Paper: The Conflict in Zaire

This paper was submitted for “Political Science 20: World Politics” with Professor Richard Anderson in Spring 2009.

In the international system, there are various lenses or perspectives to view war and conflict and the intentions or rationale behind it. There are three dominant perspectives that exist: the realist, liberal and identity perspectives. I will focus on the realist and liberal perspectives only. In War and Peace in Zaire/Congo: Analyzing and Evaluating Intervention 1996-1997 , the analysis of United States and French intervention or lack thereof is explained through a mix of the realist and liberal perspectives, noting both the power struggle in Central Africa and the economic interests and failed negotiations.

The core of the realist perspective rests upon the continuous struggle between strong actors and weak actors and the balance of power. This behavior is characterized by the lack of an overarching, authoritative power in the world – this ideally would be the United Nations, but the UN is constrained by its charter and is not recognized by all actors as legitimate. Because there is no leader or center of authority that monopolizes power, this decentralization distribution of power leaves the international system in a state of anarchy, where all states are vulnerable and are required to self-help and defend themselves through the acquisition of military arms, a visible attempt at the balance of power. However, in the pursuit of self-defense, states face the possibility of threatening other states because its intentions are either unknown or untrustworthy, causing other states to arm as well – resulting in a security dilemma. Arms may be amassed to protect the state itself or to use that power to protect its territory. Power does not only exist in military capacity but also material capabilities such as “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, and [also] military strength” (Nau 30). Resource endowments and geography, or geopolitics, are of particular importance when examining an area such as Africa that is so rich in resources (Nau 5-6, 28-31).
On the other hand, the liberal perspective, on the other hand, does not place central significance on power, but rather relationships, economic and political, and negotiations among actors. It emphasizes the role of institutions in solving international conflicts. Given these perspectives, I will analyze the conflict in Zaire through a default realist perspective and interject liberal perspectives on all levels of analysis, systemic, domestic and individual. These different levels of analysis focus on the nature of the interaction between states or the international system, the “nature of the state” and the “nature of man,” respectively (Lecture 2).

On a systemic level, there was already an imbalance of power dating back to colonial rule and indigenous divisions, as well as a volatile power transition. One of the main tenets of the realism is that war is caused by instability. This instability is rooted in the arbitrary boundaries created by European states with “little regard for ethnic of cultural homogeneity” (Nau 417). Those from the same group may find themselves in the same territorial zone, while conflicting groups may find themselves forced to exist in the same colony (Lecture 3). In Zaire alone, there exist 75 distinct languages (Nau 417). These borders are colonial remnants that have left the small countries landlocked and incapable of developing independently.

Despite the increasing tensions, through a realist perspective, after the collapse of the biopolar world, the US did not have good reason to intervene, and when it did in the later stages of the AFDL campaign, it was reactionary and served its own self-interest in promoting anti-Sudanese sentiments throughout the region (Huliaras 285). A 1995 document from the Department of Defense noted that there was “very little traditional strategic interest in Africa” (Huliaras 299). This non-intervention can be presumably attributed to the cost of involvement in African conflicts was increasingly outweighing the benefits, harkening back to failed efforts in Somalia. Non-intervention and Rwanda’s invasion by Kabila’s rebellion were considered as serving important US interests. On the international level, Washington considered intervention futile when the UN in 14 December 1996 suspended the plan to deploy force in the area (Huliaras 289). France, however, saw the US’s faint interest in Zaire as a threat to its arc of influence from Ethiopia and Eritrea via Uganda, Rwanda and Zaire to Congo and Cameroon, and termed it the “Anglo-Saxon Conspiracy”; Francophone was not to be defeated by the Anglo-Saxons (Huliaras 293). Following the Cold War, France foreign policy was insecure as Germany was reunifying and becoming a more economically powerful neighbor. Post Cold War, France was no longer an important neutral regional ally against communism, thus upgrading economics over the balance of power and security in the US foreign policy agenda. The crisis in Zaire, therefore, threatened France’s position in the world, causing it to overreact to the developments (Huliaras 294).

On a domestic level, ethnic divisions exacerbated the actor states and civil wars broke out, which meant unpredictable power transitions. Tutsi militias and the Congolese aligned with the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL) led by Laurent-Desire Kabila against President Mobutu Sese Seko and the Hutus, allied with Zairian armed forces (FAZ). The US wanted a smooth transition because a smooth transition was particularly important for the stability of the region (Nau 286). However, stability in the region meant non-intervention for the US because Rwanda’s invasion of Zaire strengthened the anti-Sudanese alliance; the US, understandably via a liberal perspective, employed unilateral economic sanctions in Sudan. Furthermore, its non-involvement in Zaire was critical in preventing the civil war from spreading north to Uganda, given the survival of Kagame’s regime of Rwanda (Huliaras 290-291).

It is clear then, that on the individual level, Kabila and Mobutu were the integral driving forces between in the conflict. After independence in the 1950s and 1960s, the norm in these African states was not democracy, but one-party rule under strong leaders who manipulated ethnic loyalties, similar to how the colonial powers had and maintained stability through brute force (Nau 420). Through a liberal perspective, the failed negotiations on March 21, 1996 with Mobutu and Kabila only aggravated the war. Mobutu said he would only relinquish power to a transitional body that would hold national elections, and presumably vote for him again, and Kabila insisted that Mobutu cede power directly to him and vowed to keep fighting with the AFDL. In regards to the liberal perspective, the intervention in Zaire by the US under the Clinton administration had less to do with eliminating the Mobutu regime than it had to do with economic interests. In particular, control of Congo was especially attractive because of its vast mineral riches profiting North-American-based and influential companies such as America Mineral Fields Inc. or AMF, based in Clinton’s hometown of Hope, Arkansas (Huliaras 288).

In conclusion, the actions of the US and France via the realist and liberal perspective on all levels of analysis display their reasons for both non-intervention and the development of insecurities within the world system.