastructure development, attracting and nurturing private economic activities, supporting socially and economically viable indigenous practices, and creating the right climate for the expression of a plural and divergent voice in civil society” (Qobo, 2007).

Sub-Saharan Africa currently lacks the minimal capacities to sustain complex economic policies. A lesson from East Asian countries is that capacity is built through trial and error, essentially a learning process. There must be constant reforms to create competency in a state bureaucracy and its parallel business sector (Akyus and Gore, 2001). A successful example is Botswana and its rare growth rate (7.7% annually between 1965 and 1998) due to good policy and good institution. Quick market liberalization and immediate global integration was not emphasized, but rather, the quality of economic policies and institutions were held more important. Botswana success was tied to its policy of managed openness and of effective use of imported resources. Integration and development stemmed from rational and sensible policy, not one that was quick to fix the problem in the present. This example illustrates the necessity of refocusing the argument, therefore, from one of which policy to how to effectively enact these policies given the quality of economic policies and institutions, which can be defined as governance (Hansohm, 2002). Poor governance within countries is usually characterized by: unaccountable governments, weak civil societies, low levels of freedom and civil liberties, weak enforcement of property rights, and limited role for the rule of law, low levels of cooperation between the public and private sectors, and sets of economic policies not based on systematic application of economic analysis (Hansohm, 2002).

Without capacity to sustain development projects, any initiative would fail. Good governance plays a critical role in the creation of capable states with the capacity to lead development efforts. “It entails the existence of efficient and accountable institutions – political, judicial, administrative, economic, corporate – and entrenched rules that promote development, protect human rights, respect the rule of law, demand a professional and ethical bureaucracy, and ensure that people are free to participate in, and be heard on, decisions that effect their lives” (Hope, 2008).

Governance, in terms of the policies and institutions cannot be functional if they are insecure and lack capacity. The states that are trying to integrate into the global economy suffer for their own internal insecurities. In particular, there are three areas of non-traditional or “human” securities that Africa currently faces: health, political and economic. The three areas of human insecurities that Africa is experiencing are detrimental to its development, politically and economically. The first one, health, is often viewed separate of traditional definitions of security, which included only military power, competence, and deterrence (Burgos 4/13/09). It is this trifecta of insecurities that needs to be addressed simultaneously in order for Africa to further develop.

Currently, the African Union is working on several initiatives from within the active member states that will address the development concerns. In contrast to the failures of the Lagos Plan, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) provides an overarching, unified vision and policy framework for accelerating economic cooperation and integration among African countries. In addition, one of the main aspects that separates it from Africa-wide initiatives for African development such as the Lagos Plan is that it emphasizes and recognizes the necessity of democracy and governance. The three insecurities listed earlier are clearly stated in NEPAD’s overarching goals:
- Promoting and protecting democracy and human rights in their respective countries
and regions, and by developing clear standards of accountability, transparency and
participatory governance at the national and sub-national levels;
- Restoring and maintaining macroeconomic stability, especially by developing
appropriate standards and targets for fiscal and monetary policies, and introducing appropriate institutional framework to achieve these standards;
- Revitalizing and extend the provision of educational, technical training and health
services, with high priority given to tackling HIV/AIDS, malaria and other communicable diseases;
- Building the capacity of states in Africa to set and enforce the legal framework, as
well as maintaining law and order.

The immediate advantage of NEPAD is that it is rooted directly in African democracies as a regional institution and will take existing institutions and better them. NEPAD’s framework recognizes the salient importance of good governance for achieving sustainable development. This framework of developing from within the continent, endogenously, has shown to be much more effective than having an external actor come in with his own interests trying to promote development. This specific plan lends itself to accountability and responsibility on the part of the countries themselves. “For the first time in post-independence Africa, the African leaders themselves are pointing to the shortcomings of the institutional structure over which they preside directly or have much say” (Hope, 2008). Because of its organic roots, NEPAD has been endorsed and supported by the international community, including the G8 countries and multilateral and bilateral organizations such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

This new partnership will require countries to yield sovereignty to a supranational regional body, the AU. More specifically, African leaders have agreed to subject their countries to peer review through the use of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). This is one of the first objective measures in something unique as this peer review. The APRM will cover issues, codes, and standards pertaining to governance and sustainable development (Hope, 2008). Together, APRM and NEPAD have the potential to provide numerous benefits for African development by providing a framework and mechanism for measuring, monitoring and facilitating progress toward good governance and sustainable development.

In conclusion, while regional integration may be an obvious solution to Africa’s deficits, it is only feasible through good domestic governance. And, good governance is predicated on stable and effective institutions and policy. The NEPAD initiative is Africa’s best option because it is the most comprehensive regional proposal grown from the member states that integrates all factors of security, macroeconomic stability and civil society.

Works Cited

Akyus, Yilmaz, and Charles Gore. 2001. “African Economic Development in a Comparative
Prespective.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 25:265-88.

Hansohm, Dirk. “Economic Policy Research, Governance, and Economic Development: The
Case of Namibia.” Better Governance and Public Policy. Ed. Dele Olowu and Soumana
Sako. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2002. 195-213.

Hope, Kempe Ronald, Sr. “Poverty, Livelihoods, and Governance in Africa: Fulfilling the
Development Promise.” New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Kanbur, Ravi. “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD): An Initial
Commentary.” Cornell University, 2001.

Qobo, Mzukisi. “The challenges of regional integration in Africa in the context of globalisation
and the prospects for a United States of Africa.” Institute of Security Studies, 2007.

Stiglitz, Joseph E. “Globalism’s Disconents.” The Globalization Reader. Ed. Frank J Lechner
and John Boli. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008. 208-215.

Realism rests on the assumption that the international system is anarchic, where the key actors are sovereign nation-states who must guarantee their own security in a constant struggle for power. Given that there is no legitimate and universal international system that can guarantee the safety of any one nation, states, as rational actors, must do what they can to ensure their survival in this security dilemma. (Nau, 2009, pg. 30-31) While there are many causes of war, the most dominant is the conscious, rational choice by these insecure states in attempting to attain security and power. This is, by no means, a universal barometer for the cause of war. As I delve deeper into each level, each action becomes more nuanced and other causes also affect the decisions. However, within different levels of analysis, the quest for power is still the dominant and overarching goal of the state and state actors leading up to World War I, World War II and the Cold War.

The anarchic international system ensures that any state’s action will be within the norms of the system itself. The system is anarchic because there is no supra-international institution that governs or can effectively and legitimately retaliate or punish a state for wrong-doing. In the case of World War I, the liberal process failed because there was no body to punish states that do not disarm, namely Germany. Such is the case of the attempted liberal appeasement of Germany through the “Versailles Complex.” The Versailles Complex aggravated the already sensitive relations between the nations by decreasing Germany’s geopolitical leverage and its military power. Realists would cite this as a turning point, among others, for the war. If resources equal power, then a drastic cut of Germany’s resources in the form of land made it increasingly insecure. (Anderson, 2009, Lecture 5) This would prove to be problematic within the power vacuum that was caused by many new, weaker colonies in eastern Europe and a weak China. (Nau, 2009, pg. 156) In this particular case, it was necessary that a major power, specifically the United States or the Soviet Union would get involve to maintain balance. The lack of a legitimate international institutional contributed to the failure to restrain and monitor Germany – and again, leaving states vulnerable and insecure.

Another institution, the League of Nations was also problematic for a variety of reasons, namely its lack of pervasiveness in the international community. (Anderson, 2009, Lecture 5) Even within the League of Nations, if it were successful, each state was still primarily concerned with its own self-interest, seeking power and security for itself, perpetuated through the requirement for unanimity. Liberal institutions that rely on diplomacy are merely an afterthought and not the main variable in explaining structural power shifts. Instead, the anarchic systemic structure of international politics dictates the need for diplomacy. (Nau, 200, pg. 120) Because of its lack of universality, the League eventually became irrelevant and the states were again left in an anarchic international system.

Likewise, in current times, the United Nations suffers from a lack of military power to assert its legitimacy and is therefore, a defunct international institute. A committee to note in particular is the Security Council. The Security Council, under Article 27 of the United Nations Charter, grants each of the five permanent members (China, France, UK, US, Russia) veto-power. This is another avenue in which the top powers can invalidate the votes of the General Assembly to further their own interest. In this way, the United Nations fails to act as a separate, legitimate institution. Instead, it is still driven by the self-motivation of its five permanent Security Council members. This underlines two assumptions of the realist perspective: the international system is anarchic and that states are rational actors motivated by their own self-interest.

Polarity and the balance of power are also essential because war typically occurs during the process of shifting hegemons and the imbalance of power. (Anderson, 2009, Lecture 4) In a bipolar world, such as the period of the Cold War, the two hegemons are able to keep each other in check and ensure quasi-stability. However, when the balance of power is in a tripolar world, the distribution of power is comparatively more unstable. In the case of the period that preceded WWII, there was a tripolar distribution of power. This prompted the US, Germany and the Soviet Union to constantly engage each other to prevent a possible alliance between the other two states. (Nau, 2009, pg. 154) The balance of power is not the process, however, it is the end result. If a state challenges a declining power, the result will either be a balance of power or war, which may eventually result in a balance of power. Most times, this balance of power suffices to stabilize the international system. (Nau, 2009, pg. 152-153) Despite these continual balance of powers, the states are still left in an anarchic world system.

States are also constrained to make decisions with inaccurate perceptions and the security dilemma. During times of imperfect information, the rational actor state will choose the best decision that is in its self-interest to survive or gain power. If the security dilemma explains how wars are possible and why states must exist in either armed standoff or war, then imperfect information and signaling explains why armed standoff fails and peace is unattainable. (Anderson, 2009, Lecture 2 and 4) Again, in the security dilemma, the risk of being disarmed and attacked is far more risky than having limited information. Ultimately, the combination of these factors in the systemic level will only intensify any existing conflicts and may create more conflict and insecurity.

In the domestic arena, competing interests within the state make the state unstable, thereby overextending itself on the international stage, increasing insecurities as well. Changes in domestic policy and within individual states cause shifts in power that exacerbate these insecurities. For example, realist explanations of WWI attribute German aggression to its cartelized domestic politics. At the time, there were three different factions forming within Germany: the agricultural landowners, the military elites, and the industrial leaders. Each group was interested in various expansionist policies that would embroil Germany with all of Europe’s major powers, and ultimately provoke the other powers. Grain tariffs agitated Russia, increased industry and naval plans antagonized Great Britain and their military plans drove a wedge between relations relations with France and Russia. (Nau, 2009, 120-121)

It is this combination of the international circumstances at the time and the rivaling interest groups in Germany seeking more power that can be marked as a pivotal point during the early stages of the war. As the levels of analyses continue to get more narrow, I cannot solely use the realist perspective. These insufficiencies in the domestic level of analysis cannot be only focused on realist expansionist policy and zest for power. It must also include the liberal perspective in other words, the weak domestic institutions. (Nau, 2009, pg. 126-127) The domestic politics of Germany demonstrate a way in which the domestic level can influence the systemic level in provoking war, whether intentionally or not.

Also, the process of power conversion solidifies the states’ desire for power. If resources translates to power, then any pursuit of geographic or economic gain can be assumed as a quest for power. For example, Hitler’s decision to eventually cut consumption to finance the war efforts illustrates that economic policies also feed into the struggle for power. (Nau, 2009, pg. 154) In addition to “hard power” or military power that is visible, power in terms of political competence and stability play a role in balance of power politics. For example, while Russia had significant natural resources, it also had an inefficient bureaucracy. Meanwhile, Germany was more efficient than Russia in producing military equipment. The ability to effectively translate wealth and resources into military power played a role in situating each state the systemic structural balance of power. (Nau, 2009, pg. 115) The importance placed on military power demonstrates that even domestic policy is made within the framework of the anarchic world order. The interest that dictates domestic policy is still power.

In analyzing the individual level of analysis, the highly variable actors and their nuanced decisions make it difficult to generalize. The vendetta of an individual in power whose seeking more power, such as Hitler, is enough to divert the course of the entire country’s history. The personality of the leader during pivotal times of crisis can largely affect the outcome, resulting in war. In all three cases of WWI, WWII and the Cold War, an individual can be attributed to mistakes leading up to the respective wars. WWI saw weak leaders (Such as: Emperor Franz Joseph, Tar Nicholas II, and Kaiser Wilhelm II) who were unable to make rational decisions while considering all options. (Nau, 2009, pg. 121) As one of the leading voices directing the domestic politics, as I mentioned earlier, leaders hold a great responsibility to act, quick and rationally, to crises.

Wars are reactions to events; WWI being the leading example. Leading up to WWII, the actions of leaders also decidedly altered the course of the war. Referencing back to the lack of accurate information, Stalin overestimated French and British power in 1939 and thereby not challenging them. Meanwhile, Hitler, in the interest of gaining power, exploited foreign policy mistakes of others, especially that of Britain’s to align with Stalin. (Nau, 2009, pg. 155). In the US, President Franklin Roosevelt amended the Neutrality Acts, a series of laws passed earlier in the decade, to be amended to lift an embargo against sending aid to European countries that face Nazi aggression. It was a decision that essentially took the US out of the neutral category and was the first step towards the US alliance with Britain and France. (Nau, 2009, pg. 156) Moreover, in the context of the Cold War, Nikita Khrushchev’s, the Soviet premier, decision to place missiles in Cuba prompted then President John F. Kennedy to order a naval quarantine. In the end, the Soviet Union, under Khrushchev, backed down. This harkens back to the idea of incomplete information, or in this case, credible signals. Khrushchev withdrew the missiles because the threat of escalation was credible. (Nau, 2009, pg. 178-180) While the Cuban Missile Crisis did not escalate to nuclear warfare, it is evident that sending signals such as deploying missiles to a significant area like Cuba, can be a cause for war. Leaders will interpret signals as they will, based on history and their own personality. In this case, President Kennedy handled the crisis in such a way by waiting for credible information and as a rational actor to deter nuclear war. His personality also allowed for extensive dialogue within his cabinet for further action. That said, individuals in position of power can drastically affect the path towards or away from war.

In conclusion, the realist perspective is most evident in the systemic level in illustrating the cause for war. The anarchic international system leaves states constantly vulnerable and threatened. One of the main reasons why the realist perspective is more salient in explaining why wars happen is demonstrated with the failed international institution of the League of Nations coupled with the existing, but defunct, international institution of the United Nations. In both instances, war has resulted, which has led me to believe that diplomacy is indeed a factor in prevention, but it comes secondary to the state’s desire for power or its fear and vulnerability. Diplomacy does not change the structure; instead, the structure dictates whether diplomacy will be necessary. In a realist perspective, war is not a last resort, but rather, it is the default in which countries avoid by creating stable balances of power within the international system.

Works Cited

Nau, Henry R. (2009) Perspectives on International Relations, 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press Inc.

In the international system, there are various lenses or perspectives to view war and conflict and the intentions or rationale behind it. There are three dominant perspectives that exist: the realist, liberal and identity perspectives. I will focus on the realist and liberal perspectives only. In War and Peace in Zaire/Congo: Analyzing and Evaluating Intervention 1996-1997 , the analysis of United States and French intervention or lack thereof is explained through a mix of the realist and liberal perspectives, noting both the power struggle in Central Africa and the economic interests and failed negotiations.

The core of the realist perspective rests upon the continuous struggle between strong actors and weak actors and the balance of power. This behavior is characterized by the lack of an overarching, authoritative power in the world – this ideally would be the United Nations, but the UN is constrained by its charter and is not recognized by all actors as legitimate. Because there is no leader or center of authority that monopolizes power, this decentralization distribution of power leaves the international system in a state of anarchy, where all states are vulnerable and are required to self-help and defend themselves through the acquisition of military arms, a visible attempt at the balance of power. However, in the pursuit of self-defense, states face the possibility of threatening other states because its intentions are either unknown or untrustworthy, causing other states to arm as well – resulting in a security dilemma. Arms may be amassed to protect the state itself or to use that power to protect its territory. Power does not only exist in military capacity but also material capabilities such as “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, and [also] military strength” (Nau 30). Resource endowments and geography, or geopolitics, are of particular importance when examining an area such as Africa that is so rich in resources (Nau 5-6, 28-31).
On the other hand, the liberal perspective, on the other hand, does not place central significance on power, but rather relationships, economic and political, and negotiations among actors. It emphasizes the role of institutions in solving international conflicts. Given these perspectives, I will analyze the conflict in Zaire through a default realist perspective and interject liberal perspectives on all levels of analysis, systemic, domestic and individual. These different levels of analysis focus on the nature of the interaction between states or the international system, the “nature of the state” and the “nature of man,” respectively (Lecture 2).

On a systemic level, there was already an imbalance of power dating back to colonial rule and indigenous divisions, as well as a volatile power transition. One of the main tenets of the realism is that war is caused by instability. This instability is rooted in the arbitrary boundaries created by European states with “little regard for ethnic of cultural homogeneity” (Nau 417). Those from the same group may find themselves in the same territorial zone, while conflicting groups may find themselves forced to exist in the same colony (Lecture 3). In Zaire alone, there exist 75 distinct languages (Nau 417). These borders are colonial remnants that have left the small countries landlocked and incapable of developing independently.

Despite the increasing tensions, through a realist perspective, after the collapse of the biopolar world, the US did not have good reason to intervene, and when it did in the later stages of the AFDL campaign, it was reactionary and served its own self-interest in promoting anti-Sudanese sentiments throughout the region (Huliaras 285). A 1995 document from the Department of Defense noted that there was “very little traditional strategic interest in Africa” (Huliaras 299). This non-intervention can be presumably attributed to the cost of involvement in African conflicts was increasingly outweighing the benefits, harkening back to failed efforts in Somalia. Non-intervention and Rwanda’s invasion by Kabila’s rebellion were considered as serving important US interests. On the international level, Washington considered intervention futile when the UN in 14 December 1996 suspended the plan to deploy force in the area (Huliaras 289). France, however, saw the US’s faint interest in Zaire as a threat to its arc of influence from Ethiopia and Eritrea via Uganda, Rwanda and Zaire to Congo and Cameroon, and termed it the “Anglo-Saxon Conspiracy”; Francophone was not to be defeated by the Anglo-Saxons (Huliaras 293). Following the Cold War, France foreign policy was insecure as Germany was reunifying and becoming a more economically powerful neighbor. Post Cold War, France was no longer an important neutral regional ally against communism, thus upgrading economics over the balance of power and security in the US foreign policy agenda. The crisis in Zaire, therefore, threatened France’s position in the world, causing it to overreact to the developments (Huliaras 294).

On a domestic level, ethnic divisions exacerbated the actor states and civil wars broke out, which meant unpredictable power transitions. Tutsi militias and the Congolese aligned with the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL) led by Laurent-Desire Kabila against President Mobutu Sese Seko and the Hutus, allied with Zairian armed forces (FAZ). The US wanted a smooth transition because a smooth transition was particularly important for the stability of the region (Nau 286). However, stability in the region meant non-intervention for the US because Rwanda’s invasion of Zaire strengthened the anti-Sudanese alliance; the US, understandably via a liberal perspective, employed unilateral economic sanctions in Sudan. Furthermore, its non-involvement in Zaire was critical in preventing the civil war from spreading north to Uganda, given the survival of Kagame’s regime of Rwanda (Huliaras 290-291).

It is clear then, that on the individual level, Kabila and Mobutu were the integral driving forces between in the conflict. After independence in the 1950s and 1960s, the norm in these African states was not democracy, but one-party rule under strong leaders who manipulated ethnic loyalties, similar to how the colonial powers had and maintained stability through brute force (Nau 420). Through a liberal perspective, the failed negotiations on March 21, 1996 with Mobutu and Kabila only aggravated the war. Mobutu said he would only relinquish power to a transitional body that would hold national elections, and presumably vote for him again, and Kabila insisted that Mobutu cede power directly to him and vowed to keep fighting with the AFDL. In regards to the liberal perspective, the intervention in Zaire by the US under the Clinton administration had less to do with eliminating the Mobutu regime than it had to do with economic interests. In particular, control of Congo was especially attractive because of its vast mineral riches profiting North-American-based and influential companies such as America Mineral Fields Inc. or AMF, based in Clinton’s hometown of Hope, Arkansas (Huliaras 288).

In conclusion, the actions of the US and France via the realist and liberal perspective on all levels of analysis display their reasons for both non-intervention and the development of insecurities within the world system.

Globalization will strengthen the United States absolutely and not only at the expense of other actors. In the past and currently, the US has benefited economically and politically, however unfairly, from smaller and weaker economies. In the long run, the US – as the nation-state becomes more relevant again – will remain a leading world power, but in a different context. In analyzing the changing role of the nation-state and the economic logic of governance, I believe that the US will be expected to participate and more importantly, lead, in a plurilaterialist system, as proposed by Philip Cerny, alongside potential super powers even if it requires learning the limits of its hegemony.

The concept of nation-states and their sovereignty was borne from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. From then until the Cold War, international relations theory was centered on the nation-state and the “classic sovereignty” model. “The Cold War system was a state-based system” . The collapse of the Soviet Union after the Cold War left the United States situated in the center of a unipolar world as the super power. When the Cold War ended, the prevailing international system was one based on complex interdependence, an idea put forth by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye that states and their economic connections are inextricably linked. Complex interdependence is a statist theory that holds the state and its national interest to be paramount; the national interest of the US was now linked to other countries’ national interest.

At around the same time, in terms of economics, noting the postwar devastation as well as the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Brenton Woods trio was formed to provide a framework of fixed rates to ensure a stable international monetary system that promoted national sovereignty and to prevent future crises. However, using the tenets of the “Washington Consensus,” the US imposed its rapid privatization and liberalization policies on vulnerable economies and gained considerably . It would require firms in a poor country to borrow money and lend the same amount to insure their loan on unfair interest rates – which is absolutely incredulous. “Open trade can conflict with social contracts that protect certain activities from the relentlessness of the free market” . The US took advantage of its free trade policies and benefited from other countries.

Within the WTO, the subsequent round of negotiations after the Uruguay negotiations, the Doha Development Round has essentially failed because of disagreements between the US, China and India. The Doha development round trade talks began in 2001 with the aim of lowering trade barriers to increase trade in an effort to benefit more developing countries. Pascal Lamy, WTO’s director-general, admitted, “There’s no use beating around the bush, this meeting has collapsed” . The US is unilaterally holding up the stalemate in favor of protecting its own agricultural sector. This pursuit reveals the US’s “increasingly narrow self-interested goals through aggressive unilateralism and regional arrangements” . This defiance and refusal to cooperate and compromise illustrates the power of the US even in a global forum intended to resolve discontents and strive for free and fair trade.

Initially, globalization was thought to make the nation-state less important, as Kenichi Ohmae and Susan Strange have argued, as its institutions and boundaries become increasingly irrelevant due to the rapid technological advancements and other emerging non-state actors. However, following September 11th, nation-states and their governments, specifically that of the US, were looked to as the panacea for security. While the Cold War system was based on states, this globalized system introduces multinational corporations and non-governmental actors, such as an Islamic extremist group that was able to organize transnational operations through the use of technologies. “The state matters more, not less, in globalization” . With a return to the nation-state, the US remains as one of the leading super powers.

Although the US is currently facing an economic crisis, comparatively, other smaller countries are doing far worse. The IMF brokered rescue packages to Pakistan, Hungary, Ukraine and Iceland. Iceland was also forced to nationalize three of its major banks . The economic crisis especially highlights the returning reliance on governments and the nation-state. The world is looking to the US for a recovery plan as it takes the leadership role at the G20 summit in London this April. The US’s economic might and political importance has not substantially wavered in spite of the recession. While most nations can only react to changes due to globalization, the US, as a dominant economic and political power, can affect changes more quickly and aptly.

To talk about whether the US will be strengthened or weakened in the long run, a comparative analysis with China is necessary because it is one country that could potentially surpass the US militarily and economically. China will not only succeed at the expense of the US and vice versa; this is a false Manichaean form of nationalism and mercantilism that is reminiscent of the zero sum theory prevalent during the postwar Realist period. The integration that was present postwar not only bound the US and China together economically, but also politically. During the Cold War, the US and China united over a common enemy: the Soviet Union. Now, they have again united against the “War on Terror.” China offered its public support and declared its alliance to George W. Bush at the time.
With increasing economic ties, increasing political integration was necessary to foster and further cultivate those economic ties, simply a cycle of increasing integration between the two countries – all of which is driven by economic self-interest, stemmed by the rational choice of both actors . The political agreement extended beyond to dealing with regional issues such as North Korea and Taiwan. By aligning politically, both countries further enhanced their economic ties.

Currently, US-China relations are thriving. The alarmist speculation in regards to China’s possession and possible selling of the US treasury bills is not as plausible as it seems. “Without those Chinese purchases, we would either have to raise interest rates, slowing our growth, or we would have to run comparable trade deficits with other countries so that they could buy our bonds” . The relationship between the US and China is a symbiotic one: Chinese growth brings American companies new markets overseas and the Chinese benefit from being a large market for US goods.

Unlike the old Soviet Union, China is not seeking to take over the US as the leading power. Its internal problems, such as its large income disparity between the rural and urban areas and its aging demographic would not make reacting negatively towards the US a rational choice. In addition to that, the US and China’s economies are so inextricably linked that the sharp decreases in the US stock markets were deeply felt on the Shanghai Composite Index.

One of the principle concerns in regards to the US’s power in the future is based on the scramble for energy, as it’s becoming a scarce resource. The rapid economic expansion of China and India, in particular, has created a large demand for energy and other resources. This not only raises the prices but is also generating a competition between the consuming countries. I believe that the US, as directed by its internal politics, will prevail given its advances in technology and university research and development.

Moreover, the more we are integrated in this global system and especially when the cost of war is too high, as it is now, nation-states increasingly rely on “soft power,” that is, cultural influence and attractiveness. The US is, by far, the dominant player in the spread of its cultural artifacts – such as taste preferences (i.e. Starbucks and McDonald’s) and entertainment preferences (i.e. Hollywood Blockbusters). Soft power is not exclusive to cultural attractions, but rather, it includes its political values and its foreign policies. This political capital that the US possesses ultimately attracts more multinational corporations and encourages entrepreneurship more so than other countries.

Revisiting the revival of the nation-state’s importance, we can also see the revival of similar Bretton Woods systems evolving. On September 26, 2008, French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, said, “we must rethink the financial system from scratch, as at Bretton Woods.” Globalization is drastically changing the system at hand, however, we must not forget the foundations that have already been set. The US is in a more advantageous position in regards to its internal domestic politics than in China to handle the crisis at hand.

In the future, globalization will inevitable create more competition as the playing field is “less spiky.” The US will still continue to be one of the main players in the international arena – though the rules of the game will be vastly different. Balance of power between states will still matter, but will involve more actors than just nation-states. It will involve transnational corporations, non-governmental organizations and international institutions. Cerny proposes the idea of plurilaterialism where there will be more than one dominant power. Instead, “states and state actors, multinational corporations, interest groups, and/or individuals, their activities will cut across different levels and structures” . These overlapping connections between different actors show that “global interaction networks are indeed strengthening” . This idea of a plurilaterial system will require new dialogue between America and the rest of the world; other countries will recognize that a less powerful US is still indispensable.

This idea of plurilaterialism is similar to neofunctionalism and the European where the supranational institution acts as the driving force behind integration of the separate actors. The US has definitely given up some of its sovereignty in order to participate and cooperate in international institutes such as the United Nations, but most countries have – this does not make it weaker relatively. That said, the US still has considerable leverage and is still expected to lead in the international arena due to its absolute advantages in all three areas of economics, politics and culture. Concerning the United Nations, specifically the Security Council – if the plurilaterialism is to be achieved, it must consider other nations to participate or have veto power to prevent deadlocks. Even the United Nations is not a unified entity; it is only an international community that is led by the United States.

“The US invulnerability to the global economy has evaporated – and with it the last vestiges of the American commitment to sacrifice narrow national interest in favor of global leadership” (Moon 2). I believe that the US will work to enhance its ideals of “trade liberalization, fair competition, greater integration and mutual prosperity” . Especially now, the domestic sphere is not insulated from the international sphere – leaving the US at an advantage with a leader that is open to multilateral and plurilaterial discussion. During the last election, the whole world was watching because in an era of globalization and increasing interconnectedness, everything that the US does, either domestically or internationally, has huge consequences that reverberate throughout, positive and negative. The US can begin to rebuild its brand again.

Works Cited

“Economist Debates: Brand America.” The Economist. 25 February 2009. 25 February 2009.

“World Trade Talks End in Collapse.” BBC News. 29 July 2008. 10 February 2009 < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7531099.stm>
Burgos, Russel. Global Studies 100A Lecture. “Economic Logic of Governance.” UCLA, Los Angeles, 18 February 2009.

Cerny, Philip. “Plurilaterialism: Structural differentiation and function conflict in the post-Cold War world order.” Millennium: Journal of International Relations. Vol. 22, No. 1 (1993): 27-51.

Friedman, Thomas. Keynote Address. “The Impact of Globalization on World Peace.” Arnold C. Harberger Distinguished Lecture. Burkle Center for International Relations, UCLA, Los Angeles, 17 January 2001.

Mann, Michael. “Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?” Review of the International Political Economy. Vol. 4, No. 3 (1997): pp. 472-496.

Moon, Bruce. “The United States and Globalization: Struggles with Hegemony.” Political Economy and the Changing Global Order. Ed. Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill. Oxford University Press, 2005.

Overholt, William. “China and Globalization.” Testimony presented to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 19 May 2005.
Rodrik, Dani. “Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization Debate.” Foreign Policy. No. 107 (1997): pp. 19-37.

Stiglitz, Joseph. Keynote Address. “Making Globalization Work.” Center for Global Development. Peter G. Peterson Conference Center, Washington D.C., 27 September 2006.
—. “Globalism’s Discontents.” The Globalization Reader. Ed. Frank Lechner and John Boli. Blackwell Publishing, 2008.

Heinze, From Scarcity to Abundance, 1990
Heinze’s topic focused on immigrants as consumers, but emphasized Jewish immigrants in particular. Heinze set out to explore why there was such a disparity between the consumption patterns of Jewish people who have immigrated to the United States versus those who have not. His hypothesis involves how Jewish immigrants interpret the values of the United States, link that to their religious past to view “America as a haven” (196) and assimilate accordingly. Thus, as Heinze concludes, Jewish immigrants are more absorbed in wanting to adopt US values, particularly consumerism, to more quickly adopt to their new home. Heinze mainly uses statistics and observations, whether his own or those noted in cultural histories.

I think Heinze’s point is very valid when he states that “this unique attitude of Jews toward America motivated them to view items of consumption as foundation stones of American identity” (197). In this essay, the idea of consumption is exclusive to material accumulation as a wealth marker so much as it is an identity marker. The identity of the Jewish immigrants were set in an unstable foundation as they were forced to flee to the US, which in turn, forced them to rely on America as their new foundation, thus adopting new values.
While most social studies are based on generalization and always leave room for outliers, I think one of the finer points of Heinze’s is the mention of language. Language is clearly one of most distinctive markers of a culture and identity, and one of the hardest. In illustrating the hesitation to invest a lot of work into learning a language, the next option would be to adopt American values of excessive consumerism because goods were more accessible and more easily acquired than a language was.

Gladwell, The Coolhunt, 1997
In The Coolhunt, Gladwell investigates what is “cool”, how it’s determined and by whom it is determined. Gladwell follows two coolhunters, Baysie Wightman and DeeDee Gordon, who are trying to revive Reebok’s cool factor. The bulk of this essay is Gladwell’s observations of Baysie and DeeDee’s work with Reebok, with a few examples of the spread of hybrid seed corn and the Hush Puppies revival sprinkled in between to illustrate diffusion research. He categorizes his findings with three rules of cool. Gladwell’s first rule highlights the ephemeral nature of cool—as soon as something is cool, it is no longer cool. But, the rule in itself poses a problem: it is impossible to observe what is cool. The second rule is that “[you] can’t just manufacture cool out of thin air” (7) —the company cannot manufacture something cool. Finally, the third rule of cool is that “[cool] can only be observed by those who are themselves cool” (11). Similar to the second rule, this one marks the exclusive cycle of those who are cool determining what is cool.

I enjoyed this article because it is a very accurate conjecture of how the fashion industry works today, nearly twelve years after this original article was written. While I do agree with a majority of Gladwell’s points, namely the fleeting nature of cool and the diffusion research studies, I have to disagree with his overly exclusive conclusion of what is cool, particularly rule three. With the influx of technology and shared information via the Internet, sites such as TheSartorialist.com features “average” people dictating what is cool. However, it can be argued that the person/people behind the website are actually very influential fashion insiders and that with that comes the ability to dictate what is cool. I believe that because of how the Internet has evolved, there is no general idea of cool—there are too many niche markets and too many diverging interests that I don’t think any person would confine herself/himself to just one.

Abramowitz, The X/Y Factor, 2007
This is the most recent article of this week’s readings. In this article, Abramowitz does a very similar exploration to Gladwell’s in The Coolhunt; however, Abramowitz is set in the 21st century era of the Internet. Much like the data determining what was cool to who Baysie and DeeDee collected and categorized then sold, the woman Abramowitz follows, Jane Buckingham, produces a manual that is sold to companies about what kids in this era considered cool. While Gladwell’s article focused on “cool” as a commodity, Abramowitz’s article focuses on the generational differences that reinforces who thinks what is cool and how that is determined.

Abramowitz notes the underlying force that separates Generation X and Generation Y—what she called “wages of technology” (1). With recent technological innovations, our lives have become so integrated and we have been so connected that oftentimes the line separating reality and virtual reality are blurred. This causes a problem to marketers, as they do not know how to advertise in such a way to captivate those Generation Y kids.

I think this article was well written and reported, but I do not think Abramowitz posed anything new or thought provoking. To me, the marketers who attend her conference should take note from Heinze’s article and instead of trying to market to a general audience, to target specific populations. Also, I believe that similar to how the Jewish immigrants adopted American consumerism because they were trying to adopt an identity, businesses should market an identity, a lifestyle instead of a pure commodity. The best example of this selling of an “identity” instead of a simple commodity would be Apple Computers. They have branded their computers with a very “cool”, for lack of better word, identity; it is the preferential computer of the artsy folks. Their marker of success is being competitive despite significantly higher costs.

Hayles, An Excerpt from: How We Became Posthuman Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics
In this excerpt, Hayles uses several people and experiments to delineate the idea of intelligence in post-humanism. She begins by introducing a famous game proposed by Alan Turning, in which the subject is given contact to two entities through a computer and he is supposed to distinguish which is the man and which is the woman through posing questions. Failure to correctly identity the two means that machines can think, Turing contended. Hayles uses this example to illustrate disembodied intelligence, that is, intelligence is separate from the embodied reality. In this case, verbal performance is used to guise the intelligence of the machine and the human. Therefore, intelligence is a discrete variable.

This example segues into Hayles mention of Hans Moravec who proposed, “ that human identity is essentially an informational pattern rather than an embodied enaction” (Hayles). Moravec composed his own test as well; one that Hayles appropriately calls the Moravec test. This test, while similar to the Turning test in that it also used the idea of disembodied intelligence, Moravec’s test extended this idea, claiming that a human being’s brain can be uploaded into a machine as information therefore becoming human.

In Hayles final example, she introduces Andrew Hodges, who believes that “verbal performance cannot be equated with embodied reality” and questions Turning’s implications of including gender. The inclusion of gender does nothing, Hodges argues, and that it [gender was merely a red herring. Through these examples, Hayles concludes that in that initial acceptance of participating in Turing’s test, the participant subjects himself to become a part of the machine itself. Using the pre-established tests and their results supported her argument well and makes her points distinct and easy to follow.

Hayles, Liberal Subjectivity Imperiled: Norbert Wiener and Cybernetic Anxiety
In this chapter, Hayles continues to explore cybernetics. She uses a wealth of data: direct quotes from notable people though mainly from Weiner, theories of nature such as thermodynamics, analogies, mathematics and science. This wide array of data types makes her argument more wholesome and provides many lenses through which to view her argument.

She begins with the burgeoning idea that the boundaries of what it means to be human is not given, but rather constructed by humans; therefore, it is not something that naturally exists. This is particularly alarming because it implies that these certain boundaries can be applied to other things, namely the machine. If the tool is a part of the man who uses it, then can an information system become part of man? Hayles mentions Weiner’s idea of liberal humanism, which included “a coherent, rational self, the right of that self to autonomy and freedom” as one of the foundations. However, in this light, can a machine own itself it can think?

Hayles transitions, rather slowly, as she sets up the analogy framework that she will use to illustrate the relationship between entropy and information. If close systems tend to move from order to randomness, more randomness equals more information. However, “if entropy and information are inversely related, the more information, the less entropy” and vice versa. The implications of this are still a bit ambiguous. If an observable pattern of information is required to successfully store onto a machine, then is randomness is not desirable?

The most notable and lucid example Hayles provides is her mention of Weiner’s distinction between Augustinian and Manichean opponents. If the Augustinian opponent plays honorably and that opponent is nature, the scientist observing nature will ultimately hold an advantage. This chapter was not an enjoyable read because not only were the ideas dense, the ideas posed were very esoteric and required a considerable amount of background reading.

Rorty, A Literary Postscript: Characters, Persons, Selves, Individuals
In this essay, Rorty examines the subtle differences between a character, figure, person, self, individual and presence. Given the essay’s title, Rorty’s main source of data is from literature, though she also uses examples from religion and philosophy. She hypothesizes that it is through these differences that we can discern the changes in conception of ourselves based on political and social constructs at the given time. This adaptive nature that we have constructed has, in some way, affected our biological base as well.

To understand Rorty’s argument, however, the reader must simplify the intricate details that distinguish character from figure from person and so on. A character is static in that its traits are defined and any response thereafter given a circumstance is because of its innate nature; therefore, choice is irrelevant. Characters’ physical and psychological traits have the closest relation. Figures, however, are characters serving the purpose of discovery and idealization. It is with the figure that inner and outer person is presented. It is when we include choice that a person is defined. After choice is attributed and other external factors, such as property, “define the right and power of agency of choice” persons become selves. The transformation between self and individual is similar in that it reiterates the notion of rational choice. Arriving at the final phase, an individual represents the fusion between nature and culture.

Rorty’s argument is laid out well in that it traces the history of the conception of character and brings back this notion of character to explain how it has been socially constructed. In her final example, Rorty uses Venusians and robots as concrete entities to be analyzed. If Venusians and robots exhibited the same functions as “we” (humans) do, are they persons? Also, if we do treat them similarly, are we Venusians and robots? I disagree that the traits specific to an individual are not so mutally transferable.

Rosecrance, The Rise of the Virtual State (Chpt. 1 A New Kind of Nation)
In this chapter, Rosecrance focuses on the process of the “shrinking nation—in function, if not in geographic size” (3). To do this, he emphasizes the increasing importance of financial markets and the mobility of capital over solely acquiring territory. Rosecrance asserts that when the acquisition of territory becomes too costly for an individual country, the country then reverts to trade-oriented strategies. Therefore, the idea of power has evolved from military might to economic might. Technology has enabled the trading state to become the “virtual state,” which encompasses increasing overseas production and global commodity chains. Though Rosecrance emphasizes the declining power of the nation-state and decreasing importance of territory, he stresses, “states require a certain minimum of territory to conduct political business” (4). His primary question is how this process is in effect and how politics and economics can reconcile and balance each other within the framework of the nation-state in a globalizing world.

In analyzing the political effects, Rosecrance mainly relies on historical facts, citing events such as the multiple genocides in Sudan, Bosnia, and Rwanda to highlight the nation-state’s reluctance and even inability to act. He also uses events such as the Industrial Revolution to highlight Fordism to transition into a more fragmented commodity chain. Rosecrance also makes use of the Gross Domestic Product indexes of particular countries to support his idea of increasing international trade over purely domestic production. He also uses ideas from notable economists such as Paul Krugman to illustrate “The New Trade” theory, which focuses on path dependence.

Rosecrance presents his ideas and lays out his data to support his hypothesis very well. He presented opposing points, such as the one from Paul Ehrlich and refuted it while supporting his hypothesis. His inclusion of further emphasis on education to cultivate our human capital was insightful and accurate. Rosecrance’s final point about the nation-state being similar to a broker state, negotiating “directly with international factors of production to solve domestic economic problems” clarified his claim that the nation was not in decline, but rather, its role in the international sphere and in a time of globalization is being further redefined (19).

Sassen, Global Networks: Linked Cities (Chpt. 12 Digital Amsterdam by Patrice Riemens and Geert Lovink)
This chapter focuses on the Digital City or DDS De Digital Stad, “an Amsterdam-based free community network” and its effect on the Amsterdam Public Digital Culture at the DDS’s onset in the “broader new media culture” in the 1990s up to the current developments and its recent privatization (327). Riemens and Lovink explore how the DDS, which started as an open social movement, enabling communication within a large audience, to become a “private enterprise as a result of management buyout” (340).

The DDS was originally created as a proxy for government officials to communicate with its citizens but has since been restructured, in part by independent hacker groups. The issue with the DDS, as Riemans and Lovink contend, is its large scope and the inability for anyone to have a complete overview of the system itself. Also, the rapid exchange and lack of permanence led to “people express[ing] opinions, then disappear[ing] without trace” (333). Adaptation to this virtual community was slow and ineffective; therefore, it lacked further necessary funding.

The authors mainly use user data from the system itself along with statistics about technology usage at the time and various accounts from publications on the subject. The interviews from the individuals involved in the private sector helped elucidate the imperative behind the self-governed system to “an executive model of governance” (339). The very last paragraphs were very effective in outlining the constant struggle between culture and markets.

Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo
This particular excerpt was uncommon in that it was more based on theory and was not as factual because it was an epilogue and epilogues usually serve to clarify and assess the author’s argument. Sassen reflects on the idea of global cities, namely New York, London, and Tokyo and how this idea has been influenced and affected by globalization.

Her hypothesis is global cities have become and important unit in the dynamic of territorialization (345). She separates her argument into six concerns regarding global cities: the construct and model, financial industries’ weight, producer services as an indicator of global city status, relations among cities, question of inequality, and whether it is in global cities that there will be the emergence of a new spatial order. Sassen mainly relies on previous scholarly journals and theory to conceive her idea of global cities. In addition to the epilogue, she has attached an appendix with further data on the specific countries, which was useful to reference when her points are vague and difficult to understand. However, while the additional data was useful, Sassen herself did not point to the information there directly in her analysis.
However, the bulk of this epilogue is Sassen defending her points against counter-arguments, such as the one proposed by Castell (349) and Scott et al. (352). The problem with these explanations is that she references other chapters without disclosing enough information for a clear understanding of her argument and the counter-argument. Because of this, a lot of her conclusions are inconclusive. Sassen realizes this, stating, “We need more studies to specify this” and “It is very difficult to establish for how much it accounts” (355, 362). Her final statement on contributing to the scholarship in the global cities study by “go[ing] out on a theoretical limb” is truthful and accurate of her efforts.

Ito, Introduction: Personal, Portable, Pedestrian, 2005
In this brief introduction, Ito primary topic is cellular technologies, specifically the “keitai” or cellular phone in the context of Japan. He examines the impacts of the keitai versus other technological systems, such as the Internet, on the social history of communication through cultural studies, sociological surveys and ethnography. Ito argues that the shift towards mobile technologies such as the keitai is in fact exogenous and not the product of a “‘universal’ technology (the mobile phone) encountering a ‘particular’ national culture (Japan)” (Ito 12).
He does this by illustrating the different ways that keitai has been incorporated and domesticated into a wide range of spheres and paradigms. The movement from a business tool model to a tool for personal communication is paramount to this understanding. Ito compares keitai usage to usage of the Internet and concludes that cellular communications bridged the offline life with the online life, creating “intimate spheres [that] are even more pervasively present” (Ito 11). This shift in the framework relied more on interaction, rather than interface, highlighting the experience provided by technologies, not just the service itself.

Ito’s argument is fluid because he provides quantitative and qualitative data. Specifically, he uses comparisons between the US and Japan in adopting new cellular technologies and the usage of said technology from different demographics in Japan. In addition to the quantities data, Ito provides “a range of approaches including diary-based study, … visits and interviews in domestic space and observations in public places” further elucidating on the shift from the intended business model to the personalized domestic model. Overall, his attempt to define Japanese keitai usage in different historical, social and cultural contexts is effective because he recognizes the mutual exchange and influence from within and outside of Japanese society.

Lipsitz, World Cities and World Beat: Low-wage Labor and Transnational Culture, 1999
Lipsitz topic is the exchange between world cities and music, specifically focusing on Miami and Los Angeles (Lipsitz 213). He examines the impact of immigrant capital and labor in “transforming Miami and Los Angeles into global cities” (Lipsitz 213).

Lipsitz primarily relies on statistic heavy data to illustrate how the geographical locations of Miami and Los Angeles helped construct their identity as attractive to immigrants, due to the heavy manufacturing based economies (Lipsitz 214, 226). Because of this heavy influx of immigrant capital and labor, the culture of both cities began to change “the meaning of all racial identities, … [and] cultural networks” (Lipsitz 216). One of these changes was music, the most easily exchanged cultural artifact. He argues that hip-hop in these communities were used as an economic tool. Lipsitz claims that the usually obscene language used in 2 Live Crew’s songs empowered women is highly questionable. However, his realization that hip-hop created another genre, not just an “immigrant subculture” is on point. Especially now, due to globalization, there have been many cultural imports that are not exclusive to their native country, but instead, have become a hybrid of both cultures—similar to the dancehall in Miami and the banda craze as “a fusion that leaves both musical styles transformed” (Lipsitz 224).

Lipsitz’s argument is structured and logically follows; therefore, it is effective. A large part of this is due to this centralization of two areas and specific trends that immigrants have brought with them to Miami and Los Angeles. He is right in that globalization is indeed a catalyst to changing racial and national identities and one of the most global things is music.

Thompson, Machines, Music, and the Quest for Fidelity: Marketing the Edison Phonograph in America, 1877-1925, 1995
Thompson’s article focuses the historical process in which the Edison phonograph became popular. His concentration on the marketing of the phonograph is on tone-tests as a way to illustrate “the real thing” and “reality itself. When the phonograph was introduced, it was regarded as a machine that could replicate live musical sessions through recordings. However, “modern artists strove not for realism but for ‘reality itself,’ and consumers of modern art sought not realistic reproductions but ‘the real thing’” (Thompson 133). The initial aim was fidelity—a way to reproduce the sounds that was faithful to the original composition.

The phonograph also failed when there was no standard to evaluate its performance, causing it to fail and reframed with a “business model” (Thompson 137). As its purpose changed, the phonograph was more accessible in private homes. Thompson illustrates the transition through data from the Tone Test campaigns, which was a demonstration to advertise for the Edison phonograph. If the audience, who was presumably aficionados of music, found the sounds to be realistic—the phonograph passed the test of replicating “the real thing.”

Thompson’s analysis in the marketing strategies was exhausted and detailed. His conclusion that “ by effacing the mechanism of the machine, by blurring the distinctions between public and domestic music, by personalizing the musical reproductions, and by cloaking them in all the traditional trappings of an elite musical culture, the tone test campaign enabled people to equate listening to records with listening to live music and thus to turn phonograph reproductions into ‘real music’” encapsulates his argument effectively and succinctly. The same way that the consumers personalized the music was the same way that the immigrants in Miami and Los Angeles personalized theirs and created an identity around it.

Endelman, “Just a Car”
In this essay, Endelman explicates the importance of the study of material culture. She contends that the information and history that can be found through objects of the past serve to complement and supplement the written history. Museums were the first institution to give purpose and significance to objects, albeit at the time, it was more to display anomalies than history itself. Now, the museum and the study of material culture have evolved to become a fundamental pillar of historical narrative. “Objects don’t lie and artifacts in museums could be approached on their own terms, unmediated, and without interpretation” (251).

She uses various types of data to support her argument, fittingly, two objects: the chair President Lincoln was sitting on when he was assassinated and the car that President Kennedy was riding in when he was assassinated. Both objects existed in the collective memory of the public and “acquired value, meaning, and an association with a historic event that was not recognized at the time” (248). However, because these two objects evoked dark and uncomfortable memories, they were hidden. These two uses of data were paramount to making her argument about objects – because she used two objects and embedded meaning to them in the context of history.

Endelman not only argued for the study of material culture as one mean, but as a study to enrich the current historical texts. Oftentimes, when paired with past accounts, an object can expand on, in the case of the Kennedy car, “conclusions about American society and its relationship with its presidency—from the open accessibility of a convertible to the armored fortress of a tank” (250). Due to Endelman’s framing the study of material objects as a supplement, rather than the only lens to view history, she is more persuasive. While written texts are compiled by an inescapably biased human being, “objects can tell the truth” (251).

Cooper, Memories of Colonization
Cooper’s primary topic is his reflections and analysis of a conference the National Archives of Senegal organized, the “Colloquium Commemorating the Centenary of French West Africa” in Dakar. He hypothesizes that the “categories and units of analysis that shape the colonial archives also shape other forms of historical preservation and memory” (257). In other words, the attempt to differentiate the colonial history of both France and Africa was futile because both of their histories are inextricably linked and are continually being affected by one another.

The data Cooper gathers is mostly from scholarly writers and historians at the event with him at the time. This gathering was supposed to be a “once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to showcase the international importance of National Archives” (260). However, this is where he has his contentions. Through various presentations, the overall tone of the conference was not one of recognizing the importance of both narratives, separately and as a whole, but rather, dissolution and “assimilation into ‘relationships’ with their inevitable ‘difficulties’” between the French colonialists and colonized Africa and ultimately rejecting the archival work (260).

Cooper believes, justifiably, that this idea of a “common” history disrespects the work of historians and sociologists. It was a paradoxical act of the colonizer redefining history to justify its “mission civiliastrice”, which was accepted by the colonized in order for the Senegalese to have their “independent struggle” (262). This tandem relationship between the two countries is baffling because it fails to challenge the “master narrative of state building, whether the centrality of the state was a consequence of colonial tutelage or nationalistic mobilization” (263).

The analysis that Cooper provides alongside transcripts of the presentation work nicely together in illustrating his discontents about the conference.

Burds, Ethnicity, Memory, and Violence
Burds main topic in this essay is the problem with “double memory,” a term used to describe the collective memory of an ethnic group and “identify the phenomenon of distinct and often contradictory accounts of divergent ethnic groups who share the same history” (466). The task of reconciling these two accounts, especially in extremely violent times, is Burds’ question.

He collects a lot of data from writers, physicians, governmental workers and soldiers. While these accounts are viable, Burds recognizes the shortfall of historian’s motives – “[they will be] impugned no matter how diligent the research, or how conscientious his or her efforts to be fair” (466). Ironically, this concession strengthens his argument.

One of the paramount concerns that Burds mentions in regards to double memory is the dynamic nature of ethnicity itself. “[They] adapt to changing circumstances” therefore, double memory is even more complex. “Just as memories are reshaped by ethnicity, and by intervening contexts, their correction or reinterpretation is profoundly inhibited and controlled by the selective construction, destruction, and reconstruction of archives” (469). If archives are ultimately shaped by the person writing it, then this fact compounded with the fact that ethnic collective memories are constantly shifting and adapting, makes the collection of those memories twice as difficult.

The data Burds uses is oftentimes unnecessary, especially the vivid accounts of the tortures. He could have made his point about the transition from tainted accounts of Soviet police abuse into “institutional memories of alleged documented evidence of rebel terror” without the uncomfortable first-hand accounts. However, again recognizing his shortcomings as an archivist being a “‘the person who knows how to destroy’,” Burds inclusion of the horrific scenes is understandable and can be accepted as an attempt to further illustrate his argument.

When the United Nations was created, it was seen as a forum for international relations—a place for nations to come together and strive towards a common goal, a “potential nucleus of a world state” . This aim, however, comes at the price of each nation forfeiting some of its sovereignty. But, by no means does this make the nation-state irrelevant in our globalizing world, as Kenichi Ohmae and Susan Strange have argued, albeit for different reasons. The United Nations, as an international organization and as a society of nation-states, pronounces the relevant, but changing role of the nation-state in a globalizing world.

In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia brought an end to the Thirty Years War. These collections of treaties defined the concept of a nation-state’s sovereignty based on the principles of territoriality and a strictly domestic authority. Following the Peace of Westphalia, individual states were given complete sovereign right to their land and people. It was this Westphalian system that has influenced many polities, such as Europe. However, after 1945, following World War II and signaling the creation of the UN, this idea of sovereignty began to shift as nation-states were willing to transfer some of their sovereign rights to a supranational institution. It is this erosion of interdependence and Westphalian sovereignty that began to overturn the realist models of international relations. However, the institutional form of the UN, built around the concept of a post WWII and bipolar world may be obsolete now that each day looks less like 1945. When political domain supersedes the nation-state, through the rapid use of technology and markets, there is a space created for International Organizations—such as the UN.

The UN may be the closest existing form of a truly international society. It aims at creating a more horizontal organization—the General Assembly being an example of this. In the GA, where all 192 countries are represented, each state is granted one vote, “favor[ing] coalitions of the small and powerless” . A simple majority is required of all member states in order for resolutions to pass. Using this organ of the UN as an example, the GA seeks to redefine the power of the state by allowing every state one vote, independent of GDP, internal politics, or etc. Ideally, this would allow a more wholesome agenda, with nations such as Vanuatu and Tuvalu able to impact the topics at hand. This is misleading, however, because GA resolutions are generally “recommendations” to member governments and the Security Council. Said resolutions are non-binding, “but up to a point the norms of the institution make opposition look more harshly self-interested and less defensible” . Even in the GA, where the playing field is most even amongst the member states, participation is still entirely dependent on the action of its member states “to enforce compliance with its resolutions and sanctions against misbehaving states” , only countered by the general stigma of a nation-state seeming self-absorbed.

It is only the SC that has the power to make binding decisions, given that the member states have agreed. The SC is comprised of 15 members, five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and 10 non-permanent rotating members (Currently this includes: Belgium, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Croatia, Indonesia, Italy, Libya, Panama, South Africa and Vietnam). The five permanent members hold veto on all substantive matters. This means that China, France, Russia, the UK and the US must agree upon all resolutions or statements issued by the SC. This can result in a lot of stalemates, further reinforcing the power of each of the five nation-states.

In refining their identity, the UN is sometimes misrepresented as simply a group of 192 member states, as opposed to a cohesive organization with similar goals. “… All sorts of collectives have learned to organize their claims around a nation-state identity, and the consolidation of the UN system has provided a central form for identity recognition” thus further allowing for the UN as an IO to gradually take on an identity of their own as a whole . An IO, the UN, is simply a venue within which nation-states interact. Once an IO is introduced and credited this power, there is a possibility that the centrality of the norm of sovereignty and the nation-state could be weakened. If an IO successfully develops an identity, it is predicated on the fact that it has developed specific interests and incentives—layers of authority, new venues for cooperation and conflict and new channels of influence. Each IO sets up its own rules, norms and procedures. However, this power to potentially weaken the norm of sovereignty, as illustrated with the example of the SC, the hard power, as defined by the power to demand and/or take action to regulate resolutions passed, rests in the votes of the Big Five or the five permanent members—the nation-states that have endlessly reasserted their own sovereignty.

The effectiveness of the UN has been questioned for this very reason. Aside from the concentration of the power in the Big Five, the UN is financed through voluntary contributions from its member states, with the US contributing 22.00% of the UN budget, Japan at 16.624%, Germany at 8.66%, the UK at 6.13% and France at 6.03% in 2006 . Through this voluntary donation system, the UN puts itself at risk to be highly influenced by these states, further reinforcing the still evident power of the nation-state. However, it must be noted that the exclusion of Russia and China from the top donors list (they do not even make the top 10) shows that the dynamics of the nation-state are changing. These Big Five countries were chosen at a volatile time in our world, following the war, when military power was the dominant power. Now, it is evident that the role of the nation-state is shifting relative to this 1945 timeframe and that economic might may take the reins.

This does not dismiss the clout of a powerful military though. The UN does not maintain its own military, instead forces are voluntarily provided by member states. While realism is becoming less relevant now, we cannot deny the fact that the nation-state is still the only power that can make war and tax, thus retaining some power as a sovereign nation. This begs the question—“is the UN paralyzed by its own diplomatic culture?” Diplomacy is the currency of the UN, but not of the world and of nation-states. When this gap is rectified, the UN will be infinitely more effective. The power of the nation-state is still the driving force at the helms of international relations. The UN and other IOs are not a substitute for the nation-state; IOs are not autonomous and therefore, there is a finite domain of authority that must be wrestled with. However, the nation-state is in good company, as more and more actors are becoming prominent players in the field, namely Non-Governmental Organizations. IOs and NGOs seek to redefine norms that have been set dating back to the Westphalian system.

While nation-states have not lost their significance despite these new players, that does not necessarily equate to a deadlock in progress. International organizations such as the UN are trying to alter the course of international relations and politics by providing a global forum for issues to be discussed. “The UN mandate from the beginning was much broader than the issues of security and peace … [becoming] the focal point for global governance in many domains” . After all, it was after gaining legitimacy on a global arena through the World Health Organization, a sub-committee of the UN, that female genital cutting was recast as a human rights issue, not exclusively a feminist issue.
When we weaken the analytical importance of borders, how does this affect our traditional way of understanding world politics? The conundrum lies in the role of the nation-state and the emerging IOs and NGOs. If IOs and NGOs perform the functions of the nation-state, does that mean one is replacing the other? If a large part of the success that IOs and NGOs have accrued is due to advances in the market allowing access to information technology, does that threaten the nation-state? If trade allows culture to be transmitted and translated throughout the world, does this threaten the nation-state? Does globalization undermine the nation-state? No, not necessarily. The idea of a nation-state still persists and is still desirable, e.g., Palestine. The United Nations is an essential facet to understanding globalization because it highlights the shifting power of the nation-state and allows for these dynamic interactions between the three pillars.

I have set the parameters for my analysis from the Vietnam War in 1965 to 1968, also the time of Labor Party Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Democratic President Lyndon B. Johnson’s term, and the Iraq War from 2003 to 2007, also the time of Labor Prime Minister Tony Blair and George W. Bush’ term. In both the Vietnam and Iraq Wars, a United States president pressed a Labor Party Prime Minister to commit forces to a war that was highly unpopular in the United Kingdom. Why then, did Wilson refuse President Johnson’s repeated pleas while Blair sent troops unquestionably? Undoubtedly, there are a bevy of circumstantial reasons to the divergent outcomes, but those reasons are heavily hinged on alliance dynamics, domestic politics, and the personality of the respective leaders.

The apparent proximity of the diplomatic ties between Britain and the US was essentially built upon history, tradition and mutual understanding. The relationship is also largely the result of circumstance: the Second World War and Cold War basically galvanized a common response to Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The Anglo-American relationship stemmed from the intimate cooperation against the Axis powers during the Second World War and rested upon a nexus of continued institutional ties in the fields of defense and intelligence, as well as frequent and prominent dealings between presidents and prime ministers. The relationship formed in a framework such that Britain was the junior ally to the senior United States. In both WWI and WWII, Britain was among the first involved, and both times, “at the point of exhaustion, she [was] saved by the United States … although undefeated, Britain’s power [was] diminished and her economy weakened” (Colman 2). Long before the Vietnam and Iraq Wars, the relationship between the US and UK was already set in place.

The Labor government of Harold Wilson coincided with the Democratic presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson during the years of 1965-68. Those years saw disagreement in ideologies at the highest levels of Anglo-American bonds, caused to a significant extent by differences over America’s war in Vietnam. In Britain, Labor Prime Minister Harold Wilson came to power in October 1964, an especially keen advocate of close Anglo-American ties. The US Ambassador to London, David Bruce, explained to President Johnson in 1965 that the Prime Minister was eager to establish a similar relationship between Harold Macmillan and President Kennedy. “Those two leaders had established a political friendship of great cordiality, frequent consultation and mutual respect” (Coleman 1). This would prove difficult as America’s involvement in Vietnam increase.

America, for the most part, fought in Vietnam alone because many of the world’s powers were recovering from the adverse effects of two lengthy conflicts. Leaders at the time had to question where their political obligations resided. Prime Minister Wilson had to assess whether his loyalty to his people could somehow be expressed in sending Britain’s finest to the jungles of Vietnam. Evidently he had trouble finding this expression. In 1965, as US forces escalated in Vietnam, Wilson was also determined to “resist what he terms the ‘fanatical pressures’” of Johnson (Costigliola 186). Opposition to the war within the Labor Party and among the British general public meant that the Wilson government could not satisfy the United States’ desire for support; certainly, London had to reject the frequent American requests for combat troops. During his April 1965 visit to Johnson, Wilson gave the President “an extensive run-down of the domestic obstacles to a British contribution and felt LBJ was left ‘in no doubt about the problems’” (Dyson 659). Wilson resisted repeated attempts from Johnson to commit troops—only offering moral, but not military help. In June 28, 1966, Wilson ‘dissociated’ his Government from Johnson’s bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. The British felt that a military solution would lead to a confrontation with either the Chinese or Soviets, and therefore favored a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

Wilson paid a price for his public support of the United States since most Europeans and members of the Commonwealth opposed the war. In the absence of direct British participation, the Johnson administration tended to regard Wilson’s various attempts to moderate the war largely as an irrelevance or even as a downright nuisance. “When he [Wilson] offered to fly to Washington for talks in 1965, fearing further escalation, Johnson told him to mind his own business. ‘I won’t tell you how to run Malaysia and you don’t tell us how to run Vietnam’” (Danchev 56). Tensions over Vietnam helped ensure that the Wilson-Johnson relationship was probably the worst between any British prime minister and US president.

Opposite to the Vietnam War, “sympathy was not enough [for the US]. The chiefs of staff swallowed their scruples and decided to send a brigade group of British troops to fight alongside the Americans—Nothing less would do” (Danchev 55). The situation in Iraq has numerous military and political contrasts to the situation in Vietnam. Whereas America fought a war in Vietnam in order to prevent an Asian domain from turning red, they also fought a costly and bloody war in which many European powers refused to back the American effort in Vietnam. Most leaders realize that involvement in such a costly movement is paid not only in currency but also in blood. Wilson recognized the risky political investment that could be made and the consequences that had the potential to blanket the rest of his political reign. In turn, he made a conscious political decision by refusing to align himself completely with Johnson. The current situation in Iraq has managed to polarize political relations across the world; many have accused an American regime of permanently destabilizing NATO.

One explanation is the theory of alliance dynamics. This theory implies that during the time of both events, the UK would submit to the demands of its senior ally in order to ensure the continuation of a beneficial alliance. The working relationships between past presidents and prime ministers are all indicative of a functioning and burgeoning Anglo-Saxon relationship. Generally, strong alliance dynamics would normally assume that the British would support America in most circumstances. However, this is confounded in the situation of the Vietnam War; Harold Wilson’s behavior proved to be contrary from what we could expect from a junior partner. His decision indicates that he ultimately “weighted the political constraints higher than alliance maintenance benefits in considering whether a British contribution was possible” (Dyson 660).

Moreover, his actions and decisions reveal a different driving force: domestic politics—the domestic pressures and constraints that can influence the governing ideologies of a leader. This political pattern is true for the Iraq case: Blair’s choice is more consistent with the theories that reflect the dynamics of an alliance. Blair reached his decision to support America by weighing the costs and benefits. In the process, he ignored a domestic backlash, but in the end he played a significant role in securing longevity in an American-British alliance.
In Britain and within the Labor Party, Wilson was in a much more precarious position than Blair, and hence had to give more attention to the left wing, anti-war part of the Labor Party than did Blair. Opposition to the war within the Labour Party and among the British general public meant that the Wilson government could not satisfy the United States’ desire for support. In the US, however, Johnson had just won a large electoral victory. He complained “‘about the troubles which [Wilson] had already given’ him … ‘our folks were damned tired…solv[ing] all the world’s problems…alone.’” (Costigliola 189)

When Tony Blair became prime minister of the United Kingdom in 1997, he took on a full plate. “At stake was how to sustain economic prosperity and increase social equality, … and how to balance ties to Europe and the special relationship with the United States” (Kramer 1). While Wilson won by a small majority, Blair enjoyed multiple terms. Blair was simply in a stronger domestic position than Wilson and so able to ignore domestic constraints more easily.

In the US, there was initially mounting support for the Iraq War from the Republican Party. However, as the two circumstances under which the war was fought: the absence of weapons of mass destruction and the absence of a UN resolution explicitly authorizing force were absent, the mounting support shifted towards caution and skeptism. “This is the Tonkin Gulf resolution all over again,” West Virginia Democratic senator Robert Byrd warned his colleagues. “Let us stop, look, and listen. Let us not give this President or any President unchecked power. Remember the Constitution.” Criticisms have been voiced concerning the Bush Administration’s course of action. An unlikely alliance of the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Conservative Union have come together and raised objections to restrictions placed on individual freedoms in the power given, in particular, by Congress to the executive branch.

An important facet of domestic politics is, of course, both countries’ economies. Cooperation between the two countries at the Bretton Woods conference of 1944 produced the framework for the operation of the Western international system, including a scheme of fixed exchange rates. In the years following the Bretton Woods conference, both Labor and Conservative governments were committed to retaining a strong pound and preserving the sterling area, despite having limited reserves. However, “Wilson’s stance against committing troops remained firm even in spite of the perilous British financial situation, and the consequent reliance upon the US for loans to stabilize the sterling” (Dyson 649). Conscious of Wilson’s decision, Johnson charged, “Wilson’s Labour budget ‘with its heavy emphasis on social security’ increased the burden of the bolstering the pound sterling and the speculative pressure on the dollar’” (Costigliola 189) as more leverage to commit troops in exchange for economic support. The economic climate in Britain was not comparable to the one that prevails in the UK right now. Britain was in recalibration mode during the 70s—it needed to revitalize its economy in order to rebound from the loss of precious colonial possessions that had propped up its economic superiority dating back to the 17th century. In the US, the failure to increase taxes produced inflation, which produced, a squeeze for money for the Great Society instead of an expanding market, as Johnson had promised. Diversion from the Great Society was not only a question of economic resources though; the war was draining in all aspects.
In turn, Blair was able to support bush’s movement because he was more financially prepared to deal with a loss. Now, the British economy not only reaps the high reward of a valued British pound, but its economy is grounded into the European Union. It is not likely to experience a sudden recession or depression as its economic policies are interlocked in a European framework that has reaped many benefits for EU members alike.

In the US, “expert opinion varies wildly on the relevance of U.S. war spending in Iraq and Afghanistan to the health of the U.S. economy” (Teslik 1). Soaring oil prices in 2005-2007 threatened inflation and unemployment, yet the economy continued to grow through year-end 2007 (CIA Factbook). Aside from focusing on the direct expenditure, Teslik writes, “international debt accrued to sustain war costs, volatility on the global oil markets in part attributed to violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the geopolitical uncertainty engendered by a war that remains widely unpopular outside the United Sates” and within the United States have a consequence of their own (1).

Finally, the theories of alliance dynamics and domestic politics only do not account for the divergent outcomes in the two cases. It has often been suggested that foreign policy crises and wars involve conditions that favor the influence of personality, and that individuals’ distinctive policy preferences, decision-making styles, and relationships to advisors are crucial elements in accounting for outcomes (Dyson 290). Some individuals are more responsive to the wishes of their constituents while others make foreign policy based on strategic alliance regardless of the political atmosphere.

Margaret G. Hermann devised a framework to analyze personality traits of leaders throughout the world based interviews and verbatim minutes from meetings called Leadership Trait Analysis. The seven traits have been found to be particularly useful in assessing leadership style: (1) the belief that one can influence or control what happens, (2) the need for power and influence, (3) conceptual complexity (the ability to differentiate things and people in one’s environment), (4) self-confidence, (5) the tendency to focus on problem solving and accomplishing something versus maintenance of the group and dealing with others’ ideas and sensitivities, (6) an individual’s general distrust or suspiciousness of others, and (7) the intensity with which a person holds an in-group bias (Margaret). Words taken from those transcripts were put into an extensive library to correspond with each of the seven traits, and given a high or low score for the corresponding trait. The leader’s verbal output was then scanned and compared against this database. The result is a “score on each trait being the ratio of words tagged as ‘low’ or ‘high,’ for a final score between 0 and 1” (Dyson 291).

In the past, this process was long and arduous, but with new technology, this can be done through a computerized method, allowing for more volumes of text and also eliminating scorer bias. Of course there is “doubt on the utility of analyzing interviews to obtain measures of foreign policy makers’ personality attributes. Further attention must be devoted to the multiple problems of source bias, situational circumstances, and temporal inconsistency” (Rasler, Thompson 47). However, Stephen Dyson has refined this by using the Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates series: a verbatim record of every word spoken in the British House of Commons as a basis for Tony Blair’s personality score. This not only eliminates the possibility of possible interviewer-interviewee conditions and pre-written answers and speeches, but “they are from a single source, [also] eliminating the possibility of differential audience and venue effects” (Dyson 291).

Unfortunately, there has not been an analysis done on Johnson’s personality. However, using past writings, I can compare Johnson using the same seven traits. The relationship between Wilson and Johnson was an especially interesting one. Johnson was renowned for his dominating personality and the arm-twisting of powerful politicians, fittingly known as the “Johnson Treatment.” In response to his critics, Johnson fired, “I am a dominating personality, and when I get things done I don’t always please all the people.” He also blamed the press, saying they showed “complete irresponsibility and lie and misstate facts and have no one to be answerable to” (Dallek). Personality attributes that were useful in his successive and multiple senate terms were “not suited to achievement within a particular institutional framework”—that being the presidency. According to this knowledge and general information, one can infer that Johnson rated high in (1) belief in ability to control events, (2) need for power, and (“Even his possession of the most powerful office in the country did not diminish his need to extend control or increase his capacity to deal with certain kinds of conflict or resistance. All this newly acquired ability to command did not reduce his drive to coerce” (Kearns 408). Johnson’s ability to focus on national attention upon his every word was a source of power that eventually turned on him. “The cabinet was his cabinet, the Great Society his program, the Congress his instrument” (Kearns 409). This classification, however, made every mistake and miscalculation in Vietnam his mistake.

Wilson, an economics master at twenty-one, a junior minister at twenty-nine, President of the Board of Trade at thirty-one, Wilson is at 48 above all, a pro… a first-rate administrator and a brilliant debater. Wilson’s administration operated through more open procedures. Wilson scores significantly lower than Blair on both beliefs in ability to control events and need for power. Wilson is close to the mean on belief in ability to control events, and substantially below the mean on need for power. David Bruce, US Ambassador to London 1961-69 noted, “Seldom if ever have two heads of state been such long-time master politicians in the domestic sense as those two” (Colman 1).

To maintain consistency in my analysis, I will use the same traits Dyson adapted from Hermann to compare Bush. However, there have not been any official papers using the same methods to analyze Bush partly due to records and minutes that have yet to be released to provide a comprehensive personality reading. Since Bush is president in our current time, I am able to offer my personal opinion, with the same seven traits, based on public statements available. The Bush administration is known for its secrecy and caution in dealing with the press and public. It was quickly clear that policymaking in the White House was limited to a handful of selected advisors, all of whom were noted for their loyalty to Bush. Two of the key traits from Hermann’s analysis that seems to be present with Bush are his general distrust in others and his in-group bias, illustrated in his reliance on his core of advisors. Another trait where Bush and Blair may share similarity in rating is conceptual complexity. Bush was quoted saying, after September 11th, “This will be a monumental struggle between good and evil” and “They will hand over the terrorists or they will share in their fate”—the same Manichaean approach as Blair (Crotty 458). As Bush told it, as soon as he heard about the attack on the World Trade Towers, “I made up my mind at that moment we were going to war” (Crotty 457).
Using Dyson’s work, Blair scored more than one standard deviation above or below the average on three particular qualities: Belief in ability to control events, conceptual complexity, and need for power. His high belief in ability to control events hypothesizes a more proactive policy orientation and that barriers can be overcome. Those who score low on conceptual complexity are more apt to “operate with a more black and white view of events and actors, [and] are comfortable with relatively straightforward binary classification schemes” (Dyson 295). British Prime Minister Tony Blair attended the speech as a show of solidarity with the United States, and subsequently issued his own ultimatum to the Taliban: “Surrender bin Laden or surrender power,” Blair warned. Closed advisory system, insulated him from the opposition of most of the foreign policy bureaucracy to the war. Lastly, his high score in need for power reveals a need for greater personal control and “an increased concern that the policy output reflect [his] preference, rather than a consensual group decision” (Dyson 295). These traits paired with the situation resulting from September 11th led Blair to cling to Bush and adopt his views undoubted.

War critic Howard Zinn said, “Terrorism has replaced Communism as the rationale for the militarization of the country, for military adventures abroad, and for the suppression of civil liberties at home” (Crotty 460). How could two situations have such glaring similarities, but also glaring differences simultaneously and produce such divergent outcomes? Simply focusing on simple models of alliance dynamics and domestic politics fails to address the complexities of both issues at hand. Public opinion and political opposition are not sole determinants, but are circumstantial to a leader’s personality and response. It is this inclusion of personality analysis that adds another layer to the multifaceted decision-making of our leaders. Using all three paradigms, we can finally draw upon a more comprehensive answer to the different outcomes in both wars by our four leaders. Only the future will reveal the impact behind Blair’s decision.

Works Cited

Colman, Jonathan. A ’Special Relationship’?: Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo-American relations ’at the Summit’, 1964-8. Manchester University Press, 2004.

Coleman, Jonathan, Prifysgol Cymru, and Aberystwyth. “Harold Wilson, Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnam War, 1964-68.” 2005. http://www.americansc.org.uk/online/Wilsonjohnson.htm (accessed May 15, 2008).

Costigliola, Frank. “From Lyndon B. Johnson, Germany, and ‘the End of the Cold War’” In Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy 1963-1968, Edited by Warren I. Cohen and Nancy B. Tucker, 173-210. New York: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1994.

Crotter, William. “Presidential Policymaking in Crisis Situations: 9/11 and Its Aftermath” The Policy Studies Journal 31, no. 3 (2003): 451-
Danchev, Alex. “’I’m With You’: Tony Blair and the Obligations of Alliance: Anglo-American Relations in Historical Perspective” In Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam Or, How Not to Learn from the Past, Edited by Lloyd C. Gardner and Marilyn B. Young, 45-58. New York: The New Press, 2007.

Dallek, Robert. Flawed Giant, pp. 391–396.

Dyson, Stephen B. “Alliances, Domestic Politics, and Leader Psychology: Why Did Britain Stay Out of Vietnam and Go into Iraq?.” Political Psychology 28, no. 6 (2007): 647-663.

Dyson, Stephen B. “Personality and Foreign Policy: Tony Blair’s Iraq Decisions.” Foreign Policy Analysis (2006): 289-306.

Ellis, Sylvia. Britain, America, and the Vietnam War. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004.

Hermann, Margaret G. “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders.” International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 1 (1980): 7-46.

Hermann, Margaret G. “Assessing Leadership Style: Trait Analysis.” The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders, Edited by J. M. Post. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003.

Kearns, Doris. “Lyndon Johnson’s Political Personality.” Political Science Quarterly 91, no. 3 (1976): 385-409.

Kramer, Steven P. “Blair’s Britain After Iraq.” Foreign Affairs, Aug. 2003, http://fullaccess.foreignaffairs.org/20030701faessay15407/steven-philip-kramer/blair-s-britain-after-iraq.html?mode=print (accessed May 2, 208).

Rasler, Karen A, William R. Thompson, and Kathleen M. Chester. “Foreign Policy Makers, Personality Attributes, and Interviews: A Note on Reliability Problems.” International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 1 (1980): 47-66.

Teslik, Lee H. “Iraq, Afghanistan, and the U.S. Economy.” Washington Post, 4 Feb. 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/