Paper: Insecure States in an Anarchic World Order
This paper was submitted for “Political Science 20: World Politics” with Professor Richard Anderson in Spring 2009. The PDF will be available shortly.
Realism rests on the assumption that the international system is anarchic, where the key actors are sovereign nation-states who must guarantee their own security in a constant struggle for power. Given that there is no legitimate and universal international system that can guarantee the safety of any one nation, states, as rational actors, must do what they can to ensure their survival in this security dilemma. (Nau, 2009, pg. 30-31) While there are many causes of war, the most dominant is the conscious, rational choice by these insecure states in attempting to attain security and power. This is, by no means, a universal barometer for the cause of war. As I delve deeper into each level, each action becomes more nuanced and other causes also affect the decisions. However, within different levels of analysis, the quest for power is still the dominant and overarching goal of the state and state actors leading up to World War I, World War II and the Cold War.
The anarchic international system ensures that any state’s action will be within the norms of the system itself. The system is anarchic because there is no supra-international institution that governs or can effectively and legitimately retaliate or punish a state for wrong-doing. In the case of World War I, the liberal process failed because there was no body to punish states that do not disarm, namely Germany. Such is the case of the attempted liberal appeasement of Germany through the “Versailles Complex.” The Versailles Complex aggravated the already sensitive relations between the nations by decreasing Germany’s geopolitical leverage and its military power. Realists would cite this as a turning point, among others, for the war. If resources equal power, then a drastic cut of Germany’s resources in the form of land made it increasingly insecure. (Anderson, 2009, Lecture 5) This would prove to be problematic within the power vacuum that was caused by many new, weaker colonies in eastern Europe and a weak China. (Nau, 2009, pg. 156) In this particular case, it was necessary that a major power, specifically the United States or the Soviet Union would get involve to maintain balance. The lack of a legitimate international institutional contributed to the failure to restrain and monitor Germany – and again, leaving states vulnerable and insecure.
Another institution, the League of Nations was also problematic for a variety of reasons, namely its lack of pervasiveness in the international community. (Anderson, 2009, Lecture 5) Even within the League of Nations, if it were successful, each state was still primarily concerned with its own self-interest, seeking power and security for itself, perpetuated through the requirement for unanimity. Liberal institutions that rely on diplomacy are merely an afterthought and not the main variable in explaining structural power shifts. Instead, the anarchic systemic structure of international politics dictates the need for diplomacy. (Nau, 200, pg. 120) Because of its lack of universality, the League eventually became irrelevant and the states were again left in an anarchic international system.
Likewise, in current times, the United Nations suffers from a lack of military power to assert its legitimacy and is therefore, a defunct international institute. A committee to note in particular is the Security Council. The Security Council, under Article 27 of the United Nations Charter, grants each of the five permanent members (China, France, UK, US, Russia) veto-power. This is another avenue in which the top powers can invalidate the votes of the General Assembly to further their own interest. In this way, the United Nations fails to act as a separate, legitimate institution. Instead, it is still driven by the self-motivation of its five permanent Security Council members. This underlines two assumptions of the realist perspective: the international system is anarchic and that states are rational actors motivated by their own self-interest.
Polarity and the balance of power are also essential because war typically occurs during the process of shifting hegemons and the imbalance of power. (Anderson, 2009, Lecture 4) In a bipolar world, such as the period of the Cold War, the two hegemons are able to keep each other in check and ensure quasi-stability. However, when the balance of power is in a tripolar world, the distribution of power is comparatively more unstable. In the case of the period that preceded WWII, there was a tripolar distribution of power. This prompted the US, Germany and the Soviet Union to constantly engage each other to prevent a possible alliance between the other two states. (Nau, 2009, pg. 154) The balance of power is not the process, however, it is the end result. If a state challenges a declining power, the result will either be a balance of power or war, which may eventually result in a balance of power. Most times, this balance of power suffices to stabilize the international system. (Nau, 2009, pg. 152-153) Despite these continual balance of powers, the states are still left in an anarchic world system.
States are also constrained to make decisions with inaccurate perceptions and the security dilemma. During times of imperfect information, the rational actor state will choose the best decision that is in its self-interest to survive or gain power. If the security dilemma explains how wars are possible and why states must exist in either armed standoff or war, then imperfect information and signaling explains why armed standoff fails and peace is unattainable. (Anderson, 2009, Lecture 2 and 4) Again, in the security dilemma, the risk of being disarmed and attacked is far more risky than having limited information. Ultimately, the combination of these factors in the systemic level will only intensify any existing conflicts and may create more conflict and insecurity.
In the domestic arena, competing interests within the state make the state unstable, thereby overextending itself on the international stage, increasing insecurities as well. Changes in domestic policy and within individual states cause shifts in power that exacerbate these insecurities. For example, realist explanations of WWI attribute German aggression to its cartelized domestic politics. At the time, there were three different factions forming within Germany: the agricultural landowners, the military elites, and the industrial leaders. Each group was interested in various expansionist policies that would embroil Germany with all of Europe’s major powers, and ultimately provoke the other powers. Grain tariffs agitated Russia, increased industry and naval plans antagonized Great Britain and their military plans drove a wedge between relations relations with France and Russia. (Nau, 2009, 120-121)
It is this combination of the international circumstances at the time and the rivaling interest groups in Germany seeking more power that can be marked as a pivotal point during the early stages of the war. As the levels of analyses continue to get more narrow, I cannot solely use the realist perspective. These insufficiencies in the domestic level of analysis cannot be only focused on realist expansionist policy and zest for power. It must also include the liberal perspective in other words, the weak domestic institutions. (Nau, 2009, pg. 126-127) The domestic politics of Germany demonstrate a way in which the domestic level can influence the systemic level in provoking war, whether intentionally or not.
Also, the process of power conversion solidifies the states’ desire for power. If resources translates to power, then any pursuit of geographic or economic gain can be assumed as a quest for power. For example, Hitler’s decision to eventually cut consumption to finance the war efforts illustrates that economic policies also feed into the struggle for power. (Nau, 2009, pg. 154) In addition to “hard power” or military power that is visible, power in terms of political competence and stability play a role in balance of power politics. For example, while Russia had significant natural resources, it also had an inefficient bureaucracy. Meanwhile, Germany was more efficient than Russia in producing military equipment. The ability to effectively translate wealth and resources into military power played a role in situating each state the systemic structural balance of power. (Nau, 2009, pg. 115) The importance placed on military power demonstrates that even domestic policy is made within the framework of the anarchic world order. The interest that dictates domestic policy is still power.
In analyzing the individual level of analysis, the highly variable actors and their nuanced decisions make it difficult to generalize. The vendetta of an individual in power whose seeking more power, such as Hitler, is enough to divert the course of the entire country’s history. The personality of the leader during pivotal times of crisis can largely affect the outcome, resulting in war. In all three cases of WWI, WWII and the Cold War, an individual can be attributed to mistakes leading up to the respective wars. WWI saw weak leaders (Such as: Emperor Franz Joseph, Tar Nicholas II, and Kaiser Wilhelm II) who were unable to make rational decisions while considering all options. (Nau, 2009, pg. 121) As one of the leading voices directing the domestic politics, as I mentioned earlier, leaders hold a great responsibility to act, quick and rationally, to crises.
Wars are reactions to events; WWI being the leading example. Leading up to WWII, the actions of leaders also decidedly altered the course of the war. Referencing back to the lack of accurate information, Stalin overestimated French and British power in 1939 and thereby not challenging them. Meanwhile, Hitler, in the interest of gaining power, exploited foreign policy mistakes of others, especially that of Britain’s to align with Stalin. (Nau, 2009, pg. 155). In the US, President Franklin Roosevelt amended the Neutrality Acts, a series of laws passed earlier in the decade, to be amended to lift an embargo against sending aid to European countries that face Nazi aggression. It was a decision that essentially took the US out of the neutral category and was the first step towards the US alliance with Britain and France. (Nau, 2009, pg. 156) Moreover, in the context of the Cold War, Nikita Khrushchev’s, the Soviet premier, decision to place missiles in Cuba prompted then President John F. Kennedy to order a naval quarantine. In the end, the Soviet Union, under Khrushchev, backed down. This harkens back to the idea of incomplete information, or in this case, credible signals. Khrushchev withdrew the missiles because the threat of escalation was credible. (Nau, 2009, pg. 178-180) While the Cuban Missile Crisis did not escalate to nuclear warfare, it is evident that sending signals such as deploying missiles to a significant area like Cuba, can be a cause for war. Leaders will interpret signals as they will, based on history and their own personality. In this case, President Kennedy handled the crisis in such a way by waiting for credible information and as a rational actor to deter nuclear war. His personality also allowed for extensive dialogue within his cabinet for further action. That said, individuals in position of power can drastically affect the path towards or away from war.
In conclusion, the realist perspective is most evident in the systemic level in illustrating the cause for war. The anarchic international system leaves states constantly vulnerable and threatened. One of the main reasons why the realist perspective is more salient in explaining why wars happen is demonstrated with the failed international institution of the League of Nations coupled with the existing, but defunct, international institution of the United Nations. In both instances, war has resulted, which has led me to believe that diplomacy is indeed a factor in prevention, but it comes secondary to the state’s desire for power or its fear and vulnerability. Diplomacy does not change the structure; instead, the structure dictates whether diplomacy will be necessary. In a realist perspective, war is not a last resort, but rather, it is the default in which countries avoid by creating stable balances of power within the international system.
Works Cited
Nau, Henry R. (2009) Perspectives on International Relations, 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press Inc.
Categorized as Portfolio, Writing, Academic Papers