Paper: International Organizations and the Sovereignty of the Nation-State

This paper was submitted for “Global Studies 1: Introduction to Global Studies” with Professor Russell Burgos and Aron Ballard in Fall 2008.

When the United Nations was created, it was seen as a forum for international relations—a place for nations to come together and strive towards a common goal, a “potential nucleus of a world state” . This aim, however, comes at the price of each nation forfeiting some of its sovereignty. But, by no means does this make the nation-state irrelevant in our globalizing world, as Kenichi Ohmae and Susan Strange have argued, albeit for different reasons. The United Nations, as an international organization and as a society of nation-states, pronounces the relevant, but changing role of the nation-state in a globalizing world.

In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia brought an end to the Thirty Years War. These collections of treaties defined the concept of a nation-state’s sovereignty based on the principles of territoriality and a strictly domestic authority. Following the Peace of Westphalia, individual states were given complete sovereign right to their land and people. It was this Westphalian system that has influenced many polities, such as Europe. However, after 1945, following World War II and signaling the creation of the UN, this idea of sovereignty began to shift as nation-states were willing to transfer some of their sovereign rights to a supranational institution. It is this erosion of interdependence and Westphalian sovereignty that began to overturn the realist models of international relations. However, the institutional form of the UN, built around the concept of a post WWII and bipolar world may be obsolete now that each day looks less like 1945. When political domain supersedes the nation-state, through the rapid use of technology and markets, there is a space created for International Organizations—such as the UN.

The UN may be the closest existing form of a truly international society. It aims at creating a more horizontal organization—the General Assembly being an example of this. In the GA, where all 192 countries are represented, each state is granted one vote, “favor[ing] coalitions of the small and powerless” . A simple majority is required of all member states in order for resolutions to pass. Using this organ of the UN as an example, the GA seeks to redefine the power of the state by allowing every state one vote, independent of GDP, internal politics, or etc. Ideally, this would allow a more wholesome agenda, with nations such as Vanuatu and Tuvalu able to impact the topics at hand. This is misleading, however, because GA resolutions are generally “recommendations” to member governments and the Security Council. Said resolutions are non-binding, “but up to a point the norms of the institution make opposition look more harshly self-interested and less defensible” . Even in the GA, where the playing field is most even amongst the member states, participation is still entirely dependent on the action of its member states “to enforce compliance with its resolutions and sanctions against misbehaving states” , only countered by the general stigma of a nation-state seeming self-absorbed.

It is only the SC that has the power to make binding decisions, given that the member states have agreed. The SC is comprised of 15 members, five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and 10 non-permanent rotating members (Currently this includes: Belgium, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Croatia, Indonesia, Italy, Libya, Panama, South Africa and Vietnam). The five permanent members hold veto on all substantive matters. This means that China, France, Russia, the UK and the US must agree upon all resolutions or statements issued by the SC. This can result in a lot of stalemates, further reinforcing the power of each of the five nation-states.

In refining their identity, the UN is sometimes misrepresented as simply a group of 192 member states, as opposed to a cohesive organization with similar goals. “… All sorts of collectives have learned to organize their claims around a nation-state identity, and the consolidation of the UN system has provided a central form for identity recognition” thus further allowing for the UN as an IO to gradually take on an identity of their own as a whole . An IO, the UN, is simply a venue within which nation-states interact. Once an IO is introduced and credited this power, there is a possibility that the centrality of the norm of sovereignty and the nation-state could be weakened. If an IO successfully develops an identity, it is predicated on the fact that it has developed specific interests and incentives—layers of authority, new venues for cooperation and conflict and new channels of influence. Each IO sets up its own rules, norms and procedures. However, this power to potentially weaken the norm of sovereignty, as illustrated with the example of the SC, the hard power, as defined by the power to demand and/or take action to regulate resolutions passed, rests in the votes of the Big Five or the five permanent members—the nation-states that have endlessly reasserted their own sovereignty.

The effectiveness of the UN has been questioned for this very reason. Aside from the concentration of the power in the Big Five, the UN is financed through voluntary contributions from its member states, with the US contributing 22.00% of the UN budget, Japan at 16.624%, Germany at 8.66%, the UK at 6.13% and France at 6.03% in 2006 . Through this voluntary donation system, the UN puts itself at risk to be highly influenced by these states, further reinforcing the still evident power of the nation-state. However, it must be noted that the exclusion of Russia and China from the top donors list (they do not even make the top 10) shows that the dynamics of the nation-state are changing. These Big Five countries were chosen at a volatile time in our world, following the war, when military power was the dominant power. Now, it is evident that the role of the nation-state is shifting relative to this 1945 timeframe and that economic might may take the reins.

This does not dismiss the clout of a powerful military though. The UN does not maintain its own military, instead forces are voluntarily provided by member states. While realism is becoming less relevant now, we cannot deny the fact that the nation-state is still the only power that can make war and tax, thus retaining some power as a sovereign nation. This begs the question—“is the UN paralyzed by its own diplomatic culture?” Diplomacy is the currency of the UN, but not of the world and of nation-states. When this gap is rectified, the UN will be infinitely more effective. The power of the nation-state is still the driving force at the helms of international relations. The UN and other IOs are not a substitute for the nation-state; IOs are not autonomous and therefore, there is a finite domain of authority that must be wrestled with. However, the nation-state is in good company, as more and more actors are becoming prominent players in the field, namely Non-Governmental Organizations. IOs and NGOs seek to redefine norms that have been set dating back to the Westphalian system.

While nation-states have not lost their significance despite these new players, that does not necessarily equate to a deadlock in progress. International organizations such as the UN are trying to alter the course of international relations and politics by providing a global forum for issues to be discussed. “The UN mandate from the beginning was much broader than the issues of security and peace … [becoming] the focal point for global governance in many domains” . After all, it was after gaining legitimacy on a global arena through the World Health Organization, a sub-committee of the UN, that female genital cutting was recast as a human rights issue, not exclusively a feminist issue.
When we weaken the analytical importance of borders, how does this affect our traditional way of understanding world politics? The conundrum lies in the role of the nation-state and the emerging IOs and NGOs. If IOs and NGOs perform the functions of the nation-state, does that mean one is replacing the other? If a large part of the success that IOs and NGOs have accrued is due to advances in the market allowing access to information technology, does that threaten the nation-state? If trade allows culture to be transmitted and translated throughout the world, does this threaten the nation-state? Does globalization undermine the nation-state? No, not necessarily. The idea of a nation-state still persists and is still desirable, e.g., Palestine. The United Nations is an essential facet to understanding globalization because it highlights the shifting power of the nation-state and allows for these dynamic interactions between the three pillars.